

# THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW

EDITED BY THE DOMINICAN FATHERS

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME XII

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

JANUARY, 1949

ARTICLES:		PAGE
States of Life . . . . .	JOHN FEARON, O. P.	1
Contemporary Theories of Man . . . . .	JAMES COLLINS	17
The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom	THOMAS U. MULLANEY, O. P.	48
BOOK REVIEWS:		
Merrimon Cuninggim. <i>The College Seeks Religion.</i>		
Vergilius Ferm. <i>Religion in the Twentieth Century.</i>	THOMAS C. DONLAN, O. P.	95
Thomas Merton. <i>Figures for an Apocalypse.</i>	SISTER M. MADELEVA, C. S. C.	101
Rudolph Carnap, <i>Meaning and Necessity.</i>	JOHN A. OESTERLE	106
Also reviews by RUDOLF ALLERS, MANOEL CARDOZO, EVA ROSS, JOSEPH McALLISTER		
BRIEF NOTICES . . . . .		124
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .		131

APRIL, 1949

ARTICLES:		
Reaffirmation: Editorial . . . . .		133
Man in Medieval Thought . . . . .	CONRAD PEPLER, O. P.	136
The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom	THOMAS U. MULLANEY, O. P.	155
BOOK REVIEWS:		
William R. O'Connor. <i>The Eternal Quest.</i>	P. LUMBERERAS, O. P.	207
Edward S. Corwin. <i>Liberty Against Government; the Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept.</i>	SISTER MARIE CAROLYN, O. P.	214

	PAGE
Paul Tillich. <i>The Protestant Era</i> .	
Lorenz Volken. <i>Der Glaube bei Emil Brunner</i> .	
James H. Dunham. <i>The Religion of Philosophers</i> .	VINCENT EDWARD SMITH 220
Also reviews by PIERRE CONWAY, O. P., RUDOLF ALLERS, RAYMOND SMITH, O. P., and JOHN K. RYAN.	
BRIEF NOTICES . . . . .	242
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	257

## JULY, 1949

## ARTICLES:

Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce . . . . .	FRANK L. KUNKEL 261
The Meaning of the "Common Man" . . . . .	AUREL KOLNAI 272
Dr. Northrop, Technology and Religion JOSEPH B. McALLISTER 336	

## BOOK REVIEWS:

Dom Oden Lottin, <i>Principes de Morale: Tome I—Exposé Systématique; Tome II—Compléments de Doctrine et d'Histoire</i> . . . . .	JAMES M. EGAN, O. P. 363
McKeough, M. J., ed. <i>The Administration of the Catholic Secondary School</i> .	
Deferrari, R. J., ed. <i>The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education</i> . . . . .	THOMAS C. DONLON, O. P. 372
Also reviews by JAMES COLLINS, R. A. KOCOUREK, JOHN C. MURRAY, S. J.	

BRIEF NOTICES . . . . .	386
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	393

## OCTOBER, 1949

## ARTICLES:

No Place for Rain . . . . .	WALTER FARRELL, O. P. 307
Physical Metaphysics . . . . .	A. J. McNICHOLL, O. P. 425
Cognitive Aspects of the Heisenberg Principle	
	VINCENT EDWARD SMITH 474

## TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME XII

V

BOOK REVIEWS:	PAGE
Robert Fawtier and Louis Canet, <i>La double expérience de Catherine Benincasa (Sainte Catherine de Sienne)</i>	JAMES B. WALKER, O. P. 500
Harry Elmer Barnes. <i>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</i> .	
Harry Elmer Barnes. <i>Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development; Theories of Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing.</i>	C. J. NUSSSE 516
BRIEF NOTICES	524
BOOKS RECEIVED	529



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## STATES OF LIFE



THE RELIGIOUS orders have always been a significant factor in the life of the Church, contributing either to her embarrassment by their failures or to her triumph by their successes. Accordingly, a correct evaluation of the religious state in general and an adequate appraisal of the various types into which that state is divided are of the utmost importance to all interested in the triumph of the Church. It is to be regretted that by an unfortunate paradox in the history of Christian spirituality modern thought on the religious state, instead of being clearer and better developed than ancient thought, is actually more confused. The varieties of the religious state and their relationships to the development of Christian perfection and the good of the Church have been subjected by modern authors to confusion and distortion, whereas in the minds of the great doctors of the past all was clear and orderly. An example of this unhappy contrast may be found in the remarkable lucidity of one of these great doctors of the past,

St. Thomas Aquinas, and the distressing confusion of one of these modern authors, the Trappist poet, Thomas Merton. They are definitely at odds in the important matter of the relative merits and the difference of function of the active and contemplative orders.

Inasmuch as modern works on Christian morality often lack a properly theological consideration of the special states of the Christian life and the ordinary theological course today treats of the religious life in a cursory and inadequate fashion, it seems well to present the doctrine of St. Thomas on the active and contemplative lives, and on the religious state and its formal variants. Following this exposition we shall contrast the teaching of the Angelic Doctor with the modern viewpoint referred to above.<sup>1</sup> In conclusion, we shall attempt to indicate a few of the many practical conclusions, important to everyone, which issue from St. Thomas' treatment of the religious life.

## I

In ordinary speech, the terms "life" and "state" can have reference to such things as magazines and civil institutions, yet a misunderstanding of the usage of these terms is unlikely. In ordinary speech, however, such terms as "contemplative life" and "contemplative order," "religious life" and "religious order," or "religious state," are frequently confused. Not so in theology. Theologically, the contemplative religious state and the active religious state are defined and differentiated in terms of the works of the active and contemplative lives, but neither *state* is to be confused with its corresponding type of *life*. In much the same fashion, the medical profession and the culinary profession are defined and differentiated in terms of the works of the sciences of medicine and cooking, in terms of health and nutrition, and yet they are not identified with health and nutrition. Fruitful theological thought on this subject must keep this distinction clearly in mind. An under-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. T. Merton, "Active and Contemplative Orders," *The Commonweal*, XLVII, No. 8.

standing of the relative merits of the contemplative and active lives must include some idea of the thing divided, an insight into the type of distinction involved, and knowledge of the standards according to which the judgment is to be made.

“Life,” as divided into “contemplative” and “active,” is not simply self-motion, a feature common to all living things. The distinction between the contemplative and the active life applies specifically to human life, intelligent and rational life. In this sense we are accustomed to say that a man leads the life of a philosopher or the life of a sportsman inasmuch as his greatest delight and chief interest is either in thought or in athletic accomplishments. Accordingly, “life” as divided into “contemplative” and “active” refers to the rational and deliberate side of human life. And a form of life in this sense is denominated as active or contemplative by what is chiefly intended in that life. Inasmuch as some men chiefly intend the contemplation of truth and others chiefly intend an exterior type of activity, human life can be conveniently divided into active and contemplative.

This distinction is adequate and sufficient. The thing divided is the intellectual life of man, that type of self-motion which is his alone, not the vegetative and sensitive life he has in common with his pets. That intellectual life and its resultant knowledge, from the view point of goal or end, is either an end in itself or a means to action, speculative or practical. It is precisely from this point of view that human life is divided into contemplative and active. In the abstract, this distinction is obviously sufficient. In the concrete, however, no man’s life is entirely one or the other; every man’s life must be a combination of both. Even the metaphysician has to know how to tie his shoes. Yet even in the concrete a man’s principal intention cannot be equally centered on both lives. Hence even in the concrete the distinction is sufficient. A shoe-tying metaphysician is still principally a metaphysician. Evaluating these two lives and assigning a position of priority to one or the other, may be accomplished with accuracy only upon the basis of a threefold

consideration of priority: a priority of nature, a priority of merit, and a priority in the order of generation.

From the viewpoint of the nature of the thing involved, i. e. human life, that life will be superior in which the conditions of human felicity are more fully realized. St. Thomas gives eight reasons for the primacy of the contemplative life. First, the contemplative life is an exercise of the noblest faculty of man, the intellect, and it considers the noblest object of that faculty, intelligible being, principally God. Secondly, the contemplative life is more continuous. Thirdly, the contemplative life is more delightful. Fourthly, in the contemplative life a man is more self-sufficient since he needs less. Fifthly, because it is more true of the contemplative life that it is desirable simply for itself and not as a means to something else, it is more perfect than the active. Sixthly, the contemplative life is more quiet. Seventhly, the contemplative life is more closely associated with divine life, whereas the active life is more closely associated with human life. Finally, the contemplative life is more purely intellectual than the active life, which involves the operation of other human faculties.

From the viewpoint of merit St. Thomas holds that in itself the contemplative life is more meritorious than the active. He argues to this position from the following premises: charity is the root of merit; charity consists in the love of God and neighbor and is more meritorious in those acts which directly pertain to the love of God than in those which directly pertain to the love of neighbor; the contemplative life is directly concerned with directly loving God whereas the active life is directly concerned with directly loving neighbor. It can and does happen however, that because of the charity of the one meriting a work of the active life is more meritorious when done with greater charity than a work of the contemplative life done with lesser charity. This consideration in no way militates against St. Thomas' objective conclusion; it is merely a question of which visitor gets the best bed in the house, the prince or the pauper. The answer is simple except in the case where the

pauper happens to have a special claim on one's affections. Finally, in the order of generation the situation of primacy is reversed. As embraced by men, the active life is a disposition for the exercise of contemplation. Unquiet human nature must first be brought under control before contemplation is a possibility to any great extent.

The various religious states are defined, differentiated, and evaluated in terms of the works of the active and contemplative lives. Yet the terms "contemplative religious state" and "contemplative life," "active religious state" and "active life" are not to be confused. St. Thomas treats of life and state in two distinct sections. However, it is true that an antecedent understanding of the two lives and their relative merits is essential to an understanding of his thought on the various religious states and their relative merits. In general, the religious state is defined by St. Thomas as a state of perfection. Accordingly, before approaching the question of the varieties of religious state and their relative merits, an appreciation of the terms state and perfection is indispensable.

In abstract terms, "state" properly signifies an immovable condition of a thing disposed in a way suitable to its nature. Etymologically the term comes from the word "stand," in which position the natural disposition of one's members is verified, *sc.*, head up and feet on the ground, though indeed in a movable way. However, in human affairs the term "state" has been transferred to signify an immovable condition in factors which are internal, invariable, and personal. Theologically it does not refer to such external variable factors as wealth or poverty. The element of immobility in that condition is verified by a permanence of personal obligation. Thus, in this restricted sense, state is properly predicated only of freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or civil affairs.

State is thus immediately subdivided into the state of freedom and the state of servility. In the spiritual order, each of these states is subdivided into that of beginner, proficient, and perfect with respect either to good or evil, the true state of freedom being one of virtue, the true state of servitude being

one of vice. Yet it is to be noted that whereas the states of slavery and freedom are specifically different, the states of beginner, proficient, and perfect differ by way of emphasis.

Human perfection essentially consists in charity. Yet charity is a virtue capable of growth. The outstanding steps in this growth have been isolated by the doctors of the Church on the basis of difference in emphasis. Thus they distinguish a state of beginners in which emphasis must be placed on the avoiding of sin and the resistance of evil inclinations. In the second stage, that of proficients, emphasis is on the very process of increasing in charity itself. Finally, they distinguish a third stage, that of the perfect, in which primacy of interest is simply that they cling to God and enjoy union with Him. When St. Thomas refers to the religious state as a state of perfection he means perfection in this latter sense. Just as the commandments impose obligations which remove those things contrary to charity in the absolute sense, so too the counsels are ordained to removing impediments to the development of charity into the third stage, *sc.*, that of the perfect. Yet the impediments to the presence of charity in the human will are things in themselves evil, whereas the impediments to the growth of charity are not, e. g., matrimony, worldly business, and the like. Hence the religious state consists essentially in the assumption of the counsels as obligations. Since state is an immovable condition this obligation must be permanent and solemn, i. e., one of public vow recognized as such by the Church. For this reason the religious state is in a special sense a state of perfection.

Thus, paradoxically, a man perfect in charity in the sense that his prime interest is union with God, although he is not solemnly bound by vows to the obligation of following the counsels, is not in the state of perfection. And a religious bound by vow to the obligation of following the counsels yet chiefly interested in avoiding sin is in the state of perfection. For though man's spiritual condition before God is of greater importance than obligations recognized in and by the Church, it is this solemn obligation and not simply charity that places him in a state of perfection, as that term is used by St. Thomas.

The question now arises as to whether there is such a thing as variety in religious institutes and if so is it possible to grade them in an order of excellence. In the first place, a religious institute as an exemplification of the religious state is a school in which men are habituated or trained in the perfection of charity. And inasmuch as there are diverse works of charity and diverse methods of training, it is possible to ascertain differences in religious orders. On the one hand, they can be distinguished by their goals, that is by the diversity of works to which various institutes are ordered, as, e. g., the care of the sick, or the redemption of captives. On the other hand, they can be distinguished by the diversity of practice, e. g., some castigate the body by fasting, some by manual labor, and some by standing in cold water. Since goals are universally significant and, relative to societies, are in fact specificative, the prime differences in religious institutes must be considered from the view point of goal. Indeed it is true that there is a certain community of goal or intention in all religious institutes and a certain community of practice, *sc.*, the vows. Yet both goals and methods admit of an element of variation which constitutes true differences. This variety has been always introduced and conserved by the authority of the Holy See as of maximum importance for the good of the Church as a whole.

St. Thomas holds that the varieties of the religious state are not only defined and differentiated but also evaluated in terms of the active and contemplative lives. And in an orderly fashion he lays down the standards according to which that judgment is to be made. Differences on the part of goal are more important than differences on the part of method. Things can be contrasted only in those aspects in which they differ, hence the relative excellence of a religious institute flows from differences with respect to goals primarily and to method secondarily. The comparison from the part of goal is absolute inasmuch as goals are sought for themselves; comparison on the part of method is relative, for methods are good only in terms of their efficiency in obtaining the goal.

The works of the active life to which a religious institute may

be ordered as to a goal are twofold: some by their very nature are derived from the fullness of contemplation—teaching and preaching sacred doctrine; others, such as giving alms and caring for the sick, are totally exterior occupations and are not of their very nature derived from the fullness of contemplation. The first type of work is preferable to simple contemplation by way of addition for it is better to illumine than merely to shine. Both the first type of work of the active life and simple contemplation are preferable to the second type of work of the active life. The validity of this evaluation of works has already been established in the consideration of the active and contemplative lives. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of goal, orders which are ordained to preaching and teaching rank first, those which are ordered simply to contemplation rank second, and those which are occupied with exterior works of the active life of the second type rank third. Within each of these three classifications preëminence of various institutes is to be estimated: first, by more detailed gradations of the work involved; secondly, by the number of works which can possibly multiply excellence; and thirdly, by the proportionate effectiveness of the statutes of each institute to accomplish proposed goals.

In this evaluation St. Thomas is speaking of instances of the religious state and not of individual religious and their particular degree of holiness. All the religious orders have this in common, that they tend toward the perfection of charity. It would be a distortion of the text of St. Thomas to say that simply active orders tend only toward the initial stage of perfection. Also, it is to be noted that it is not the multitude or intensity of exercises that establishes the relative excellence of method but their proportion to the goal, their effectiveness in attaining the end of the order. This is not a concrete evaluation of religious orders based upon the spirituality of their actual members, but an objective analysis of the nature of these institutes as stipulated in their statutes. This is a brief summary of the mind of St. Thomas on the active and contemplative lives, and on the religious state and its varieties. It has

been culled from his tract on the different lives<sup>2</sup> and from his tract on the different states.<sup>3</sup>

## II

The task of criticising Thomas Merton's article<sup>4</sup> is made difficult by the fact that his sequence of thought is somewhat perplexing. Lest this criticism suffer that same disadvantage, we will offer: first, a general criticism of the argument as a whole; secondly, a particular criticism of particular parts. The author of this article proposes as his object the "argument 'action vs. contemplation' . . . ." Specifically he attempts "to reconcile" an alleged contrariety between St. Thomas' teaching<sup>5</sup> that the "mixed vocation" is superior to the contemplative or active vocation and his doctrine<sup>6</sup> that the contemplative life in itself by its very nature is superior to the active life. This proposed reconciliation is effected by a reference to qualifications of the general doctrine by St. Thomas himself and by an interpretation of what St. Thomas must have meant in the light of traditional teaching.

As regards the first article of the one hundred eighty-second question, the author insists that the general evaluation of the two lives must be qualified by the doctrine contained in the response to the third objection to that article. "When he admits that the active life *can* be more perfect under certain circumstances, accidentally, he hedges his statement with half a dozen qualifications of a strictness that greatly enhances what he has already said about contemplation. First, activity will only be more perfect than the joy and rest of contemplation if it is undertaken as the result of an overflow of love for God . . . in order to fulfil His will. It is not to be continuous, only the answer to a temporary emergency. It is purely for God's glory, and it does not dispense us from contemplation. It is an added

<sup>2</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 179-182.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, qq. 183-189.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 188, a. 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 182, a. 1.

obligation, and we must return as soon as we morally can to the powerful and fruitful silence of recollection that disposes our souls for divine union.”<sup>7</sup>

In view of this response and in view of traditional teaching, the author offers his interpretation of the sixth article, question one hundred eighty-eight, which evaluates the various types of religious orders. By active orders he says that St. Thomas here “clearly” means orders engaged in external works of charity or mercy for the good of others. He says that the bare statement “the religious institutes which are ordered to the work of preaching and teaching hold the highest rank in religion” is frankly misleading and conjures up nothing more than a mental image of some pious and industrious clerics bustling from the library to the classroom. Finally, he maintains that in ranking the three types of institute St. Thomas was obviously thinking of the traditional conception of the degrees of perfection so explicitly found in St. Augustine and St. Bernard. Accordingly, as he sees it, by the “mixed” orders St. Thomas must really have meant the peak of the mystical life, the marriage of the soul to God, which gives the saints a miraculous power and smooth and tireless energy in working for God and souls.

By arguing that all religious, and in fact all lay people, do (or at least should) in some sense arrive at this peak of mystical life, the author considers that he has reconciled the contrariety between the two texts of St. Thomas and has exposed the true meaning of the Angelic Doctor. By way of corollary he concludes that all orders are best, that there is only one vocation for all since all are called to the summit of perfection, and that degrees and varieties in perfection, i. e., of religious vocations, depend on the perfection of divine union and not on the means the order has at its disposal for preaching and teaching.

In the first place, it is necessary to say that there is no such contrariety as the author alleges between the two texts cited from the *Summa*, nor is there any need for a reconciliation of

<sup>7</sup> Merton, *loc. cit.*

them. Only on the basis of an inexcusable confusion between St. Thomas' concepts of life and state could such a contrariety be envisaged. The exception cited from the response to the third objection of the first article, question one hundred eighty-two, is not an exception to the superiority of the contemplative life over the active life. The response merely states that in certain circumstances the *works* of the active life can be superior to the *works* of the contemplative life. It makes no specific reference to types of active work done, e. g., preaching, or caring for the sick. The assumption of such works according to the stated circumstances would in no way vary the species of the contemplative life which is established by primacy of intention.

In the sixth article, question one hundred eighty-eight, St. Thomas treats of the varieties and grades of the religious state. Inasmuch as the religious state is a state of perfection, all varieties and grades of that state have as a common intention and goal perfection, in the sense of perfection in charity, without relation to the initial and proficient grades of charity. It is common to all religious institutes that they pertain to the religious state, and constitution in this state depends, not upon simple intention, but upon the formal assumption of the counsels as personal obligations. St. Thomas was not assuming the grades of charity of St. Augustine and St. Bernard as the basis for his differentiation and gradation of religious institutes. Actually he is both clear and explicit as to his foundation for differentiation and gradation, *sc.*, the goals of the various institutes considered in terms of the active and contemplative lives. He indicates two types of work of the active life: some which of their nature flow from the abundance of contemplation—preaching and teaching, and others which of their nature do not, i. e., the giving of alms and the reception of travelers. Seen in this light, St. Thomas' conception of the most perfect type of religious institute suggests something far superior to the image of pious and industrious clerics bustling from the library to the classroom, which Thomas Merton seems to have drawn from it.

The author appears to conclude too widely in judging that all orders and all Christians do or should live according to a pattern which mixes the works of the contemplative and active life,<sup>8</sup> and thus fulfill the vocation of the most perfect type of religious institute as described by St. Thomas.<sup>9</sup> For St. Thomas, to contemplate and to pass on to others the fruit of contemplation has a very specific meaning. Some works of their very nature are fruits of contemplation, *sc.*, preaching and teaching sacred doctrine. Praying for others and being an example of contemplative perfection are not works of the active life which of their nature flow from the abundance of contemplation. They are part and parcel of the contemplative life in the sense of being solely contemplative. Indeed the abbot might strictly give to the community the fruits of his contemplation; but he is only the abbot, he is not the institute; his role is not the specific goal of the institute. The Little Sister of the Poor who has an intense interior life and cares for the aged is not giving of the fruits of contemplation in the strict sense. Such religious are doing works of the purely active life and are merely being good religious in the process. A religious of the most perfect type of religious institute should engage in the works of the active life, *sc.*, preaching and teaching in conformity with the conditions laid down by St. Thomas.<sup>10</sup> It does not logically follow that every type of activity (e. g., caring for the sick, redeeming captives, being an example of contemplative perfection, praying for others) is a giving to others the fruits of contemplation. Strictly speaking, these works are not the fruits of contemplation. Hence it is absolutely false to conclude that there is only one type of religious state and one vocation.

The author's corollaries as well, seem to be at variance with the doctrine of St. Thomas. Degrees and varieties of religious vocation (i. e., vocation in the objective sense of *state*) do most certainly depend upon the works to which the various institutes are ordained, e. g. preaching, teaching, etc. In St. Thomas, the

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 182, a. 1, ad 3um.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 188, a. 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 182, a. 1, ad 3um.

degree of union with God has nothing to do with this problem. The author has completely obliterated all bases for differences in religious institutes and has also overemphasized their common element, *sc.*, their tendency to the perfection of charity, but this is not the thought of St. Thomas.

Moreover, the author's division of religious institutes into contemplative, active, and mixed is not an exact rendering of St. Thomas' doctrine. These "mixed" orders in St. Thomas are orders whose goal is works of the active life which of their nature flow from the abundance of contemplation, not just any works of the active life. The simple term "mixed" in no way conveys this exactitude of thought. The author is also of the opinion that St. Thomas uses the term "active life" in two different ways, *i. e.*, to denote (1) external acts of charity and mercy for the good of others; (2) as the activity required for the practice of any virtue by anyone in the purgative or illuminative ways. He thinks the Doctor changes from one sense to the other without giving any warning when he is about to make the change. It is true that St. Thomas uses the term "active life" in slightly varying senses, but the opinion that this change in sense occurs in a confusing manner is without foundation.

In the opinion of the Trappist author, the "mixed" orders today in America realize their vocation to contemplate and give to others the fruit of their contemplation by way of compromise, *sc.*, by dividing their duties between their nuns and their priests. The nuns live in cloisters and do the contemplating and the priests live in colleges and cities and do the teaching and preaching. As a matter of fact the goals and statutes of the "mixed" orders in America today are the same as they were since their foundations in Europe. Though they may fail to realize their ideal to a certain degree, a failure that is easily understandable considering the height of the ideal, compromise has not taken place either legally or factually, nor has it even been considered. In the article under consideration the author makes an evaluation of the "mixed" and contemplative orders according to two different standards. He evaluates the "mixed" orders in America today according to what he thinks

has actually happened to them, and evaluates the contemplative orders in terms of their statutes. Such a difference of standard might have the advantage of being rhetorically strong, but it has the disadvantage of being logically very weak.

The author attempts to prove that the Carthusians are a mixed order in the most flattering sense of the term because they copy books, that the Cistercians are a mixed order because they once produced a school of mystical theology, and that the nursing sisterhoods are mixed because they have a deep interior life. In this he fails to prove his point. "Mixed" orders are such because they have for their goal works of the active life which of their nature flow from contemplation. Copying books hardly seems to be a work of that nature. It is rather difficult to see how taking a sick man's temperature with a thermometer is an operation of its very nature flowing from the abundance of contemplation. His example of an ecstacy of St. Bonaventure as a typical instance of giving to others the fruit of contemplation is not an example of that fruit at all. An ecstacy is not a work of the active life. If the aim of this article was to convince Christians, both religious and lay, that they subjectively had a vocation to the mystical life, then the argument the author chose was peculiarly inappropriate. The tract in the *Summa*, upon which the conclusions are based can not lead to the author's conclusion, if the tract is properly understood.

### III

The evolution of the Church in a given area can be divided into three general stages. Initially, the major burden of the missionary effort is to make the Church visible in that area. The second phase of development consists in establishing the Church on a more or less self-sufficient basis from the viewpoint of finances and clergy. The final and lengthiest stage of that evolution is basically a matter of bringing the members of the Church to the perfection of the Christian life and bringing the population of that territory into the Church. These various stages require diverse abilities and diverse agencies in the forces

which are attempting to bring about growth. This generation in America is perhaps the first to see the day when the missionary and second stage of development are more or less completed. Accordingly, the Church in the United States today is at a point when special emphasis needs to be placed on those special abilities and agencies whose peculiar work it is to bring the Church to perfection.

In this historical context one of the first practical applications of St. Thomas' doctrine on the differentiation and gradation of religious institutes is that these institutes whose special work it is to bring the Church to perfection need to be encouraged. For the most part the work of bringing the members of the Church to the perfection of the Christian life is one of preaching and teaching sacred doctrine. On the other hand the great bulk of men outside the Church belong to the rather well-educated but unreligious class we ordinarily characterize as secular. To date no effective apologetic methods have been devised to bring this class of men into the Church. But this much is clear: the work is going to have to be done by men who are thoroughly spiritual, in a word—contemplatives, and by men who are intellectually equipped by specialized doctrinal preparation, by men who actually, personally, have contact with that class. In other words one of the most vital needs of the Church in America today is healthy and numerous institutes of the so-called "mixed" type whose special goal is the work of preaching and teaching, works which of their nature flow from the abundance of contemplation.

Religious institutes of all types generally adapt themselves to the conditions of time and place and adjust themselves to the needs of the Church at the given moment. Thus, for example, it happens that institutes with different goals will all engage in missionary activity in the initial phase of the life of the Church in a given territory. Yet in the final process of bringing the Church to perfection it is of the utmost importance that their particular goals and their specialization of activities be re-emphasized. Hence the needs of the American Church in our day call for a general return by religious institutes to the works

for which they were originally approved and to which their manner of life is best proportioned.

As a further practical application of the thought of St. Thomas on the varieties of the religious state and the standards whereby the different institutes are to be evaluated, it might be noted that it would be well if those actually engaged in vocational guidance would keep them in mind. Those burdened with the duty of providing vocational advice to youth should be perfectly familiar not only with the different types of work done by each institute but also with the proportion the observances of each institute bear to the intended goal. A valid judgment of a religious institute must be made from both points of view. Vocational guidance should not be a mere process of populating a favorite community or recommending the institute which is most arduous in the sense that its observances are absolutely the most rigorous. In conclusion it might be well to recall that St. Thomas maintains that the differences in religious institutes are for the beauty and good of the Church. Both from the viewpoint of doctrine and from the viewpoint of practical attitudes, questions of difference in kind and difference of degree should be approached with that consideration first and foremost in mind and heart.

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## CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF MAN<sup>1</sup>

68

### I

**I**N TREATING of modern man's metaphysical and religious needs, two preliminary points require brief mention. How do these needs compare with other human needs that are commonly recognized? And what special weight should be given to the word "modern" in this context?

There is a legitimate sense in which the metaphysical and religious requirements imposed by our having a human nature stand alongside the other requirements for the good life. At the outset of an empirical inquiry into the human condition, it is only necessary to observe that the human drives toward realization are various, that the reaches of human desire extend in many directions. Merely private wants and social ones, those which are only momentary and those which remain throughout a lifetime, wants which are shared with other animals and those which seem peculiar to man, these are some of the distinctions which come immediately to mind. It is usual to differentiate between the technological, biological, cultural, social and political aspects of our life. In addition, man can be viewed—and, indeed, can regard himself—from the standpoint of widest generality as one being among others in the world, displaying certain traits and having certain needs in virtue of his inclusion in the common situation. Like the rest of nature his tendency toward the good is a search after actual goods and hence after some share in God's perfection. He is, then, also a metaphysical and religious animal.

What distinguishes man from the other parts of nature is his ability to place an interpretation upon his life and to guide his actions by the insight so gained. He is not content simply to

<sup>1</sup> The educational importance of these conceptions of man is borne in mind throughout this study.

be implicated in the world and to be subject to certain desires. He wishes to understand his presence in the world, to test and order his desires, and to pursue his ends in accord with the meaning he places upon his existence. In addition to the fact of various human needs, there is question of the nature of the distinction and order obtaining between them. When this comparative study inquires in a fundamental way about the nature, existence, operations, and ends of man, one avenue has been opened to a metaphysical treatment of human nature. Because this approach tries to determine the most comprehensive traits of our experience, it holds the first rank among the ways of gaining self-knowledge.

The pursuit of metaphysical and religious wisdom is an abiding and central need of man. Its great importance does not, however, seal it off in proud isolation from man's other pre-occupations. Investigation of the structure and dynamism of being in general and of our human mode of being cannot be carried on in an intellectual vacuum. It is impossible to discover the common pattern of human experiences unless they are actually attended to at every level where they make their appearance. There are metaphysically important aspects of our artistic, political, scientific, and economic activities. If they are disdained, the resultant metaphysics will be an artificial and inhumane account which fails to provide a basis for human unity and integration. In revenge, the other sciences which touch upon man will try to organize human life around one or another particularist standpoint. Some such defection on the part of metaphysicians has led to the present state of affairs, in which general agreement about the sense of human existence is neither present nor held desirable.

If metaphysics is commonly regarded as a misty and irrelevant pastime or as the scullery maid in the scientific household, the responsibility lies primarily with philosophers themselves. Many of them have either taken scandal or taken fright at one stubborn feature of human reality: its temporal, historical character. Those who have taken scandal tend to deprecate the importance of the world of development and to

overstress the timeless and changeless nature of metaphysical principles. They retreat into a realm of immutable essences where all is neat, undisturbed, and thoroughly inhumane. Those who take flight are liable to abandon all permanent truths and autonomous philosophical thinking. Their flight leads to some place of refuge among the physical or social sciences where the most acute and radical questions need not be faced.

Both the eternalistic and the scientistic casts of mind are foreign to a perennial philosophy. Perhaps this incompatibility is less apparent in the case of the former group, but it is no less real. A perennial philosophy is not an eternalistic one, but one which perseveres and grows throughout the years. It recognizes the permanent validity of some metaphysical principles and concepts, but also the need for developing and correcting them and the danger of losing sight of them. It refuses to convert truths drawn from and referring to the real world into building-blocks of a deductive or dialectical substitute for this world. Metaphysics, like every other human discipline, is itself subject to the common risks of temporal existence. It is not relativism but awareness of the human character of philosophy to allow that insight may increase or deteriorate, that the forms of truth may change and its content be corrected and developed, that the stress ought to be different in the modern age than in times past, and that a living tradition has special obligations which are historically conditioned.

One of these obligations is to approach a problem in a way that is familiar and pertinent to contemporaries. It is no secret that there is a crisis today in the Western world's conception of man himself. This is a focal point of philosophical discussion. Apart from the Christian teaching on man, there are at least three general attempts at providing an acceptable philosophical anthropology: Marxism, naturalism, and existentialism. After making some comparative remarks about these competing philosophies in relation to Catholic university education, I wish to examine each theory briefly in its historical and doctrinal aspects. The educational implications of this analysis should not be difficult to draw out.

## II

What immediately strikes one in viewing these representative theories is a sense of familiarity. They have all been met with upon previous occasions. The student of the social sciences is well-acquainted with political and economic aspects of Marxism. If we would believe the naturalists, their methods and assumptions are held in common with the physical scientists. In any case, the reverberations of naturalism have been felt by those who are sensitive to the deep-running currents in American education. Finally, one meets with sounds and rumors of existentialism in every corner of the literary scene today. All these positions are firmly established in our world and solicit attention and allegiance on their several grounds.

We are not dealing, then, with systems of pure speculation, but rather with philosophies which deliberately envisage the practical order and the possibility of transforming it in definite ways. Yet although a practical program affecting our cultural and institutional life is intended, acquaintance with the philosophical background remains indispensable. It is true that a large number of camp followers neither can master nor care to master the philosophical foundations of the cause being promoted. This fact does not dispense others, who do not belong to the fold, from reckoning with these underlying principles if they hope to offer a convincing estimate and perhaps an alternative proposal. Otherwise, discussion will remain at the surface and will never penetrate to the heart of the issue.

Investigators working only with the tools of literary and moral criticism are often so intent upon pointing out the disastrous results to which existential writings lead that they forget to direct attention toward the theoretical sources from which they draw steady inspiration. Granted that a sensibility and character nourished upon the novels and plays of Sartre will be inclined toward atheism and amoralism, this provides no satisfactory answer to the reader who is already troubled about the accepted views on God and the moral law. Literary

and moral appraisal should be integrated with a properly philosophical treatment of Sartre's conception of man, freedom, and the universe. Otherwise no answer can be forthcoming to the inevitable retort that to depict man as the creator of his own standards of conduct in a godless world is only to depict him with superior realism "as he is in fact."<sup>2</sup>

A similar lassitude steals over the mind when it is confronted by Marx and Communism. An admirable amount of industry may be expended on biographical research, on economic and sociological descriptions of the nineteenth-century environment, on detailed historical studies of the fortunes of Marxism and Leninism, and on the discrepancy between promise and actuality in lands under a Communistic regime. Such efforts are indispensable but not enough to constitute an adequate critique of the Marrian view of man. Nor is the missing element supplied merely by collecting Marx's and Engels' *obiter dicta* about God, religion, and the spiritual side of man. To publicize these sayings is not the same as to expose the taproots of their philosophical position. Here again is an obligation to push the discussion just as far back in the direction of fundamental commitments as Marx himself has done.

This same requirement holds all the more stringently in the case of John Dewey because of the fact that Dewey himself is a philosopher. His case does not stand or fall completely with the activities of the Deweyites, and preoccupation with the latter is a manifest instance of *ignoratio elenchi*. Dewey has underlined the close relationship between his general convictions about experience and nature (including human nature) and his stand on educational, social, and artistic matters. The latter cannot be taken meaningfully by themselves with only a token recognition of their theoretical setting. It will not do to skirt the philosophical concepts, since Dewey himself will not allow his critics to make the evasion if they really mean to be entering into discussion with him. If he is to be taken

<sup>2</sup>This is the contention, for instance, of one of Sartre's most alert literary followers, R. Campbell: *Jean-Paul Sartre ou une littérature philosophique* (rev. ed., Paris, 1946), especially in his polemical chapter IX.

seriously as an educationist, then he begs that he be taken seriously as a philosopher who claims to justify his educational theories in terms of philosophical naturalism.

In the university community, separatism should tend to disappear and the gap between the various disciplines to close not by way of amalgamation but by more ready communication and tighter integration of the sciences. The study of man is a joint undertaking which needs the contributions of students working at various levels and standpoints. The success of the venture at any stage depends upon two prime conditions. No single discipline should consider its own report to be sufficient without the others, but each should try to co-ordinate its findings with the rest of the available evidence. Secondly, the work of co-ordination and synthesis is facilitated when an intellectual principle of order is admitted. The primacy of metaphysical and religious aspects is expressed educationally when the metaphysician and theologian take the trouble to inform themselves exactly about the state of studies in other fields and also when workers in the more particular sciences recognize in practice the decisive bearing of metaphysical and religious considerations upon the final result. The ultimate judgment about the three conceptions of man under consideration is a philosophical and theological responsibility.

### III

Like many other minds of an innately academic sort, Karl Marx took delight in ridiculing the bookish dons, especially the professors of philosophy. In later life, he looked back to his university days with none of the customary affection. He seemed to have been ashamed of his academic past, but although he deprecated it, he cannot be said ever to have escaped beyond its influence. It has often been remarked that, for all his celebration of action and the concrete manipulation of forces, Marx himself was pre-eminently the theoretician, the student of social affairs from a relatively safe distance. More significant for our purpose is the fact that his theorizing about

political economy was conditioned not only by his associations with the French radicals and by his factual studies in the British Museum but also by his early training in speculative philosophy. This filiation is sometimes simplified to the point of merely repeating the famous quip that Marx's aim was to set the Hegelian dialectic back on its feet. It is nearer the truth to say that he accepted and improved upon Feuerbach's reversal of the dialectical top and bottom. A study of this mediate relationship of Marx to Hegel by way of Feuerbach (as far as critical appraisal is concerned) brings into relief the attitude of Marx towards humanism.<sup>3</sup>

Several times in the course of his writings,<sup>4</sup> Hegel presents a synoptic view of modern philosophy as it leads up to his own system. He took his own major accomplishment to be the synthesis of an idealistic and monistic notion of the absolute with a dialectical mode of philosophical thinking. This is an accurate judgment, for Hegel did all in his power to make such a view of God and philosophy reasonable. He regarded the absolute in a quasi-Aristotelian way<sup>5</sup> as pure thought or mind, but as mind involved in the dialectical process which comprises the finite world of categories, physical nature and the spiritual achievements of man. The purpose of this development is to make explicit and actual all the latent powers of spirit, so that it can come to know itself in and through its antithetic forms and historical phases. Yet Hegel also seeks to persuade us that spirit embraces the finite process within its own perfect, self-same and eternal actuality. This actuality, being a living consciousness, is by nature thoroughly dialectical.

To be one of Hegel's immediate successors was a trying lot, since one had to choose between the safe mediocrity of merely filling out the paragraphs of his system with secondary details

<sup>3</sup> This approach has been made successfully by F. Grégoire: *Aux sources de la pensée de Marx: Hegel, Feuerbach* (Louvain, 1947).

<sup>4</sup> See, for instance, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (Engl. tr. by J. Baillie, rev. second ed., London, 1931), pp. 80, 802-04.

<sup>5</sup> Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle poses the major comparative problem in G. Mure's *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford, 1940), chs. I-VI.

and the audacious task of challenging the major principles themselves. Ludwig Feuerbach wished to choose the better part and proceeded to make radical suggestions about the key concept of the absolute. The controversial point concerned the nature of the relation between the absolute and man. Hegel had looked upon man as a necessary manifestation of the divine idea, as the being in whom the divine idea comes into conscious possession of itself. Man's perfection, therefore, consists in working out dialectically his identity with the absolute mind. The philosophy of the absolute reveals to man his true essence as being the absolute itself. Feuerbach challenged this assertion that the divine mind or spirit was the inmost core of human nature. In order to reach the state of divine self-contemplation, man would have to lose his characteristic proportions and mode of being. The Hegelian philosophy is a kind of crypto-theology and must be replaced by what Feuerbach liked to call a thorough-going anthropology. Only when the philosophy of the absolute is converted into the philosophy of man can there be a vindication of the concrete human being.

In order to found his new version of humanism, Feuerbach found it necessary to repudiate not only absolute idealism but also the ordinary religious belief in God as an entity independent of and superior to empirical men.<sup>6</sup> Both viewpoints result from a failure to organize human life around a completely human ideal. Feuerbach declared them both to be instances of what Hegel himself referred to as the state of estrangement or alienation from oneself. If the absolute mind were the true substance of man, as Hegel avers, then men in their ordinary condition would stand toward such an absolute much as slaves stand toward the master who determines the meaning and disposition of their lives. A similar relationship of lord and bondsmen characterizes the religious attitude of worship. The worshippers fail to appreciate and cultivate their own powers when all attention is paid to glorifying a transcendent God.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *The Essence of Christianity* (Engl. tr. by M. Evans, London, 1853), and the anti-Hegelian essays collected in vol. II of Feuerbach's *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. by Feuerbach (10 vols., Leipzig, 1846-66).

What is the real import of the ineradicable religious tendencies of mankind, especially in their noblest Christian form? Hegel had taught that the same insight was present in religion as well as in the philosophy of the absolute, although it stood forth in its true conceptual form only in its philosophical expression. Feuerbach agreed that the content is the same in both cases, but maintained that only an anthropocentric philosophy can interpret the religious impulse correctly. Its message speaks in favor of man himself rather than of an absolute subsistence apart from man. Human individuals, aware of the disproportion between their actual shortcomings and their deepest aspirations, are inclined to keep the latter feelings pure and to lend them greater sanction by attributing the perfections to an objective being set over against themselves. Feuerbach denies that he is an atheist in the opprobrious sense of one who has no regard for man's sublimest ideals. But he does wish to dissociate these ideals from a being foreign to man, and in this sense he denies the existence of God. All the attributes which are usually objectified in God are returned by Feuerbach to man himself in his essential nature and tendency. In this recognition of the divinity and communal oneness of man, human individuals attain the concrete unity and freedom for which they have always been striving under various metaphysical and religious guises. Thus Feuerbach declares the essence of religion and Christianity to be man himself as a self-founded being.

Marx read this critique of Hegel and orthodox religion with great enthusiasm, for it opened a way for him to pass beyond mere left-wing idealism to a more independent position. He liked Feuerbach's repudiation of a metaphysical absolute, his replacement of the science of the absolute by a theory of man, his vindication of feeling and his hints about the social factor in human nature. On the other hand, there was plenty of work left for Marx himself to do.<sup>7</sup> The Feuerbachian analysis of

<sup>7</sup> Marx's early criticisms of Hegel and Feuerbach are gathered in the first volume of the first section of the Marx-Engels *Historisch-kritische Gesamt-Ausgabe*, ed.

religion was true as far as it went, but it had not ascertained the cause of the religious projection of an ideal world into a subsistent region of its own. This cause Marx found to lie in the social and economic conditions under which men were living. Feuerbach had successfully reversed the relation between the ideal and the real, revealing the former to be a derivative of the latter. But his realism was not sufficiently dialectical and critical, since it left untouched the actual condition of flesh-and-blood men. This reluctance to engage in social as well as religious criticism was attributed by Marx to the passive view Feuerbach held of sense perception and, ultimately, to his remaining in the theoretical sphere where thought does not issue in action of a revolutionary sort.

It seemed clear to Marx that the critique of religion is only a preface to the more basic critique of political economy. For why are men led to objectify their aspirations if not because of the intolerable social conditions under which they are forced to exist? Religion is both the expression of this miserable state and a protest against it, a protest which yet is quite ineffective since it leads men to dream about an illusory happiness coming from on high. The radical cure for the religious sickness is not the reduction of theology to anthropology but the surpassing of all ologies in favor of a revolutionary transformation of the social and economic order. Hegel had said that we can speak of man properly only when he is regarded as a member of civil society and as having certain needs and functions in that society. Marx admitted that man is properly human only as a unit of society. But he pointed out that the established order within which Hegel sought to define man (and against which Feuerbach did not rebel) was itself inhumane and hence no fit matrix for the total realization of human potentialities and hopes. As modern society has developed, the vast majority of men are reduced to the inhuman status of means of production

D. Riazanov (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1927 ff.). The mature position of Marx is reflected in F. Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of German Classical Philosophy* (Engl. ed. by C. Dutt, New York, 1934). See S. Hook's *From Hegel to Marx* (New York, 1936).

and pawns of the impersonal demands of the market. Some way must be found to confer personal dignity upon empirical individuals and so to emancipate man simply as man.

We may leave Marx at this intermediate stage in his journey. His theories about history, class warfare, the proletariat, and a classless society constitute his more definite proposals for ushering in the era of Marxian man. He employed the dialectical method for materialistic ends, believing that religion, the conflict of classes, and the misery of self-alienated societies would disappear when and only when his view of man as essentially a collective and economic being prevailed in a concrete way. His critique of religion is integral with, but also subordinate to, his more basic critique of political economy. If man is to find any salvation on the face of the earth, Marx looked for it in a quickened appreciation of the dignity of work as a union of theory and action, insight and sense, freedom and discipline. His socio-economic interpretation of man is in many ways the strict outcome of Hegelian philosophy and the bourgeois view of life. It goes a long way toward making understandable the attraction which some men of good will have felt, at least momentarily and in theory, toward Marx and Communism. Here, then, is one modern attempt to provide a satisfactory account of man and his vocation.

#### IV

Another answer is proposed by American naturalism. This movement is still subject to growing pains and perhaps cannot as yet be given a rounded description. It reckons Frederick Woodbridge, Morris Cohen and (*sotto voce*) George Santayana among its forbears, and still benefits from the vigorous aid of John Dewey. One attempt at stating compendiously the common convictions binding naturalists together reads thus:

Naturalism can be defined negatively as the refusal to take "nature" or "the natural" as a term of distinction. . . . It is opposed to all dualisms between Nature and another realm of being—to the Greek opposition between Nature and Art, to the medieval contrast of the

Natural and the Supernatural, to the empiricist antithesis of Nature and Experience, to the idealist distinction between Natural and Transcendental, to the fundamental dualism pervading modern thought between Nature and Man. For present-day naturalists "Nature" serves rather as the all-inclusive category, corresponding to the role played by "Being" in Greek thought, or by "Reality" for the idealists. . . . Naturalism thus merges in the generic activity of philosophy as critical interpretation—the examination of the status of all these varieties of "stuff" in Nature—or in Being, or in Reality—and the discovery of their various relations to each other and their respective functions in man's experience. Positively, naturalism can be defined as the continuity of analysis—as the application of . . . "scientific methods" to the critical interpretation and analysis of every field.<sup>8</sup>

One further general point is to be noted. Naturalism is not only antidualist but also antireductionist, i. e., it does not wish to deny the presence of various levels or modes of being, provided that they are all included within nature and are susceptible of treatment by the method of physical science.

Naturalism as so defined owes its greatest debt to John Dewey, a debt, it will be noted, which is primarily philosophical rather than educational. Dewey's philosophical development during the last two decades of the nineteenth century is decisive for the whole later course of American philosophy, especially for the naturalism which is its direct outgrowth.<sup>9</sup> Like most American thinkers of that period, he turned for philosophical guidance to Hegel. The present decline in serious Hegelian studies is a handicap to the historical appreciation and criticism of Dewey and the naturalistic movement in America. It was natural for Dewey to follow the lead of Hegelian masters like George S. Morris in regard to the continuity of all modes of thought and being and the embracing character of universal mind. Dewey sought to show in logical theory the organic correlation and underlying sameness of all entities and poles of

<sup>8</sup> J. Randall "Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. by Y. Krikorian (New York, 1944), pp. 357-58.

<sup>9</sup> Dewey's earlier standpoints have been chronicled by M. White: *The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism* (New York, 1943).

tension in the universe. He sided with the Hegelian denunciation of hard-and-fast dualisms in method and reality. This antidualism placed him in simultaneous opposition to Kant (who set off the transcendental from the empirical, the theoretical from the practical) and to the British empiricists (who regarded the knowing subject as passively and nonorganically related to an independent object).

Dewey's study of Darwinian evolutionism and the psychological theories of William James affected his outlook as radically as had Kant's reading of Hume.<sup>10</sup> Darwin re-enforced the conviction about man's continuity with the rest of nature, but did so in biological terms rather than idealistic. For his part, James suggested a way of interpreting intelligence and the cognitive process according to a biological pattern. If knowing can be taken as but one instance of the vital and purposive adjustment of organism to environment, then a synthesis can be made of the best elements in the older idealisms and empiricisms. This was the aim of Dewey's experimentalism and his adoption of the pragmatic view of mind and truth for his own use in logical and social inquiry. Whereas Hegel had understood science to be the dialectical method used by philosophical reason in gaining knowledge of the absolute, Dewey restricted the meaning of scientific method to the procedure followed by the physical sciences (with the biological sciences questionably included under this heading). These sciences display the common type or pattern of inquiry which must be followed in all fields where warranted knowledge is to be obtained. Dewey's plan is to empty the method of the physical sciences of all definite metaphysical import, erect it into the sole universally valid scientific method—because of its admitted success in its

<sup>10</sup> Dewey gives his own account of this transition in his essay, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. by G. Adams and W. Montague (2 vols., New York, 1925), vol. II. Here Dewey recalls that the reading of a text on physiology written by T. Huxley gave him his first interest in philosophy. Admiring the interdependence and interrelated unity found in the human body, Dewey "was led to desire a world and a life that would have the same properties as had the human organism" (p. 13). This organicistic prejudice has operated throughout his later speculations.

original application—and extend it to all subject-matters of inquiry.<sup>11</sup>

More recent naturalists are attempting to execute this program in detail, especially in the case of those specifically human areas which were formerly reserved for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Men like Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, and John Randall stress both the polemical and the constructive interests of naturalism. A favorite object of attack is the Catholic Church, which upholds a real distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders and the reality of the latter order. Along with Catholicism is attacked Scholastic philosophy, which is accused of rending the seamless robe of human experience by admitting a transcendent God and personal survival of an immaterial human soul after death. The list of recusants is extended to include Plato, Kant, John Locke in certain aspects and, generally, all philosophers who have recourse to "transcendental" causes and principles of explanation. Their common fault is to have supposed some entity beyond nature, whether this transcending being be God raised above His creation or man in contradistinction to the physical universe or reason operating according to a method distinctively its own. On the other hand, the naturalists also profess opposition to the "nothing-buttters" in philosophy, the simplistic thinkers who would reduce the universe to nothing but cosmic mind or nothing but matter in motion. This disqualifies a crude materialism as well as metaphysical idealism.

Such wide negative criticism would seem to leave only a scanty group of acceptable thinkers in the past who can survive the naturalistic separation of sheep from goats. However, admiration is expressed for what is termed the naturalistic spirit of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hobbes. What wins approbation in these philosophers is not their peculiar sets of doctrine but their application of the same categories to man as well as to the rest of nature. Even Aquinas is commended for this

<sup>11</sup> Consult *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, 1925), ch. I; *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), pt. IV.

trait as well as for his insistence upon the unity of the human composite.<sup>12</sup> Hegel is looked upon with favor insofar as he advocated the unrestricted use of a single method, although the warning is issued that method must now be taken in the more empirical sense suggested by successful operations in mathematical physics and biology. If scientific method is adequate for studying all phases of reality, then at least in principle there is assured a continuity of analysis. This means that the same notions and principles can be applied to all sections of experience. No exceptions are allowed, and whatever cannot be treated in terms of the common categories and method cannot claim the status of reality.

Francis Bacon described the purpose of his *Instauratio Magna* to be the restoration of the fruitful commerce and unity between the mind of man and the nature of things. John Dewey, who pays homage to Bacon as a kindred empirical mind,<sup>13</sup> declares this to be also the goal of the naturalistic reconstruction in philosophy. It wishes to restore man to nature and thus to guarantee a single world of experience untroubled by an infinite God or a kind of "spiritual" aspect peculiar to man. Certain phases of human nature have been successfully submitted to scientific analysis. There is no obstacle in principle against interpreting the rest of human experience in the same way. Whatever reality is contained in man's artistic works, his moral character and his religious attitude can be determined empirically and incorporated within the naturalistic context. Not only human bodily activities and cognition, but also the pursuit of beauty, virtuous living, and self-sacrificing devotion are natural events and come within the scope of intelligence as naturalistically construed. Naturalists have hope of closing the gap between the descriptive and the so-called normative sciences, between fact and value, isness and oughtness. They look to a future situation in which human life and society

<sup>12</sup> J. Randall, *loc. cit.*, p. 370.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the remarkably uncritical pages devoted to Bacon in Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, 1920), ch. II.

will be just as effectively explored and organized for man's benefit as is nonhuman nature under scientific dominion.

## V

Perhaps as a dialectical counterbalance to the Baconian sort of optimism and confidence in the future accomplishments of science is the widely popular existentialist reading of man's nature and destiny. This interpretation of man is a kind of revenge taken by the private individual against the standard of public verifiability and operationalism when they do not allow for the insight of the individual human mind into self-evident truths of being. It is a kind of protest of human inwardness and "the underground man" (as William Barrett suggests<sup>14</sup>) against the universal claims of the objective method. A reminder and even a threat are tendered that there are regions of human personality which are not only irreducible to the other elements in nature but also at times in revolt against them. The terrible capacities of human freedom are again brought to the attention of those who have been lulled into treating themselves and their actions in exactly the same way as all other natural things and events.

One cannot speak indiscriminately about "the existentialists," since the widest differences separate thinkers like Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre. For our present purpose, only the views of Jean-Paul Sartre will be considered. His version of existentialism belongs on the extreme left wing, is avowedly atheistic and antireligious, and has been spread far and wide through novels, plays, and pamphlets. Furthermore, Sartre has insisted upon the humanistic consequences of his doctrines. Another point of comparison with the philosophical standpoints previously considered is the close dependence of Sartrean existentialism upon certain movements in the nineteenth century.

In this latter respect, the role of Hegel as a fountainhead of later thought is again emphasized, but from a new angle.

<sup>14</sup> *What is Existentialism?* (New York, 1947).

Hegelian philosophy is truly ambiguous. It has been hailed and exploited by Marx and Dewey for its defense of scientific knowledge, method and rationality. From this standpoint, it is a great essay in panlogism. But other students of this system have pointed out its radical irrationalism, its sheer positing of the idealistic absolute and its helplessness before the genuine instances of otherness present in human experience.<sup>15</sup> A strain of hopeless tragedy is injected into even the most optimistic flights of the dialectic. An "unhappy consciousness"<sup>16</sup> pervades Hegel's thought as he reflects upon the universal need for negativity, alienation from self, and clash with the irreducibly other. Hegel himself tried to incorporate unhappy consciousness as but an integral moment in the triumphal progress of the absolute idea. Marx grasped at the identification of unhappy consciousness with the romantic and medieval religious attitude, proclaiming that the religious consciousness would disappear once the material grounds for a diremption of self were removed. Dewey could not find any scientific grounds for entertaining this foreboding state of mind and so banished it to the limbo of private emotions and public superstitions.

But the pessimistic note was sympathetically received by some philosophers. Hegel had written prophetically that he and his nineteenth century were standing in the shadow of a speculative Good Friday. The sense of living in a world without a God or an idealistic absolute filled the mind and sensibility of Friedrich Nietzsche. He tried to present the death of God as the good news of human liberation.<sup>17</sup> Yet the moral

<sup>15</sup> R. Kröner: *Von Kant bis Hegel* (2 vols., Tübingen, 1921-24), vol. II, p. 271; I. Iljin: *Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gotteslehre* (Bern, 1946), pt. IV. For a half-hearted attempt to assimilate the irrationalistic element in Hegel to the rationalistic, cf. J. Royce's *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven, 1919), lect. X.

<sup>16</sup> A thorough study of the role of *das unglückliche Bewusstsein* in Hegel's thought is found in J. Wahl: *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris, 1929); for a commentary on its classic development in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, cf. J. Hyppolite: *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de L'Esprit de Hegel* (Paris, 1946), pp. 184 ff.

<sup>17</sup> Typical passages are furnished in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, prologue to pt. I, and pt. IV, ch. 73, #2.

and even intellectual values of the modern world had a religious attachment and would be cancelled by a thorough-going atheism. Nietzsche accepted this consequence and spent himself in the attempt to make a godless world a human and hopeful one. His myths about the Dionysian man, the laughing genius, Zarathustra, *Uebermensch* and the eternal return of the same are his desperate substitutes for God as the foundation of moral and intellectual life. Our contemporary world, although fascinated by these myths, prefers either to rediscover the living God Who had been lost sight of by many nineteenth-century proponents of religion or to explore the possibilities in a world without either God or any myth of the absolute.

Sartre stems from this latter option in favor of a "lucid atheism." He has learned with Heidegger to regard Nietzsche's *amor fati* as an acceptance of the finitude and contingency of existence without the prospect of founding this existence upon any principle outside of man. Heidegger was content to confine his analysis to the structure of human existence, without taking any overt stand on the religious implications of his metaphysics.<sup>18</sup> Yet these implications were there to be worked out. If the results of a study of human existence are universally valid, then every real being must be subject to contingency, temporality, and limitation. Heidegger himself admitted that questions about an eternal, infinite God and a creation outside of time are not legitimately posed in an existential philosophy. Sartre is more forthright in maintaining that the very notions of God and creation are absurd.

To understand his position on these matters, his ontological doctrine on man must be grasped.<sup>19</sup> Man is set off by his ability to reflect upon his own nature. In certain moods of a primitive kind, he is overwhelmed by an impression of the brute givenness of his own existence and of all things. This existence is simply there in its complete gratuity: it is underived from

<sup>18</sup> For Heidegger's most recent remarks on humanism, see his "Letter on 'Humanism,'" - appended to: *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (Bern, 1947).

<sup>19</sup> This view is given technical formulation in the Introduction to *L'Etre et le Néant* (fifth ed., Paris, 1943).

any other principle and cannot be explained in a deductive way by any prior set of premises. Taken by itself, this mode of *being-in-itself* is so opaque and closely pressed together that it leaves no room for consciousness. The latter takes its origin in the bosom of brute existence after the manner of a void, a distance, a questioning process. Because man can, as it were, place his own existence off at arm's length so as to scrutinize it and raise doubts about it, he enjoys the mode of *being-for-itself*. Thus man shares in two modes of being: as a given thing subject to determining laws, he is a fact of existence; as a questing consciousness, he can inquire about the meaning of his life and of his world.

Consciousness is by nature intentional, i. e., it intends or is directed toward an object. The object toward which the human intelligence is directed is an other, and the pursuit of the other constitutes the process of transcendence. Among all the goals of human transcendence, one is supreme and specifies man's nature in a special way. The ideal which arouses the deepest response is a mode of being which would combine the solidity and plenitude of given existence with the lucidity and self-presence of consciousness. Were there such a being, it would be the equivalent of God. But Sartre denies even the possibility of God's existence, since brute existence and consciousness are never found as one.<sup>20</sup> They establish a duality at the heart of being which cannot be bridged by any movement of transcendence. To seek forever to realize their synthesis is, however, the most ingrained drive of man. He is truly a religious animal, but the passion by which he is moved is in principle a futile one. It is his doom to seek an ideal that can never be made actual.

Faced with this hopeless prospect, what ought a man to do? What he ought to do and what he usually does do never coincide. Ordinarily, he finds a way of evading the bitter truth either by drowning his critical spirit in a multitude of everyday tasks or by pretending that the law of his life is inscribed some-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34, 123-24.

where in unfaltering script. What he ought to do is to confess the bad faith behind these dodges and to embrace his human situation with fortitude and ingenuity. Sartre's kind of humanism calls for a frank recognition that no values or laws exist before the individual creates them through his unconditioned freedom. What his existence is to mean for the individual is a work solely for his own free decision and effort. He is called upon by loyalty to himself to organize his own world according to a self-imposed pattern of intelligibility order and values.

As best he can, the Sartrean man is also required to correlate his world with the projects of other selves. Conflict is the ineluctable outcome of our efforts at forming a domestic, social, or political community. We may regard as typical the fate of Orestes, in Sartre's play, *The Flies*. Having killed the king and queen without remorse and without concern over the impreca-  
tions of Jupiter, he finds in the end that even the people, for whose sake he had slain the tyrants, fail to discern in his act the true mark of liberty. Disillusioned but sustained by his own sense of freedom, Orestes betakes himself to the solitude which befits the one free spirit on earth. Orestes has been called the only "authentically humanistic" figure in Sartre's imaginative writings. His brand of humanism is solipsistic, histrionic, and destructive of human life.

## VI

What general observations, relevant for Catholic education today, can be drawn from an examination of these three approaches to the problem of man? Some results of the study may be set down in this final section.

A thorough sifting and weighing of the needs of modern man cannot be undertaken unless the problems singled out in various special fields are replaced in their general philosophical setting. The modern philosophical mind has been no less preoccupied than the medieval with the relation between God and man, despite the wide discrepancy in the respective solutions of the problem. In one of his occasional essays, Professor Gilson observes that the Renaissance differed from the Middle Ages

not because it added a new emphasis on man's dignity but because it subtracted belief in God from our common heritage.<sup>21</sup> And, Gilson adds, the tragedy was that in losing God the Renaissance went on to lose man as well. What holds true of the Renaissance holds with at least equal force of subsequent intellectual history. Perhaps the most critical phase in the progressive dehumanization of human kind was entered upon in the nineteenth century. More philosophical research needs to be devoted to this period from which our own situation has grown.<sup>22</sup>

There is need to grasp and try to undo a disastrous misunderstanding. All three representative thinkers agree that the loss of belief in God and of membership in the Church, far from spelling the destruction of man, is the necessary condition for all further improvements in our human condition. This conviction was a main factor in justifying and fostering the alienation of great masses of working people from the Church. The remedy for this separation is not wholly or mainly economic, but philosophical and religious. Criticism must be directed toward the treatment accorded to religion by absolute idealism. On the one hand, the assumption of Hegel and Feuerbach that religion and an absolutistic philosophy have the same content can be challenged, especially in the case of Christian revelation which is not assimilated to a philosophical system simply because its conceptual equivalent can be loosely expressed in terms of that system. On the other hand, neither the existence of God nor the spiritual principle in man's nature is inextricably bound up with the explanations of Kantian philosophy. The dualisms of the latter are its own and are not transferrable to a realist philosophy of God and man. A Christian humanism finds a place for social betterment, scientific method, and personal freedom, without absolutizing any one of these factors in human experience. Because it will

<sup>21</sup> *Les idées et les lettres* (Paris, 1932), p. 192.

<sup>22</sup> Recent studies have been made by K. Löwith: *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche* (Zurich, 1941), and by H. de Lubac: *Le Drame de l'humanisme athée* (rev. third ed., Paris, 1945).

not be satisfied with anything less than an integral conception of man, perennial philosophy is required to set forth the historical and methodological reasons for the inhumanity of so much current philosophizing about man.

Marxism and naturalism have abused the historical argument to the point of forgetting that every philosophy must stand the test of intelligence as well as of time and the cultural drift. Marx likes to settle irritating questions by an appeal to the larger impersonal verdict of the dialectical movement. But in actual fact, it is the historical individual rather than history which makes judgments. The habit of looking upon his own conception of man as the culmination of the entire movement of history came all too easily to Marx for having witnessed Hegel's claims for his philosophy. Although repudiating any final issue to history, Dewey is similarly inclined to spin an apocryphal tale about the development of the Western mind much in the manner (although not in the doctrinal spirit) of that other philosophical raconteur, Léon Brunschvicg. It is an abiding temptation to substitute a counsel that we move along with the times for an examination of data that are publicly accessible not only as between contemporary individuals but also as between men in different ages. Much of the fostered disagreement in American life today can be traced to this substitution of myths about intellectual and social history for philosophical discussion.

Another source of deliberate disunity is the generalization of a method which has proved workable in a restricted sphere. Only one who is not already convinced that the triadic method holds good in a rigid way outside the field of logic will agree with the Feuerbachian account of the religious attitude. One of the main themes in Christian revelation is the overcoming of the master-slave relationship not by abandoning religion but precisely by entering into closer religious friendship with God. To replace absolute mind by man and then by the socio-economic collectivity is a *tour de force* whose success is limited strictly to the realm of systematic concepts. There is no reason to believe that the Marxian plan for man will be any more favorable to

the enrichment of actual human lives than were the recommendations of its dialectical antecedents.

On his own reckoning, method is of key importance in the writings of John Dewey. This is only to be expected in any essay at philosophical thinking. No intrinsic requirement of sound inquiry, however, obliges him to single out one method as the prototype of valid investigation in all fields and problems.<sup>23</sup> This is an uncriticized residue from Dewey's idealistic period. Because he now prefers to formulate this presupposition in biological terms is no warrant that it has been critically re-examined and found to be sound. In actual practice, the naturalistic interpretation of the continuity of analysis is suspiciously pliable. It tends at times to confuse univocity and continuity of method. There is certainly a common pattern of inquiry displayed by intelligence at work in various fields and upon various problems. Aristotle sought to characterize science in this broadest sense. Just as important as the likeness is the presence of differences arising from the readjustments needed in order to deal with the various areas of experience. What naturalism fails to do is to determine in any precise and open way the nature of these methodic differences and their significance for defining the standard of warranted assertibility.

We are shown the gravely sober, antidualistic side of naturalism whenever there is question of other uses of intelligence and other perspectives on the universe than its own. Because operationalism cannot but be the mode of verification in physical science, it is concluded that only in this way can men discern truth from fancy and superstition.<sup>24</sup> And because truth-seeking in the practical order does bear some resemblance to organic adjustment, only those solutions of problems which can be stated biologically as a resolution of an indeterminate situation merit our respect. The danger is that these pronouncements

<sup>23</sup> A critical treatment of Dewey's methodology is attempted in my article, "Metaphysics in an Empirical Climate," *Giornale di metafisica*, vol. II, nn. 4-5 (1947).

<sup>24</sup> On the limitations of the method of physical science, cf. V. Smith: *The Philosophical Frontiers of Physics* (Washington, 1947).

may be taken in a literal and heavyhanded way by incautious minds. Their conclusion will be that since a good deal of what was once taken to be among man's "highest" achievements cannot be verified after this manner, whole areas of human personality and activity have no standing before naturalistic intelligence. This would undoubtedly impair the case for naturalism as a champion of man and human culture.

The other face of naturalistic method is exposed in order to cope with these charges of levelling and antihumanism. Naturalism then expresses its abhorrence of reductionism and all its works. Stress is now laid upon the various levels of experience and the incalculable capacities of the human spirit. Only a "certain" continuity is claimed for scientific analysis, leaving room for various techniques and uses of scientific method. Religious and moral aspects of experience, for instance, are honored—with the one proviso that they cannot be taken as testimony to the existence of God or of a natural moral law which shares in His eternal wisdom. While the pattern of scientific method is admitted to be the same, generous allowance is made for variety in techniques and procedures and ways of testing because of differences in the subject-matters of inquiry. Even the meaning of experiment is so liberalized that "looking to the consequences of action" approaches the classical meaning of *speculare*. Educationally, this permits a naturalist like Sidney Hook to take a broadly balanced view of educational content and aims.<sup>25</sup>

What is *not* allowable is to show only the one aspect of naturalism or the other as the turn of controversy would seem to dictate. For this leads now to an excessively narrow interpretation of scientific method and now to an excessively capacious one. Unless the ambiguity is cleared up, there will remain

<sup>25</sup> *Education for Modern Man* (New York, 1946). In his criticism of Professor Demos' remarks on the philosophical aspects of the Harvard Report on General Education, Hook makes a plea that operational logic be "intelligently understood and not identified with the specific techniques of physics" ("Synthesis or Eclecticism?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. VII, n. 2, 1946, p. 215). This is a sound suggestion and one which would help to appraise this logic apart from the misleading appeal to the successes made by physics.

a dilemma facing the naturalists. Either their theory will have no way of dealing with all human experience or it will be incapable of determining what is warranted belief and what is non-warranted. When a restrictive appeal is made to scientific method, there is passed an effective pre-judgment of what content or subject-matter of experience is "real" and of what type of problem is "soluble." This is a reductionism of method leading indirectly to a reductionism of experience and content. But if a quite commodious sense is attached to naturalism, then no convincing rebuttal can be made to the extravagant arguments of a Professor Northrop. The latter simply attaches the eulogistic term "scientific" to a number of procedures he favors and to a number of plans he would like to see carried out.<sup>26</sup> To become humanistic in practice, naturalism must renounce its reductionism of method; to avoid equivocation and undisciplined speculation, it must specify more closely the kind of adaptation followed by reason in pursuing various sorts of problems. The condition for arriving at a humanistic understanding of science is the development of a theory of method as having an analogical unity throughout its various uses. With the aid of such a methodology, the existence of God, His presence in the world, the created character of the finite world, and the presence in man of an immaterial principle can be admitted without falling into what naturalists call the "dualist" view of experience. The ground is then cut away from the assumption that belief in God and an immortal soul is detrimental to man's welfare.

Methodological questions are of prime concern to Sartre also, leading him to make a close study of phenomenology. But phenomenological analysis is no adequate tool for constructing an ontology and a theory of morals. It hypostasizes the objects of consciousness, misleading the unwary investigator into identifying the results of his analysis with real entities. This

<sup>26</sup> This is Northrop's procedure in *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York, 1947), a book which recalls the equivocations in the Hegelian use of *Wissenschaft*.

accounts for the intermixture of fantasy and verisimilitude in Sartre's descriptions of familiar human situations. Brute existence and consciousness are never opposed in man as irreconcilable things. Another drawback to a method adapted primarily to a discrimination of the modes of conscious content in human experience is its unsuitability for characterizing nature as a whole. These two defects are joined together when Sartre discourses about God and human community. The failures which he records are due not to an inherent contradiction in the ideas of God and human love and unanimity but to the unwarranted extension he has made of his method.<sup>27</sup>

It may be asked what genuine needs of modern man help to explain the prevalence of these philosophical doctrines. Marx voiced the need for criticizing unregulated capitalism and for reorganizing social and economic life on a more humane basis. He rightly deplored the dichotomy between one's rule of action as a private person and as a public functionary or member of society. In addition, he saw in an ennobled attitude toward work a powerful means for improving our social lot. A similar urgency to vindicate the dignity of practical life and intelligence is felt by Dewey in reaction against a one-sided stress on speculation. He has reminded us both of the nobility of the practical order and of our responsibility to bring insight to bear in a relevant way upon our own situation. His discontent with dualism has a sound basis insofar as it seeks to reinstate the unitary being of man and his placement in the general order of nature. Body and soul ought not to be regarded as independent and only extrinsically related entities, nor should the temporal, finite condition of man be glossed over or depreciated. The naturalistic insistence upon common terms for the description of all parts of experience is a condition for any renewal of metaphysics. It is as though the first stage on the long road to a full appreciation of human nature is a reminder about our common finitude and implication in nature. The sentiment of contin-

<sup>27</sup> For further discussion, cf. my study, "The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre," *Thought*, vol. XXII, n. 88 (1948).

gency also permeates the thought of Sartre, along with an intimation of the dignity and strength of human freedom.

Yet the vision of man needs to be seen in its wholeness. The promise of community must be fulfilled at every level of human personality and society; our naturalness and finitude should be allowed to reveal themselves further as signs of the creatureliness which we share with all the works of God; our freedom strains to follow its proper inclination, transforming us from things and vain passions into free men living in free solidarity with God and our fellows. In a word, instead of aiming to be orthodox Marxists, naturalists, or existentialists, we should try simply to become men, men of full stature. The scattered fragments of the image of man can be reunited provided that we come to see ourselves for what we really are: men of God and fellow workers in His world. The nihilistic alternative—also suggested by the nineteenth century—is expressed by Dostoevsky's protagonist, Kirillov:

To recognize that there is no God and not to recognize at the same instant that one is God oneself is an absurdity, else one would certainly kill oneself. For three years I've been seeking for the attribute of my godhead and I've found it; the attribute of my godhead is self-will! That's all I can do to prove in the highest point my independence and my new terrible freedom. For it is very terrible. I am killing myself to prove my independence and my new terrible freedom.<sup>28</sup>

But what steps can Thomists in particular take toward the resolution of the humanistic crisis? In order to bring out more

<sup>28</sup> *The Possessed* (Engl. tr. by Garnett, New York), pp. 582-83. These lines from Dostoevsky have been the center of a controversy concerning Marxism in particular. They are quoted by Jacques Maritain: *Humanisme intégrale* (Paris, 1936), p. 70, as evidence of the radical inviability of the atheistic outlook. But Sidney Hook (*Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy* [New York, 1940], pp. 97-98) takes Maritain to task for using these sophistical sentiments as proofs of God's existence. The text of Dostoevsky and the context of Maritain's quotation make it clear that a Kirillov embodies the attitude of a deeply-felt denial of God's existence and affirmation of man's will to the absolute. He shows the nihilism bordering on madness to which atheistic humanism leads, when it becomes the mainspring of a man's life. I agree with Hook, however, that Dostoevsky himself assumes a much more dialectical position to his characters than Maritain allows.

sharply and definitely the relevance of the Thomistic conception of man for these problems, only the case of Dewey will be considered. On at least three major counts, the Thomistic theory stands in paradoxical relation to that of Dewey. Although not naturalistic, it satisfies certain legitimate demands made by naturalism; yet it also contradicts the negative aspects of naturalism without entailing the fearful consequences predicted for any such disagreement. The three stumbling blocks concern St. Thomas' method, his doctrine on human nature and his doctrine on human cognition and contemplation. The main lines of criticism may be suggested very briefly.

First of all, St. Thomas challenges the assumption that the philosopher must choose between continuity of being and analysis on the one hand and hierarchy and causal explanation on the other. His own approach indicates that there is a non-naturalistic way of regarding lower and higher modes of being as belonging to a single world or integrated situation. This is not incompatible with a persistent search after a sufficient causal explanation of the different kinds of organization, which Dewey is content to leave unexplained. Dewey rightly criticizes Hume for being satisfied with calling the associative laws of mind primitive and irreducible facts. In the same way, Dewey himself is open to criticism for merely labeling the differences between inorganic, animal, and human structures as irreducible general traits which do not permit of further analysis. To say that causes cannot be interpolated "suddenly from without" is to evade a difficulty by calling upon the imagination. It is not a matter of arbitrary metaphysical preference or "supernatural intervention" when Aquinas concludes that the formal nature of man is superior in kind to that of other animals. This superiority is based not upon some ideal scale of values but upon the operations, cognitive and otherwise, which contribute to human experience and reveal something of the distinctive character of human nature.

Significantly enough, St. Thomas avoids positing gaps in a universe of many modes of being precisely because of his views on divine causality and the graded ordering of finite causes

under God's government. Instead of stipulating in an *a priori* way that any transcendent being would disrupt the continuity of nature, he asks how it can be that the universe is operationally and telically continuous. He agrees with the pseudo-Areopagite that a lower grade of being in its most perfect form makes ontal and causal contact with the lowest instances of a higher grade. The continuity need not derive exclusively from a surge upwards on the part of less perfect beings, as the evolutionists suppose. There is a reciprocal and constructive influence stemming from more perfect agents as they help to establish order in the world which constitutes their environment and field of action. All finite causal power is regarded by Aquinas as sharing in God's causal power. Hence the actions of creatures bear the mark of the divine wisdom as it orders all agents and their operations to each other and to a common end of all nature. The world of finite causes is pre-eminently a con-crete world, one in which things cooperate in the joint task of making existence available variously and with ever increasing richness. God's wisdom and love are the principles of this dynamic continuity and process.

A second challenge is offered to naturalism when Aquinas treats the human substantial essence as a composite of an immaterial form and prime matter. He is just as solicitous as the naturalists to avoid a dualism which would jeopardize the human person as a single integrated being. Against those who would place the human soul in only a kind of extrinsic or accidental association with the organism, the essential and substantial nature of their union is urged. At the risk of scandalizing contemporaries who were indeed inclined to a dualistic view, Aquinas held that the human soul is by nature ordained to substantial union with matter and that the human person is neither the one principle alone nor the other but rather the composite whole. He did not overlook the difficulties attendant upon this position, but the instructive point is his refusal to rule out beforehand an essential union between material and spiritual principles of being within our natural world. It is at least more reasonable to explore this possibility thoroughly than

to block the path of inquiry by dubbing it non-naturalistic at the start. Nature does not wait upon the decision of naturalism before determining what can be and what cannot be. Philosophy must look to the clues provided by human nature in its actual operation rather than to cautionary tales about Ptolemaic cosmology.

Finally, a reading of Aquinas forces one to reconsider critically one of Dewey's despised trinities: Reason, Intuition, and the *A Priori*. This combination of human knowing powers is supposed to cover—in some impossible way—systems so widely divergent as those of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel. The inference is that all thinkers who do not subscribe to Dewey's own version of intelligence must fall into either gross empiricism or a kind of mystic and idealistic exaltation of Reason as a "pure," separate power of contemplating eternal objects. Dewey's account is a bewildering historical scramble in which one gets a fleeting glance now at Aristotle's *Noesis*, now at the Plotinian One, now at Hegel's *Vernunft* and now at some pseudo-mystical leap in the dark. The student is also left wondering how to account for St. Thomas' long polemic against ascribing to man a separate intellect, a superior reason different in kind from ordinary reason, and a state of perfect beatitude in this life. There would be no explaining the Thomistic teaching on the proper object of the human intellect, the close workings of intellect and sense, the distinction in kind between angelic and human intellect, and the analogical analysis of intellectual cognition as one among other sorts of vital operation. These salient points in Thomistic philosophy give the groundwork for a valid inclusion of man in a continuous universe. They suggest that Dewey has set up an artificial triad in counterdistinction to his own theory of mind. They also suggest the need to rehabilitate reason against the mythic excesses of idealism and the narrow vision of instrumentalism.

Dewey occasionally makes grudging acknowledgment of the good which is reflective knowledge sought for its own sake. But by a kind of sophistical distinction (dictated by his own social doctrines) between self-centered activity and socially respon-

sible action, he erects an opposition between the latter and contemplative activity. Here again, his reaction against a genuine evil has led him to the contrary excess. A selfish cultivation of the intellectual life in disregard of the claims of society is an attitude deserving condemnation. But it should be understood that the truly contemplative person is the first to denounce such a perversion of the search for truth for its own sake. St. Thomas set forth the theoretical foundation for the precept which governed his own life in religion: to convey to others the fruits of one's own contemplation. It is not out of distraction, senseless sacrifice, or capitulation before the exigencies of life that the contemplative person is zealous for the welfare of others, the communication of truth and the direction of society to proper ends. By its own weight, contemplative activity prompts a man to have regard for the wider sharing of the most important goods in life and of all goods in due order. Bergson in our own time brought forward empirical testimony to the immediate connection between loving contemplation, practical good sense, and social influence.

With this observation, the present study can be concluded. There is need today in education as in public life for great contemplative strength of mind making itself felt widely and fruitfully. Otherwise, the partial and warring contemporary theories of human nature will complete their work of dismemberment. And their common premise about the incompatibility of God and man will have worked itself out to its suicidal finish.

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# THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

[*Fourth Installment*]



## II. THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

### I. POTENCY AND ACT IN THE ORDER OF BEING

1. *The Metaphysical Order: Created Essence and Existence.* In discussing the essence and existence of things one is talking about their very being; Suarez begins, therefore, by pointing out what "to be" can mean. It can be taken in four ways: as the being of (1) essence, (2) existence, (3) subsistence and (4) the truth of a proposition. The first, if we distinguish it from being of existence, adds nothing real to created essence; "being of essence" does not imply something real having being outside its causes. "Being of existence," however, means actual being outside its causes by which a created thing is outside nothing. "Being of subsistence" is, unlike being of existence, proper to substances. It is distinct and separable from the substantial existence of a created nature; it does not constitute the nature in the ratio of actual entity as existence does. The "being of the truth of a proposition" is not of itself something real and intrinsic but is objective in the intellect composing.<sup>271</sup>

The fundamental question is the relationship between being of essence and being of existence; are they one reality or really distinct? Suarez' own solution is written large in the very first section of his discussion of this question; created essence and existence are not really distinct, and the foundation of this opinion is that nothing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself. If created essence and existence are distinct,

<sup>271</sup> *Disp. Meta.*, disp. xxi, sect. 1, n. 2.

by the very fact that each is really distinct as being from being each has this that it is a being and distinct. Consequently neither can formally and intrinsically *be* through the other.<sup>272</sup> But a penetration of that requires some preliminary discussion.

Being can be considered in two states: (1) in potency and (2) in act. A created essence *in potency* of itself, and before it is made through God's free, efficient act, is *nothing*. It is not a real thing having being distinct from God's being. What is not made by God (and these things are not yet made) is either God or it is nothing. It follows that being-in-act and being-in-potency are immediately and formally distinct as being and non-being, simply. Being in potency bespeaks no positive state or mode of being but includes, besides denomination from the agent's power, a negation of the things having actually come forth from potency. So, a thing ceases to be in potency when it is created.<sup>273</sup>

It follows that being-in-act, or an essence-in-act does not add existence to essence-in-potency; the latter is nothing and to nothing one cannot, properly, add anything. Even if one means that essence-in-act can add a distinct existence to an essence which is already an actual being but is potency with respect to existence one is involved in difficulties, for it follows that an actual essence differs from a potential formally and precisely not in the act of being but rather in its very essential entity.

<sup>272</sup> Et sic affirmat haec sententia existentiam et essentiam non distingui in re ipsa . . . Et hanc sententiam sic explicatam existimo esse omnino veram. Ejusque fundamentum breviter est quia non potest res aliqua intrinsece ac formaliter constitui in ratione entis realis et actualis per aliud distinctum ab ipsa, quia hoc ipso quod distinguitur unum ab alio tanquam ens ab ente utrumque habet quod sit ens, ut condistinctum ab alio, et consequenter non per illud formaliter et intrinsece (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

<sup>273</sup> Essentiam creaturae seu creaturam de se et priusquam a Deo fiat nullum habere in se verum esse reale . . . essentiam . . . omnino esse nihil (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, nn. 1-3). Principium . . . statuendum est nimurum in rebus creatis ens in potentia et in actu immediate et formaliter distingui tanquam ens et non ens simpliciter . . . quod illud esse in potentia seu illa potentia objectiva non possit esse res aliqua vera et positiva in se ipsa . . . est evidens . . . Relinquitur ergo ens in potentia ut sic non dicere statum aut modum positivum entis sed potius praeter denominationem a potentia agentis includere negationem . . . cum res creatur, desinit esse in potentia (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, nn. 1-4).

A being in objective potency is nothing; so, necessarily, any actual entity formally differs from the potential through that which constitutes the former in its genus of actual entity—in this case, the very essential being of an actual essence.<sup>274</sup>

It is clear that a real essence which in itself *is* something actually distinct from its cause is intrinsically constituted by some real actual being, for all real entity must be constituted by real being.<sup>275</sup> Yet this constitution is not through the composition of such being with such entity but through identity for (1) an actual essence differs from a potential essence immediately through its very entity. Therefore through that entity it has actual being and is constituted, and (2) a real essence is distinct from existence either (a) *not* really, and in that case, clearly it has no being distinct from existence by which it is made actual or (b) in *nature*, and in that case while the being of an actual essence is distinct from the being of actual existence it is *not* distinct from the actual essence; otherwise we proceed to infinity. Hence the constitution of the actual essence is not through composition with the being which constitutes it.<sup>276</sup>

<sup>274</sup> *Observandum est . . . frequenter ab auctoribus dici essentiam in actu addere existentiam ipsi essentiae. Qui modus loquendi juxta sententiam eorum qui affirmant essentiam existentem non distingui ex natura rei a suo esse intelligendus est necessario de additione secundum rationem . . . quia additio realis non fit proprie nisi enti reali . . . diximus autem essentiam in potentia nihil habere entitatis . . . ex hoc tamen necessario sequitur quamvis essentia actualis non differat a potentiali nisi dum est . . . formaliter tamen ac praecise non differre immediate in actu essendi sed in sua entitate essentiali* (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

<sup>275</sup> Our division of the remainder of the matter in this section is our own, yet justified. When from *Disputation XXXI* the parts pertinent to our point had been selected and reassembled under their respective headings, the matter quite naturally fell into four main divisions: (1) what created existence is, and what it is not—the formal cause; (2) what things exist—the material cause; (3) what agents can proximately effect some existences—the efficient cause; and (4) the effects of existence. We have unhesitatingly used a division natural and obvious, yet it is a division to which Suarez would perhaps object. The implications of the term, “The Material Cause of Existence,” would seem particularly inaccurate to him. He expressly teaches that existence as such requires no material cause; some existences do require one, but only when the actual essence does (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 8, nn. 4-5). Even the notion of formal cause of existence would seem inappropriate to him (*Ibid.*, n. 6). However, we use these terms in a wider sense than that in which Suarez would deny their acceptability.

<sup>276</sup> *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 4, nn. 1-3.

Suarez' next proposition is the fundamental one: this being by which the essence of a creature is formally constituted in the actuality of essence is true existence. He offers these arguments:

(1) For the truth of proposition, "essence is" when in the proposition there is only subject and copula (*locutio de secundo adiacente*) this being, precisely taken, is sufficient. Therefore this being is true existence. The consequence, Suarez adds, is clear for according to the common concept of men "is" in a proposition of this kind (*de secundo adiacente*) does not abstract from time but signifies actually being in nature, which is what we all mean by existence. The antecedent is shown by this that through this being of an actual essence precisely taken such an essence is a being in act and distinct from being-in-potency; by reason of it then the essence *is* for to be a being-in-act does not have less ratio of being than is included in the verb "is."<sup>277</sup>

(2) To the being of actual essence convene all those things which are attributed to existence. It is, therefore, true existence. As for the antecedent:

- a) This being is temporal not eternal = existence is temporal
- b) This being convenes *contingently* = existence convenes to to the creature a creature so
- c) This being is conserved in the = existence is proximate- creature by the Creator's efficiency ly conserved through God's efficiency

Thus no condition necessary to existence is unverified of the being of an actual essence unless one says: "One condition is lacking, namely, that it be distinct from the essence." That

<sup>277</sup> Illud esse quo essentia creaturae formaliter constituitur in actualitate essentiae est verum esse existentiae. . . . Hoc esse praecise sumptum satis est ad veritatem hujus locutionis de secundo adjacente. . . . *Essentia est*; ergo illud esse est vera existentia. Consequentia est clara: nam juxta communem significationem . . . hominum *est*, de secundo adjacente, non absolvitur a tempore sed significat actu esse in rerum natura quod omnes intelligimus nomine existentiae (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

begs the point; it is also illogical since a distinction is a result of, not a condition for, being.<sup>278</sup>

(3) Existential being is that by which, formally and immediately, a thing is constituted outside its causes, ceases to be nothing, and begins to be something. But the being by which, formally and immediately, a thing is constituted in the actuality of essence is that by which it is constituted outside its causes, ceases to be nothing, and begins to be something. The major is clear from the immediate and formal opposition between being-in-act and being-in-potency. Actual being is existing (else there would be a medium between possible and existing); hence what constitutes a thing actual in itself and outside its causes constitutes it existing. The minor is almost *per se* known; through this being an essence is constituted outside its causes and outside possibility. This being of the actual essence if it be understood to remain without any other distinct being (whether that be possible or not) is sufficient to distinguish an actual being from a possible and so constitute it in a new and temporal state and so terminate the action of the agent. This being, then, is existence.<sup>279</sup>

Suarez also puts his argument in these words: In reality it is the same for man to be and for man to be man, if in both propositions "to be" indicates act and not merely aptitude or the truth of a proposition. Likewise it is the same for man to

<sup>278</sup> *Huic esse actualis essentiae convenient omnia quae tribui solent existentiae . . . ergo est verum esse existentiae . . . nam esse essentiae actualis non est aeternum, sed temporale . . . hoc esse convenit creaturae contingenter . . . huic esse actualis essentiae convenit, ut conferatur creaturae per efficientiam Creatoris. . . Esset ergo voluntaria petitio principii inter conditiones necessarias ad esse existentiae ponere hujusmodi distinctionem . . . distinctio cum sit negatio vel relatio quaedam non est conditio per se requisita ad esse rei, sed est quid resultans ex tali esse rei (Ibid., n. 5).*

<sup>279</sup> *Esse existentiae nihil aliud est quam illud esse quo formaliter et immediate entitas aliqua constituitur extra causas suas, et desinit esse nihil, ac incipit esse aliquid; sed hujusmodi est hoc esse quo formaliter et immediate constituitur res in actualitate essentiae; ergo est verum esse existentiae. Major videtur esse per se nota. . . Item . . . ens actu idem est quod existens . . . Minor autem . . . fere est per se nota . . . ostensum est per hoc esse formaliter constitui essentiam extra possibilitatem (Ibid., n. 6).*

be man and to be rational or animal etc., for all these, in reality, are the same. Therefore all these predicates are taken from the same actuality and the same thing whether that thing is called actual essence or actual existence (*esse*). In one thing therefore there is only one being by which it is constituted a being-in-act, and that is the being of existence.<sup>280</sup>

More briefly we can phrase the argument: being-in-act is formally the same as existing; but the latter as such is formally constituted only through existence. It is really the same to say that man is as to say that man is man if *is* in both cases bespeaks act.

Negatively Suarez supports his teaching by arguing that a really distinct "being-of-existence" is both superfluous and impossible. It is superfluous, for if there were any necessity or utility for such imagined existence it could be shown by some reasonable and probable argument, and no formal effect can be assigned to this "entity of existence." To say it formally constitutes the essence as existing begs the question. The notion "existing" cannot add any ratio distinct from that of an actual being outside its causes; so there is no existence distinct from the being which constitutes each thing in the actuality of its essence.

It is impossible for it is unnecessary, and nature never postulates the superfluous. Also, where there is no possible formal effect there is no form possible, but there is no formal effect that a distinct existence could give.<sup>281</sup> To the argument that not all actuality comes from existence but that within the very essence

<sup>280</sup> Secundum rem idem est hominem esse et hominem esse hominem si in ultraque propositione esse dicat actum et non solam aptitudinem aut veritatem propositionis . . . reipsa idem est hominem esse hominem et esse rationalem vel animal, etc. quia haec omnia in re idem sunt. Quapropter ab eadem actualitate et ab eadem re haec omnia praedicata sumuntur sive illa res vocetur essentia actualis sive esse actuale ejus. . . . Non est est in una re nisi unum esse quo constituitur ens actu, et illud ipsum est esse existentiae (*Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 15).

<sup>281</sup> Omnis alia entitas vel modus realis est superfluus et sine probatione confictus. . . . Et hinc satis etiam constat hujusmodi entitatem vel modum esse superfluum. . . . Quid confert alia existentia? Inferimus hujusmodi entitatem existentiae . . . esse . . . impossibilem . . . quia ubi effectus formalis nullus est vel non est possibilis neque forma est possibilis (*Ibid.*, nn. 10-12).

there is actuality (for the inferior grade is actual with respect to the higher and the form with respect to matter) Suarez answers that the actual can be taken as opposed to (1) objective potency (so taken all actuality does intrinsically and formally come from existence), or (2) receptive potency (and it as so taken in the objection).

The act opposed to objective potency (entitative act) is sometimes really distinct from the act opposed to receptive potency (formal act) for the former, as participated by a receptive potency is really distinct from that potency's formal act. Sometimes however, the entitative act is only rationally distinct from the formal act. For the form to be the act of matter (at least aptitudinally) and actually to be such a thing differ only in concept. Hence (1) actual being distinct from being-in-potency is formally constituted through existence, (2) all formal actuality or actuation as it comes from some partial essence, comes too from a partial existence, for a form does not actuate matter unless it is such an actual entity, and it has this through its existence.<sup>282</sup>

From this teaching that the being of an actual essence *is* existence certain propositions are bound to come. As corollaries we shall treat here Suarez' notions of (1) the distinction between created essence and existence; (2) their composition; and (3) their inseparability.

(1) We certainly conceive created essence and existence as distinct. The question is, what distinction is there, in reality, between the two? Suarez proceeds methodically and discusses and judges three different opinions.

<sup>282</sup> [Actus] potest enim sumi vel ut opponitur potentiae objectivae vel ut respicit potentiam receptivam . . . in priori sensu . . . verissimum est omnem actualitatem entis . . . provenire ab esse existentiae. . . . Objectio autem procedit in posteriori sensu. . . . Actualitas autem prior seu entitativa ita comparatur ad actum . . . formalem ut interdum re ipsa distinguantur, interdum sola ratione . . . participatur non solum ab actu formalis sed etiam a potentia receptiva cuius entitativa actualitas realiter distinguitur ab actualitate formae; in ipsa autem forma, esse actum materiae, saltem aptitudine et esse tale ens actu sola ratione distinguuntur. . . . Non solum verum est, ens actu . . . constitui formaliter et intrinsece per esse existentiae sed etiam est verum omnem formalem actualitatem . . . sicut provenit ab aliqua essentia . . . ita provenire ab aliqua existentia. (*Ibid.*, n. 15).

(a) A real distinction between actual essence and existence is excluded; a created essence constituted in act outside its causes is not really distinguished from existence. Suarez argues: (1) From the authority of Aristotle saying that being joined to things adds nothing to them; it can be gathered from Aristotle himself that this is proportionately true of a thing in potency and act.<sup>283</sup> (2) Such a distinct entity of existence (1) added to an actual essence cannot formally give it the first actuality by which it is separated and distinguished from being in potency (for nothing can be constituted in its very entity through something distinct from itself) and (2) it cannot be necessary under any ratio of cause in order that an essence have its actual entity of essence, as has been shown. The position that existence is a necessary condition is unproven. In any case there are many conditions necessary for a thing to be; all of these conditions would then be existence.<sup>284</sup>

He considers the argument that a formal cause has a two-fold respect: (1) to the *composite*—it intrinsically composes the effect; (2) to the *matter*—for if the form, by informing or actuating the matter, confers to its being it can rightly be called its formal cause; therefore in the same way the entity of existence can be called the formal cause of the essence, and with the essence, it constitutes one existing thing; existence actuates the essence and formally makes it remain in being. To this argument Suarez replies that there is no composite to be composed of essence and a distinct existence. An existing thing and a being in act (an actual essence) are the same; the essence is not potential for existence but it has identical with itself some real existence constituting it outside its causes. Even if existence were a distinct act an actual essence could be conserved without it, by divine power at least (for while God can not supply for

<sup>283</sup> [Aristoteles] ubique ait ens adjunctum rebus nihil eis addere . . . hoc autem cum eadem proportione verum est de re in potentia et in actu (*Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 1).

<sup>284</sup> Talis entitas addita actuali essentiae nec potest illi formaliter conferre primam . . . actualitatem (potentia non constituatur intrinsece et formaliter in sua entitate per alteram, quae est actus) neque etiam potest esse necessaria sub aliqua ratione causae . . . ut essentia habeat suam entitatem actualem essentiae (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

an intrinsically composing formal cause He can supply for the dependence of one composing part on the other) and an entity so conserved is truly existing. Hence whatever this distinct act adds it is not existence, or necessary to the formal effect of existence. By the very fact that we understand an actual entity made by God we conceive it as existing. Since there is nothing false in that objective concept we can conclude that no other superadded thing is necessary for the formal effect of existing.<sup>285</sup>

(b) A modal distinction between essence and existence is not to be admitted, for a modal distinction which is positive on the part of both extremes can only be between a thing and its mode, so that the thing even without the mode is a positive real actual being. Hence an essence without the mode would already be actual, i. e., existing; so the mode cannot constitute it in that actuality. In any case the modally distinct existence would itself be modally distinct from its actual being, and the distinctions could go on to infinity.<sup>286</sup>

(c) In creatures a rational distinction with a foundation in reality is to be admitted between an actual essence and existence, and such a distinction is sufficient for us to say absolutely that it is not of the essence of a creature actually to exist. God alone has entity from Himself (*ex Se*) which includes a negation of having it from another and through efficiency. In this sense the statement "Existence is of the essence of God but not of the essence of creatures" is true; even to have the actual

<sup>285</sup> Concludimus nullum posse assignari constitutum propter quod talis entitas necessaria sit . . . existens . . . et ens actu id est non in potentia, idem omnino sunt . . . essentia illa ut jam est actualis entitas per effectiōnem suaē causae non est in se . . . pura potentia in ordine ad esse sed . . . omnino identice habet aliquod esse reale et actuale quod esse est vera existentia . . . saltem per divinam potentiam posse conservari actualis entitas essentiae sine illo ulteriori alio actu formalī . . . si autem Deus conservet essentiam sine actu existentiae distinctae illa entitas seu conservata est vere existens et . . . quidquid illi addi fingitur non potest veram rationem existentiae habere (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-8).

<sup>286</sup> Ipsa essentia praecise concepta . . . esset verum ens actu; ergo . . . non posset intrinsece constitui in tali entitate actuali per illum modum . . . resolvi posset in aliam entitatem et illum modum; et ita procedetur in infinitum donec sistamus in simplici entitate actuali (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-10).

entity of essence is not of the essence of a creature.<sup>287</sup> Yet when we say that it is not of the essence of a creature actually to exist, "creature" is not to be understood as a real created entity, for, as an actual entity, it does demand to exist. As whiteness is of the essence of a white thing, existence is of the essence of an actual thing. The creature can lose existence, but not without being destroyed. Therefore the creature does not have existence "of its essence" in the sense of having it independently of anything else; it does have it "of its essence" in the sense that that phrase means the primary and formal constitutive of a thing.<sup>288</sup>

(2) In view of what Suarez has already written, his answer to the question "of what kind is the composition between created essence and existence?" is easily predictable.<sup>289</sup> We can summarize that answer in these propositions: (1) This composition is called composition only analogously; it is not real but merely rational, since it is not between really distinct terms. (2) It is metaphysical composition since it is common to all creatures. (3) It is not the basis of corruption but abstracts from corruption. (4) Though only composition of reason it has a foundation in creatures, namely that creatures do not have existence from themselves but participate it from another. The fundament then includes imperfection which is repugnant to God; hence this composition is proper to creatures.<sup>290</sup>

<sup>287</sup> Dico . . . in creaturis existentiam et essentiam . . . solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute dicamus non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

<sup>288</sup> In hoc sensu, sicut albedo est de essentia albi ut album est ita existentia est de essentia creaturae ut res actu creata est . . . prout dicitur esse de essentia id quod est primum et formale constitutivum rei . . . existentia vere dici potest de essentia creaturae in actu constitutae (*Ibid.*, n. 24). Suarez adds that existence convenes contingently to a creature considered absolutely, that is, as it is precised from this that it be created or only creatible, but that it convenes necessarily to a creature taken for an actually created thing, namely, the conditional necessity that a thing be when it is. For Suarez' account of how reason arrives at its distinction between created essence and existence, cf. *Disp. Meta.*, loc. cit., n. 15 and ff.

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 13.

<sup>290</sup> Dicendum est compositionem ex esse et essentia analogice tantum compositionem appellari, quia non est compositio realis sed rationis . . . [quia] hic . . .

It does not follow that created existence, as unreceived in a potency, is therefore unlimited and infinite, for in any class of creatures existence is somehow limited. The existence of accidents is received in the subject; material substantial form is received in matter; matter is limited by its respect to form; a whole composed substance is limited by its parts; angels can be said to be received into the supposite; subsistence is limited since subsistence is only made; the whole supposit is limited because it is composed of limited extremes.<sup>291</sup> Created existence is, in fact received *by*, though not *in*, something for a thing can be unreceived in either of two ways: (1) unreceived both *in* something and *by* something—such a thing is infinite; (2) unreceived *in* something (a subject) but received *by* something—such a thing does not imply infinity since it subsists through composition with subsistence and is not pure act. It must not be thought that because it is participated existence, it is participated by a subject, which is really distinct from it; rather one and the same thing is a reality in a participated way.<sup>292</sup>

A being which is not received by anything, Suarez points out, is limited by itself, by its own nature, for it is of just so much perfection. That existence be limited it is enough that it be received *by* another in *such* a measure of *such* perfection even though it is not properly received in any passive potency. Likewise a created essence (even though it be its own existence)

*extrema non sunt in re distincta . . . haec vero est metaphysica . . . haec . . . ex se abstrahit a corruptione vel transmutatione physica (loc. cit., n. 7) . . . in re habeat aliquod fundamentum . . . hoc autem fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet se actu existere (Ibid., n. 9).*

<sup>291</sup> Non oportet ut esse creaturae illimitatum sit quamvis sit irreceptum in subjecto (*Ibid.*, nn. 14-15).

<sup>292</sup> Dupliciter intelligi esse irreceptum: uno modo quod sit irreceptum tam in aliquo quam ab aliquo . . . et de tali esse recte dicitur esse infinitum . . . Alio vero modo dici potest esse irreceptum in aliquo quamvis sit receptum ab aliquo et hoco modo conceditur esse creatum posse esse irreceptum; . . . Nego tamen inde sequi quod sit . . . infinitum. Tum quia, . . . est subsistens per compositionem . . . cum ipsa subsistentia; tum etiam quia non esset purus actus sed per participationem . . . non est imaginandum quod una res sit quae participat . . . et alia quae participatur . . . sed quia una et eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

can yet be limited, namely, by its own intrinsic difference. For Suarez it has not yet been proved that an actual thing can be limited only by composition with potency; for an absolute thing which has no potency to terminate it can yet be terminated by reason of this alone, that it has *such* a grade of being. Extrinsically it is limited by God either effectively or as an exemplary cause.<sup>293</sup>

(3) By reason of his fundamental thesis Suarez is forced to conclude to an absolute inseparability of essence and existence.<sup>294</sup>

He teaches briefly:

(a) It is impossible that existence be separated from its essence in such a way that existence is preserved, the essence destroyed. Those who hold for a real distinction teach this too, but they can give no reason why God could not separate the created existence and preserve it alone, for essence is not its cause through intrinsic composition; for such extrinsic causality God can supply.<sup>295</sup>

(b) Even by absolute power it cannot be that a created essence is conserved in nature and outside its causes without any existence. Suarez adds that the defenders of a real distinction can give no adequate reason why God could not conserve one without the other.<sup>296</sup>

(c) Created essence and existence cannot be so separated

<sup>293</sup> [Esse] seipso et ex vi entitatis suae esse limitatum et finitum neque indigere aliquo limitante vel contrahente in re distincto a seipso sed intrinsece natura sua esse tantae perfectionis . . . essentia actualis per seipsam vel per sua intrinseca principia est formaliter limitata (*Ibid.*, nn. 18-19). Nulla enim sufficienti ratione adhuc probatum est rem non posse finiri nisi illo modo [i. e. per potentiam] (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXX, sect. 2, n. 19).

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 12.

<sup>295</sup> Dico . . . impossibile esse ita separari existentiam ab essentia ut conservetur existentia, destructa essentia. . . . Qui putant existentiam esse rem omnino realiter distinctam ab essentia creata . . . vix possunt sufficientem hujus diciti reddere rationem in ordine ad potentiam Dei absolutam (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

<sup>296</sup> Fieri non potest etiam de potentia absoluta ut essentia creata conservetur in rerum natura et extra causas sine ulla existentia. . . . Cum dicant essentiam et existentiam esse res condistinctas nullam rationem addere possunt cur non possit Deus conservare illam entitatem essentiae nudam (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

that each is really preserved while the union between them is dissolved, for between them there is not union but identity.<sup>297</sup>

(d) By God's absolute power a created existing essence cannot be conserved through some existence other than its own. (According to Suarez all theologians agree to this, for they all affirm that there is in Christ's Sacred Humanity its created and proper existence). The argument is that as an actual essence cannot be conserved without itself, neither can it be conserved without its own existence. The very conservation of the essence is an affection of it; and every affection is a communication of some being which is existence. Here again Suarez sees an indication of the weakness of the theory of a real distinction; for, he asks, if essence and existence were really distinct why could not God supply for existence and conserve the essence without its existence?<sup>298</sup>

(e) Actual existence is separable from a created essence only in such a way that each perishes or is destroyed; and essence deprived of existence is nothing.<sup>299</sup>

Having considered the nature of existence we now come to the question of its subject: What things exist?<sup>300</sup> The principles governing Suarez' answer have already been indicated quite fully, so here we only briefly indicate the conclusion he reached.

(1) To common natures abstractly conceived existence in the singulars (even partial existence) does not convene; for actual existence is repugnant to anything abstract.<sup>301</sup>

(2) To a supposit alone (as distinct from an undetermined

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 7-8.

<sup>298</sup> Non potest de potentia Dei absoluta conservari creatura essentia existens per alienam existentiam absque propriam. Ita sentiunt omnes Theologi qui affirmant in humanitate Christi esse existentiam creatam et propriam, et non existere formaliter humanitatem illam per existentiam Verbi . . . sicut conservari non potest [essentia creatura] sine seipsa, ita etiam nec sine propria existentia . . . [Si essentia et existentia distinguuntur realiter] nulla posset (ut saepe dixi) sufficiens ratio reddi, cur non posset Deus actualem essentiam sine existentia conservare (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-12).

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 34-37.

<sup>300</sup> *Loc. cit.*, sect. 11.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 2-3.

nature) convenes substantial existence which is in every way complete. Yet there is substantial existence which convenes to things not supposit, since suppositality presupposes a nature already actual and therefore existing. Substantial existence then is two-fold: *per se* and complete (composed of the existence of the nature and the existence of the supposit) and incomplete. In the order of nature a nature can, by incomplete existence, exist before the subsistence.<sup>302</sup>

(3) The existence of the nature generally speaking is not an act of the complete essence only but is total or partial, complete or incomplete according as the nature is such. Partial existence convenes to parts of the essence, integral existence to the complete essence, for the parts are themselves actual beings not really distinct from their own existence. Matter and form have partial existences through which the integral existence of the whole is completed.<sup>303</sup>

(4) Accidents, since they have their own essence distinct from the subject, have their own existence.<sup>304</sup>

(5) Modes of things, as subsistence, figure, etc., have their own existence.

It is clear then that in that statement that essence and existence are really identical the existence meant is that through which the essence is constituted in its own proper and precise reality; the essence is not altogether indentalical with any other existence.<sup>305</sup>

<sup>302</sup> *Recte divisa est existentia: quadam enim est omnino completa in genere substantiae . . . quae includit non tantum actualitatem essentiae . . . sed etiam modus talis naturae . . . Talis ergo existentia est solius suppositi . . . alia vero est existentia substantialis non omnino completa, quia adhuc potest per subsistentiam terminari. . . . Potestque talis natura praexistere subsistentiae ordine naturae* (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

<sup>303</sup> *Sicut distinguitur essentia in totalem et partialem seu completam et incompletam ita etiam distinguendam esse existentiam intra illum ordinem. . . . Existentia ergo partialis immediate convenit parti essentiae . . . sequitur ex fundamento positio quod existentia non distinguitur in re ab essentia actuali . . . Item . . . materia prima . . . habet propriam existentiam partialem* (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

<sup>304</sup> *Dicendum . . . est, formam accidentalem habere suum proprium esse existentiae* (*Ibid.*, n. 25).

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 32-33.

There remains the question of the efficient cause of created existence. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the proximate efficient cause and that relative only to things which are generated or come about through a change of some pre-supposed subject, not with things which are through creation alone. Suarez' doctrine is this:

(1) Secondary causes are true efficient causes of the existence of their effects, according as these effects are from them. His direct arguments are these: (a) By one action is made an existing thing and its existence. But secondary causes do effect their real and existing effects. Therefore. (b) All real efficiency terminates at some existence. But secondary causes are truly efficient causes of something. Therefore. (c) Essence and existence are not really distinct. But secondary causes give to their effects the entity of actual essence. Therefore.<sup>306</sup>

(2) Secondary causes can be principal and not merely instrumental causes of existence. The existence of these effects proceeds from their causes just as their essences do. But the secondary cause is a principal cause with respect to the effect, (i. e., with respect to its essence). Therefore. No cause, Suarez notes, can be both principal and instrumental with respect to one and the same action and term. Even if we suppose a real distinction between created essence and existence the latter does not exceed the power of the second cause.<sup>307</sup>

The position that secondary causes bring about the determination to *such* being, not being itself, Suarez dismisses on the ground this proposition can mean either (a) the secondary cause effects some difference or intrinsic mode in being which

<sup>306</sup> Existentiā quando per generationem fit, a causa proxima fieri ut a propria et principali causa in suo ordine, subordinata (*Ibid.*, sect. 9, n. 5) . . . quia unica et eadem actione fit res existens et existentiā ejus sed causae secundae vere efficiunt aliquid. Ergo efficiunt existentiā eorum. Secundo quia omnis vera efficientia terminatur ad aliquid esse existentiā . . . sed causae secundae vere efficiunt aliquid. Ergo, etc. (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

<sup>307</sup> Existentiā rerum quae generantur et corrupuntur non solum flunt a causis secundis ut ab instrumentis sed etiam ut a causis principalibus proximis . . . etiam posita distinctione reali inter existentiā et essentiā non video qua probabilitate possit haec assertio negari (*Ibid.*, nn. 19-20).

determines being, which is impossible because physical action attains a thing itself as it is in itself, and not a mode or a metaphysical difference; or (b) the secondary cause determines being merely on the part of the subject, by preparing a subject which is receptive of this being, not of any other. Two actions are supposed, one of the creature inducing a form according to the being of essence, another an action of God alone conferring being. This (1) multiplies acts uselessly, (2) ignores the fact that some existence must be given through the creature's action since by that action is given some real being making the thing to be outside its causes. The action attributed to God alone is superfluous. Why could not God suspend this action? If we suppose He did the effect would be existing by reason of the action of the creature alone. The action of the creature effects some real being else it is not real action. The real being effected can be either existence or essence. If the former, Suarez' point is conceded; if the latter it is either in potency or in act. If in potency it is nothing made in reality; if in act then there is something temporal and new, therefore something existing.<sup>308</sup>

From the side of the action attributed to God alone, too, Suarez thinks this position unacceptable. That action is either creation or the eduction of an act of existing from the potency of the subject (essence). The first is impossible, for it would follow that every created existence would be subsisting, independent of any receiver; the latter is not to be admitted for such an eduction does not exceed the power or proportion of a created agent.<sup>309</sup>

<sup>308</sup> *Vel est sensus quod causa secunda efficit in ipsomet esse aliquam differentiam . . . et hoc est impossible nisi efficiendo totum ipsum esse . . . vel est sensus quod solum ex parte subjecti causae secundae determinant esse praeparando subjectum susceptivum talis esse. . . . Hoc autem falsum esse . . . demonstro. . . . Secundo quia si consideretur praecise illa actio causae secundae . . . necesse est ut propter illam detur aliquod esse existentiae quia per illam datur aliquod esse reale. . . . Non repugnat Deum suspendere omnem aliam actionem quae se solo facturus erat; . . . nihilominus intelligimus ex vi hujus primae actionis rem actu esse genitam (Ibid., nn. 12-13).*

<sup>309</sup> *Talis actio neque ex modo quo fit neque ex termino ad quem tendit superat vim agentis creati (Ibid., nn. 16-17).* Yet Suarez adds that in the effecting of existence and essence there is something proper to God in which He surpasses

A final word about the effects of existence will be helpful to complete our account of the Suarezian teaching about created existence.<sup>310</sup> (1) Actual existence is altogether necessary for exercising material and formal causality. It is required both in the order of time and in the order of nature: (a) in the order of time: for such causality consists in actual and intrinsic composing and in sustaining and actuating. But for these existence is needed; (b) in the order of nature; for existing causality must proceed from an existing cause. Again the actual existence of matter and form is necessary in the instant in which they cause. But it is not necessary as a consequent of its causality (it would then cause itself) so it must be required as antecedent in the order of nature.<sup>311</sup> (2) The existence of matter (and this holds true proportionately for form) is that through which matter, in its genus, causes.<sup>312</sup> (3) What has been said of material and formal causality applies to efficient. The existence of an active form is the ratio or *per se* principle of its acting, for (a) it is the actual essence of the form which certainly is the principle of acting, and (b) God is, in the highest way, effective because He is being (existence) through His Essence. Created existence therefore can very well be the principle of effecting. To argue that it is finite proves nothing. The essence is finite also.<sup>313</sup>

## 2. *The Physical Order: Primary Matter and Substantial*

creatures for with regard to existence: (1) The adequate object of Divine Power is created being as such; that of the created power is this being; 2) God alone gives the total being totally, the creature completes and perfects being already begun; 3) God produces existence from no pre-existing creature; The second cause gives being only from the presupposition of other being. The same excellence and singularity convenes to God in effecting essence (*Disp. Meta.*, *loc. cit.*, nn. 21-24).

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 10.

<sup>311</sup> Existentia actualis est omnino necessaria ad exercendam causalitatem materialem et formalem non solum in duratione temporis sed etiam in antecessione seu ordine naturae (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-11).

<sup>312</sup> Existentia materiae (et idem proportionaliter est de forma) in re ipsa est id per quod materia causat in suo ordine (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

<sup>313</sup> Nam quae diximus de materiali et formalis causa possunt et debent ad efficientem applicari nam majori ratione in ea locum habent . . . ipsamet existentia formae activae est ipsamet ratio seu principium *per se* agendi (*Ibid.*, nn. 16, 18).

*Form.* Since we are interested in matter and form in as much as they are physical potency and act we shall consider them here together under that precise aspect rather than separately according to all that Suarez has to say of them.

Primary matter is the first subject out of which something is made. In general matter is usually divided into three classes: matter *out of which*, matter *in which*, and matter *about which*.<sup>314</sup> Matter is called first both through negation of any prior matter and through respect to second matter. Since matter bespeaks a subject, that is first matter which supposes no previous subject. It is under this aspect that the Aristotelian definition of primary matter (given above) considers matter.<sup>315</sup> Second matter (and a substantial composite is called such with respect to accidents) is that which supposes a prior subject. Even proximate matter, i. e., matter disposed by accidents for a form, is called second matter since the reception of such dispositions precedes in the order of nature, and constitutes the subject proximately capable of such a form.

Substantial form, for Suarez, is a certain incomplete and simple substance which, as the act of matter constitutes with matter the essence of a composed substance. It is a substance; this is the genus of the definition which distinguishes this reality from accidents and from substantial modes. It is simple—to distinguish it from composed substance. It is incomplete—to distinguish it from separated substances (angels). The rest of the definition distinguishes it from that other simple, incomplete substance which is primary matter, Suarez admits, too, that we can call substantial form, as Aristotle did, the act of a physical body.<sup>316</sup>

In exposing the nature of matter Suarez begins by ruling out certain unacceptable notions. Primary matter is not, he indi-

<sup>314</sup> *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIII, sect. 1, nn. 1-2.

<sup>315</sup> *I Phys.* 9, 1. 82.

<sup>316</sup> *Forma est substantia quaedam simplex et incompleta quae ut actus materiae cum ea constituit essentiam substantiae compositae* (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XV, sect. 5, n. 1).

cates, a simple body,<sup>317</sup> nor a complete and integral substance,<sup>318</sup> nor a composite of substantial potency and some incomplete form.<sup>319</sup>

Yet the matter of generable things is essentially constituted in an ultimate species, an ultimate species of matter retained under every form, invariable or at most accommodated to various forms merely through added accidents. It is specific yet communicable to essentially diverse substances so that while the concepts of generable substance is generic it is not such by reason of matter.<sup>320</sup> What kind of entity then does matter of itself have? This much, Suarez is sure, is agreed on: matter actually under a form, and which with the form constitutes a corporeal substance has some entity which is real, substantial, and really distinct from the entity of the form.<sup>321</sup> It is real, for if it were nothing matter would have no real function in nature. Corruption would be a resolution to nothingness, generation a production from nothing. It is substantial; matter essentially composes a substance and substance cannot be composed by nothing; it requires at least incomplete substances. It is really distinct from the entity of form; it is really separable from any particular, determined form. The distinction cannot be merely modal for substantial form is not a mode as is clear from the fact that any form can be conserved in being, by God's absolute power, without matter. Matter, moreover, is perpetual and prior to form; it must, then, have a distinct entity.<sup>322</sup>

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 3, nn. 5-6.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 8-11.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 12-16. Suarez argues here that (1) nature gives no indication of such a form; (2) such a form could not be composed with subsequent forms since of two actual beings a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made; (3) no form can give "quasi-generic" being without giving specific being as well, for a form is precisely that which is distinct.

<sup>320</sup> *Materia prima rerum generabilium . . . essentialiter est constituta in aliqua ultima specie. materiae quam retinet sub omni forma, nec variare illam potest sed ad summum per accidentia superaddita potest ad hanc vel illam formam accommodari. . . . Conceptum substantiae generabilis ut sic non esse genericum ratione materiae* (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

<sup>321</sup> *Materiam quae actu est sub forma . . . habere aliquid entitatis realis et substantialis distinctae ab entitate formae* (*Ibid.*, sect. 4, n. 2).

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 3-5.

Granted the entity of matter the question is, does matter, of itself, have entity which is actual? (Here the phrase "of itself" is meant by Suarez to signify a negation of a formal, not of an efficient cause). Suarez gives an account of the Thomistic answer to this question,<sup>323</sup> then sharply differs from it insisting that matter has its own actual entity of essence and of existence not intrinsically from the form, but of itself, though always with an intrinsic regard to form.

Matter created by God and existing in a composite must have some essence, else it is not a real being. But the essence of matter is not constituted intrinsically, in its essential being through form. Therefore of itself it has some essential entity.

The minor premise Suarez upholds with these arguments: (1) Form does not intrinsically constitute matter except by composing it. But matter is essentially a simple not a composed thing. (2) Every simple thing (because simple) must have its own essence through itself. But matter is simple. (3) Matter is essentially incomplete. It cannot therefore be intrinsically constituted through form, for if it were it would be a complete essence.<sup>324</sup> Matter can, in fact, lose one form and acquire another, while preserving numerically the same entity. This essential entity and perfection then is different from that given by the form.<sup>325</sup>

Yet since matter is essentially potency and all potency be-speaks an intrinsic respect to form, matter does not have its own entity of essence without transcendental relation to form. This respect, however, is to form absolutely, not to this or that form; another clear argument, Suarez adds, that matter does

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 7.

<sup>324</sup> Materia creata a Deo et in composito existens habet aliquam essentiam realem alioquin non esset ens reale; sed essentia materiae non constituitur intrinsece in suo esse essentiae per formam; ergo per seipsam. . . . Minor probatur quia forma non constituit intrinsece aliquam naturam in suo esse essentiae nisi componendo illam per modum actus; forma autem non componit essentiam materiae . . . quia materia essentialiter est entitas simplex . . . omnis entitas simplex necessario habet per seipsam intrinsece . . . suam entitatem . . . materia essentialiter est entitas incompleta ergo intrinsece non constituitur per formam (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 10.

not have its essential entity from the information of a form. Matter, he has already pointed out, has its own species (the ultimate species of matter) even apart from form.<sup>326</sup>

Matter has its own entity of existence. This proposition must follow since in Suarez' theory, existence adds no real thing or real mode to the entity of essence as this latter is actual and outside its causes. By the very fact that a thing is conceived as actual, as outside its causes, it is conceived as existing. This doctrine that matter has its own existence Suarez confirms with these considerations: (1) Matter under a new form has numerically the same entity it had under the old. Consequently it has numerically the same being by which it is constituted in actual existing entity. (2) The subject of generation (matter) since it is not nothing is a created entity. But creation terminates at an actual, existing entity. Therefore the subject of generation (matter) is actual, existing. (3) If matter did not really exist it could not be a real subject. (4) As the essence of a corporeal substance is composed of the partial essence of matter and form, so its existence is composed of the partial existences of matter and form.<sup>327</sup> Yet the existence of matter depends on form and on the information of form, for matter is so imperfect that, unaided, it cannot be.<sup>328</sup> Matter then is through creation; its entity is incorruptible. God can destroy matter only through annihilation.<sup>329</sup>

<sup>326</sup> *Haec autem habitudo non est per se primo ad hanc vel illam formam sed ad formam absolute. . . . Quod etiam est clarum argumentum materiam non habere entitatem essentiae ab informatione formae (Ibid., n. 11) . . . responsum est materiam . . . constitutam esse in ultima specie materiae in qua specie non constitutur per eam formam qua informatur (Ibid., n. 12).*

<sup>327</sup> *Materia prima etiam habet in se et per se entitatem seu actualitatem existentiae distinctam ab existentia formae . . . materia eamdem numero entitatem actualem habet sub forma geniti quam habet sub forma corrupti; ergo etiam habet idem numero esse . . . materia ut praesupponitur formae . . . non est omnino nihil; est ergo aliqua entitas creata; ergo entitas actualis et existens . . . sicut ergo essentia substantiae corporeae componitur ex partialibus essentiis materiae et formae ita etiam integra existentia ejusdem substantiae compositur ex partialibus existentiis materiae et formae (Ibid., n. 13).*

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 14.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 16-17.

What causal influence, then, does form have on this entity of primary matter?<sup>330</sup> Suarez answers that form is not a proper cause of matter, formally giving to it that proper being by which matter exists. Matter, already has its own partial essential entity which entity it retains under all forms. That entity includes its partial existence distinct from all existence coming from a form. Suarez' fundamental reason he has already treated; matter is a real subject; therefore of itself it has actual being.<sup>331</sup>

Matter to be sure is pure potency but this does not exclude that it have its own actual entity.<sup>332</sup> A fuller understanding of this depends on a knowledge of what is meant by saying that matter is pure potency which we shall consider in the next section.

From Suarez' concept of the independent actuality of matter there follow many corollaries. For the sake of indicating how far he was willing to go with this doctrine we shall point out a few that are explicitly and formally taught by Suarez himself.

(1) Primary matter can be conserved without any substantial form at all, not in the ordinary cause of nature but by God's power.<sup>333</sup> From Suarez' principles this must follow since matter of itself has true actuality of being. But even if created essence and existence are really distinct (so that matter would not have existence of itself), Suarez thinks that there would be no reason why God could not give existence to matter alone. By the connatural order existence is in the supposit, admittedly; but by Divine power it could be in one part of the supposit alone, as God can make accidental existence remain in accidents separated from any subject. Matter has a partial, substantial

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8.

<sup>331</sup> *Forma, non est propria causa materiae dans illi formaliter proprium esse, quo materia existit . . . quia forma non dat materiae illam partiale entitatem essentialem quam in se habet . . . sed illa entitas includit suam particularem existentiam distinctam ab omni existentia proveniente formaliter a forma* (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

<sup>332</sup> *Quod enim dicitur pura potentia non excludit actualem entitatem ipsius materiae* (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

<sup>333</sup> *De potentia absoluta potest conservari materia sine ulla forma* (*Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 9, n. 1; cf. also disp. XV, sect. 9).

essence; any essence in so far as it is, can be actuated through its act, namely existence. Nothing indicates that the order between substantial form and existence is so essential that it cannot be changed by God.<sup>234</sup>

On Suarez' own principle that essence and existence are really identical his conclusion is even more apparent. Matter has its own partial entity of essence; therefore it has its own partial entity of existence too. Hence it can be conserved by God even without form. Any partial nature is capable of a proportioned existence; in that existence then it can subsist, even alone, through Divine power. The partial existence of matter, Suarez repeats, does not flow from form as from an intrinsic cause, so God can supply for the function of the form and so conserve matter alone. Even if form be a cause of the being of matter it certainly is not a cause which intrinsically composes it; so God's efficient causality can supply for such causality as this. It is not of the ratio of existing matter nor does the essence of matter demand that it have form; matter consists in aptitude for form. Hence it can be actual (entitatively) and yet in potency to formal act.<sup>235</sup>

(2) In the conservation of any body there is a separate action by which the matter is conserved; in the conservation of man there are three actions, one conserving the body, the second the soul, and the third their union. This follows logically enough from the doctrine of matter's actuality. Matter, Suarez thought, is created by one act; a form is induced in it by another

<sup>234</sup> Quamvis teneremus existentiam esse rem distinctam ab essentia nulla reddi posset sufficiens ratio cur non posset Deum illum actum ponere in sola materia . . . per divinam potentiam posset [existentiam] constitui in una parte . . . posset [Deus] conservare esse substantiale in sola forma . . . ergo etiam posset in sola essentia materiae ponere actum existentiae, quia . . . revera est quadam partialis essentia substantialis; quatenus ergo aliqua essentia est, poterit per existentiam actuari; nam existentia est actus essentiae (*Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 9, n. 3).

<sup>235</sup> Ex propriis [principiis] ratio a priori hujus sententiae est quia materia sicut habet suam partiale entitatem essentiae, ita et existentiae; . . . ideo . . . potest Deus . . . materiam sine forma conservare . . . existentia partialis materiae non manat intrinsece a forma . . . non est de ratione partis essentialis actu existentis quod sit forma, vel habeat formam . . . solum consistat in aptitudine ad formam (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

action. These same distinct actions continue as conserving actions.<sup>336</sup>

Matter, then, according to Suarez, has its own entity; yet it is also pure potency. In what sense is this latter statement true? Suarez gives various opinions on this question but his own opinion is basically this: matter once created cannot be said to be in logical or objective potency; while it is pure receptive potency (in its essence it includes no formal act) it yet has entitative act.<sup>337</sup>

To clarify: (1) Matter is not called pure potency with respect to all metaphysical act, for: (a) it can be understood as composed of genus and difference; (b) by nature matter has some goodness, some appetible perfection which means that it has some actuality. (c) it has a partial and proportionate act of subsistence. (2) Matter is not pure potency in such a way that it is not some entitative act, under some aspect. Since it is a real subject it receives something else; and what receives something else is itself something. (3) Matter is called pure potency with respect to act informing and actuating it, and that with respect to act absolutely and simply so called. Since matter itself is simple it does not include the ratio of informing act; whatever there is of entity in primary matter is ordered to the function of receptive potency of substantial form. To call it "pure potency" excludes from it the ratio of complete act, act simply so called, but not the entity and actuality necessary to real potency.<sup>338</sup> (4) Matter is, metaphysically, a composed thing, composed of genus and difference of essence and exist-

<sup>336</sup> In conservatione ignis vel alterius rei similis duae actiones interveniunt . . . in conservatione hominis tres interveniunt actiones. . . . In creatione rei corruptibilis . . . intervenire duas . . . actiones (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, nn. 6-7). Materia non producetur per unam et eamdem actionem qua creatur totum (*Ibid.*, sect. 8, n. 18).

<sup>337</sup> Materia prima quamvis sit pura potentia receptiva atque . . . nullum includit actum formalem, nihilominus . . . recte dicitur esse vel habere actum entitativum (*Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 5, n. 4; cf. also n. 11).

<sup>338</sup> Dicendum est ergo primo materiam non creari puram potentiam respectu omnis actus metaphysici. Dico secundo materia non est ita pura potentia quin sit aliquis actus entitativus secundum quid. . . . Dico tertio materia dicitur esse pura potentia respectu actus informantis seu actuantis, et respectu actus absolute et simpliciter dicti (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-11).

ence, of nature and subsistence, but physically simple. Such composition as it has argues, not to a potency prior to matter but to this, that in matter one ratio is prior to another, though the prior ratio always includes somehow the potentiality of matter.<sup>339</sup> The being of matter can be said to be from form because form in some way terminates its dependence. But Suarez rejects the argument that matter cannot be in act because of two things in act (and form certainly is in act) a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made; for the principle he says is true only of things complete in actual being. Only incomplete actual beings can compose a complete being, for what is not being cannot really compose.<sup>340</sup>

Primary matter then is at one time entirely act and entirely potency, not by reason of any composition but through identity, for receptive potency essentially includes an incomplete, entitative act.<sup>341</sup> It is potency not with respect to the whole substance (since it is actually its own substantial entity) but with respect to the form and to the being of the composite. It is impossible that there be a real receptive potency for the whole latitude and genus of substance, complete and incomplete, for such a potency could not be accidental (accidents suppose a substance) and it cannot be substantial i. e. in potency to itself.<sup>342</sup>

In delineating the mutual inter-play and causality between matter and form, Suarez is not too precise and firm in his own opinion but inclined (as he often is) to fall back on probabilities. Yet the following seems a fair and accurate statement of his views.

<sup>339</sup> Metaphysice vero concedi debet materiam componi ex actu et potentia (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

<sup>340</sup> Axioma *ex duobus entibus in actu non fit unum per se* non potest intelligi de quibuscumque entitatibus actualibus; nam potius impossible est ens per se ac completum actu componi nisi ex entibus actualibus incompletis; nam quod nihil est . . . non potest realiter componere. . . . Debet ergo intelligi de entibus in actu incompletis in suis generibus (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

<sup>341</sup> Materiam totam esse potentiam et totam esse actum, qualem nos explicuimus . . . per identitatem (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

<sup>342</sup> Materia non est potentia ad totam latitudinem substantiae. . . . Repugnant enim dari potentiam realem et receptivam respectu totius generis et latitudinis substantiae (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

(1) The being of matter depends on form not as on a proper cause but as on a necessary condition. This is not surprising in view of what Suarez has already said about the separate creation of matter, etc.<sup>343</sup> He supports his view as follows: (a) Matter depends on form in some way for: (x) The matter of corruptible things is not more independent of form than celestial matter. But celestial matter depends on form. (y) Matter does not seem to be more dependent on accidental forms than it is on substantial form. But matter cannot naturally be without accidental form, at least of quantity. (z) Whatever, in physical things always happens in the same way and not in another way seems to be naturally necessary. But it always happens that matter is under some form. This therefore is from natural necessity. But this necessity is not from the form, nor from the extrinsic agent (the efficient cause), therefore it is from the necessity of the matter and its intrinsic need.<sup>344</sup>

(b) Yet this dependence is probably dependence on a necessary condition, not dependence on a proper cause; for the former is both possible and sufficient: (y) *Possible*: for in this way the form or its union depends on certain accidental forms as on necessary dispositions in the way of conservation; for an even greater reason then matter can have such dependence on form as on a necessary condition. Just as matter depends on quantity in this way, so it can depend on form. (z) *Sufficient*: for such dependence as this preserves all that has already been said about the dependence of matter on form; this is an easy, clear mode of dependence.<sup>345</sup> As a matter of fact to understand the dependence of matter on form as dependence on a proper cause is, for Suarez, difficult. It can hardly be reconciled, he says, with the fact that matter is presupposed to form, and to its eduction. Again matter comes about through a true creation and is conserved through the same act. Clearly then, in its becoming it does not depend on form as on a cause for if it did

<sup>343</sup> Quod sit dependentia a posteriori et a conditione necessaria videtur probabiliter persuaderi (*Ibid.*, *disp. XV*, *sect. 8*, *n. 17*).

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, *nn. 14-15*.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*, *n. 17*.

the created form would concur to the creature act. Since matter becomes without such dependence, it is without such causal dependence on form.<sup>346</sup> Suarez admits however that there are probable arguments for the other side.<sup>347</sup>

(2) Matter and form are, nevertheless, causes of one another, though not altogether in the same way. (a) Matter causes material forms both as to their being and their causality (since their information also depends on matter). (b) Form causes matter; it informs and actuates it. But it is a cause rather of informed matter than of the being of matter for this latter is distinct from the perfection which form brings to it. Matter, on the contrary is a cause of form, simply speaking.

(3) Matter and form are causes to one another of the retention of being, and in this they can be said to cause one another in the same way. Matter through its being causes form; it can be said to be caused by form in as much as it cannot have being without form. Yet there is a difference even in this; matter through its being, directly and *per se* causes the being of the form; the latter cannot be presupposed to the causal influence of matter, but is caused by it. On the other hand the being of matter must simply be conceived as presupposed to the being of such a form since it is the principle of that material influence without which such a form cannot be made. The being of matter is from form only as from a condition and added actuality without which it cannot naturally be.<sup>348</sup>

A few final words are necessary to determine Suarez' ideas

<sup>346</sup> *Juxta alium modum [dependentia a propria causa] difficile intelligitur haec mutua dependentia; nam cum materia simpliciter supponatur formae . . . vix intelligitur quomodo a priori possit materia a forma dependere . . . non pendet in suo fieri a forma ut a vera causa (Ibid. n. 18).*

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 20.

<sup>348</sup> *Materia et forma sunt sibi invicem causae. . . . Haec assertio primo declaratur in materia prima et substantialibus formis materialibus de quibus certum est causari a materia et quoad esse suum, . . . et quoad suam causalitatem. . . . Materia est causa formae simpliciter et secundum esse ejus, forma vero est causa materiae solum quatenus formata est . . . esse materiae solum est a forma pendens ut a conditione et actualitate superaddita. . . . Materia per suum esse directe et per se causat ipsum esse formae (Ibid., disp. XXVIII, sect. 2, nn. 4-5).*

of the relation of this matter and form to the composite which results from their union. The question is whether a composed substance is something distinct from its parts and from their union. Suarez' answer is that such a substance is not something really or modally distinct from its essential parts taken together and united, but, at most, rationally distinct from them.<sup>349</sup>

He explains: (1) A composed substance is really distinct from its single parts, not adequately and by its whole self, but through the inclusion of the other part, for the whole includes something really distinct from each part separately taken. Yet this distinction is not greater than that which comes from the inclusion of a distinct thing.<sup>350</sup> (2) A composed substance is different in reality from matter and form taken together, for it includes them and adds something, viz., their real substantial union, which is modally distinct from them, for there can be an aggregation of the parts by merely local propinquity to one another without the substance existing. (3) Yet the total differs from the parts taken as together and united only rationally.<sup>351</sup> (4) Since the whole is a distinct thing from the form and from its union but is not distinct from the total reality of matter form and union collectively taken the composite seems to be a sum of these parts (though Suarez denies that essential parts are integral).<sup>352</sup> (5) Matter, though it includes a transcendental respect to form preserves its own proper entity in any composite and form intervenes as a merely extrinsic cause.<sup>353</sup> The union therefore is brought about through something distinct from the component parts, viz., a substantial mode.<sup>354</sup>

<sup>349</sup> *Tota substantia non distinguitur a partibus simul sumptis et unitis realiter aut ex natura rei seu in re ipsa, sed solum ratione* (*Ibid.*, disp. XXXVI, sect. 3, n. 9).

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 7.

<sup>351</sup> *Substantia composita distinguitur in re ipsa a materia et forma simul . . . sumptis, tanquam includens utramque earum, et addens realem unionem substantialem . . . quae est aliquid in re ipsa distinctum ab eis* (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-9).

<sup>352</sup> *Non vero recte inferre partes integrales esse essentiales vel e converso* (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 9, n. 5.

<sup>354</sup> It seems that Suarez should have concluded that the union in a composite is

## II. POTENCY AND ACT IN THE ORDER OF OPERATION

I. *The Conditions Requisite for Efficient Operation.*<sup>355</sup> We have seen the Suarezian doctrine about potency and act in the order of being. We begin now to see the same teaching in the order of operation. Here again our treatment is two-fold. We shall consider first some of the general conditions requisite for efficient operation, secondly those proximate principles of operation which are potencies (in the predicamental sense) and their relation to act. Accepting the fact of efficiency and even of the truly efficient causality of creatures<sup>356</sup> we shall give here on Suarez' teaching about efficient causality as this bears on his teaching on potency and act, pausing only to clarify what efficiency meant to Suarez.

Suarez repeats Aristotle's definition of the efficient cause as that "whence is the first principle of change and of rest." He sees many flaws in the definition and a need for much explanation, but finally finds it acceptable in the sense that it really means the first principle whence is action or the first principle whence the effect is, through the medium of action, a description which distinguishes this cause from all others.<sup>358</sup> The efficient cause can be. (a) *per se*: that on which the effect directly depends according to that proper being which it has in as much as it is an effect; (b) *per accidens*: not a true cause but it is called one because of some respect to or similarity, or union with a *per se* cause;<sup>359</sup> (c) *physical*: that which truly and really effects (*influit in effectum*); (d) *moral*: this is two-fold; it can mean a cause which: (y) *acts freely*: so taken it is not altogether distinct from a physical cause; (z) *does not truly effect*, but so acts morally that the effect is imputed to it.

accidental, for he says (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. IV, sect. 3, n. 19) that unity which convenes through something else is accidental.

<sup>355</sup> Cf. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XVII and XVIII.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, especially sect. 1.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XVII, sect. 1.

<sup>358</sup> Aristoteles causam efficientem . . . definit . . . unde primum principium est mutationis aut quietis (*Ibid.*, n. 1; cf. also nn. 4-5).

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 2.

This is always a per accidens cause;<sup>360</sup> (e) *principal*: that which flows into the very action through which the effect is produced, by its own principal (even though secondary) power; (f) *instrumental*: which concurs, or is elevated, to making an effect more noble than itself, which is beyond the measure of this agent's perfection and action.<sup>361</sup> (The principal cause needs no elevation to achieve its effect since it has its own intrinsic power which is *per se* proportioned to the effect. The instrumental cause on the other hand helps achieve the effect only through a power of a lower ratio or perfection than the effect. Its own power is not sufficient or not proportioned to the effect, so in addition to it, it needs an instrumental power from the principal agent.)<sup>362</sup> (g) *first*: which is altogether independent in acting; (h) *second*: is dependent in acting, even if it acts through its own principal power;<sup>363</sup> (i) *equivocal*: produces an effect which is not similar to its own form; (j) *univocal*: operating through the power of its form it makes an effect similar to it.<sup>364</sup>

Given the nature of efficient causality, then, the question of interest to us is whether an efficient cause must be really distinct from the recipient of its causality, whether, in other words a thing can reduce itself from potency to act.<sup>365</sup> Since Suarez' answer to the question lies in the distinctions he makes we must proceed with him step by step.

Suarez lists three propositions as evident and essential pre notes for this matter: (1) It is not necessary that the agent be distinguished as a supposit from the patient which receives. This is clear from examples and from the fact that a thing can move itself if it is distinguished into a part *per se* moving and a part *per se* moved. (2) Within a supposite the agent can be distinguished from the patient in various ways, (a) according to different integral parts, (b) according to different substantial and essential parts, (c) one is a faculty of acting, the other of receiving. (3) Suarez distinguishes three kinds of

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 6.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 20.

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 16.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 21.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 17-18.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7.

action: (a) natural dimanation, (b) physical and material movements under which are included alteration, augmentation, local motion and, in some ways the local motion of spiritual things, (c) immanent acts of sense powers (cognitive and appetitive) and intellectual powers (cognitive and volitional).<sup>366</sup>

*In natural dimanation*, though it happens that the proximate efficient principle is not distinct from the recipient yet, simply speaking, the effect is reduced to an efficient cause which is distinct from the patient.

The proximate cause is not distinct; for example, consider the faculties of the soul as flowing from the soul. The soul is their principle, but it also receives them, and the distinction in the soul between its ratio as agent and its ratio as receiver is a distinction of reason only. The same is true, Suarez adds, of the substance and properties of angels; but in corporeal things it is not so for almost always, such properties flow from the form and are received into matter, or into the composite by reason of the matter.<sup>367</sup>

Yet the effect is always reduced to a really distinct efficient cause for the property in question flows from the substance or essence not as from a principal agent but as from an instrument of the generator; the effect is attributed to the generator as to its principal cause; and the generator is of course really distinct from the thing generated and from its potencies.<sup>368</sup>

*In physical motion and action*: Every cause which is efficient through physical motion and transient action is somehow really distinct from the material cause which receives the effect. (a)

<sup>366</sup> *Statuendum est non esse necessarium agens distingui supposito a passo recipiente . . . supponendum est in eodem supposito agente in seipsum variis modis posse distingui agens a paciente . . . distinguere oportet varias actiones . . . naturalis dimanatio . . . motus physici ac materiales . . . efficientia per actiones immanentes sensus aut appetitus intellectus aut voluntatis (Ibid., nn. 6-8).*

<sup>367</sup> *Dico . . . in resultantia naturali quamvis contingat proximum efficiens non esse distinctum a recipiente tamen simpliciter ille effectus reducitur in efficientem causam distinctam a passo. . . . In anima distingui possit ratio agendi et recipiendi . . . potentias . . . tamen . . . illa distinctio rationis tantum sit (Ibid., n. 9).*

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*,

As to *alteration*, Suarez argues by induction that there is found no proper alteration made by an agent in itself “*per se primo*” i. e., according to one and the same part.<sup>369</sup> (b) In augmentation one thing does not act on itself through itself: there is no motion of augmentation except by a previous alteration. Suarez assigns as the a priori reason for this the truth that one thing cannot at the same time and under the same aspect be in act and in potency.

This principle, Suarez points out, can seem invalid, even as applied here, since an agent can have a virtual quality, and lacking the formal act, can act in itself to acquire that formal act.<sup>370</sup> But here the objection is dismissed on the ground that the formal act must be either natural to the agent, or violent, or neither. If the formal modification is natural the agent will always have it, unless violently impeded, but will have it through natural diminution by action principally reduced to the generator. If the quality is violent it is impossible that the agent by a virtual quality should formally reduce itself to a violent state.<sup>371</sup> The third member, the quality, is neither natural nor violent, is impossible, for it cannot be that an agent by its own virtual quality reduce itself to a form which is neither natural nor violent. The quality will find in the subject dispositions which are either repugnant to it (and then the formal act is violent) or it finds no repugnant disposition (and then the formal act is natural).<sup>372</sup> Suarez concludes then that the Aristotelian principle involved here is true even with regard to a virtual act, but with two limitations: (1) Immanent and

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 11.

<sup>370</sup> Non potest esse idem secundum idem simul in actu et in potentia. Cui rationi valde obstat objectio . . . quia procedit haec ratio ad summum de alteratione univoca . . . non vero de alteratione equivoca quae procedit a qualitate virtuali seu superioris rationis. . . . Nam tunc nulla esset contradictio quod eadem pars haberet qualitatem virtualem et careat formaliter et ideo ageret in se (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

<sup>371</sup> Si qualitas est naturalis semper habebit illam. . . . Si autem illa qualitas sit violenta impossibile est ut eadem res per qualitatem virtualem coloris seipsam formaliter calefaciat calefactione violenta (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

<sup>372</sup> Alteratio autem indifferens, i. e. non violenta, nec naturalis, esse non potest in eo qui habeat qualitatem virtualem ad talem alterationem faciendam (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

vital acts are excluded (what Suarez has said holds only when it is a question of an act which is a principle of physical and merely natural motions); (2) It is to be understood of a thing in its natural state, not in a preternatural one.<sup>373</sup>

(c) As to local motion, a body can be moved only violently, indifferently, or naturally. In the first two cases the motion is clearly from a distinct agent. In the third case Suarez distinguishes two motions, animals moving themselves, or the motion of inanimate things tending to their own place. In both the agent is distinct from the patient; in the case of animals, they are distinct as part from part; the inanimate bodies are moved by their generator.<sup>374</sup>

With regard to the motion of animals there is some difficulty, Suarez admits, since while one part moves another, we cannot admit any infinite process but must arrive at a first moving part which is also moved. In this part then there seems to be no distinction between mover and moved; it seems to be both. The same difficulty, Suarez points out, is to be found in explaining the perpetual motion and quiet of the heart. It seems simply to move itself.<sup>375</sup> After some discussion Suarez concludes that one defensible answer is that the soul as informing the first part moved and moving through itself or through a potency, moves that part, so that the integral part moving and moved is not distinct, but the essential part is.<sup>376</sup> Essentially the same is his final answer to the question of the motion of the heart; it is moved and moves according to the same integral part, so that the motion is not to be attributed to the generator:

<sup>373</sup> Dicendum est illud principium *non potest esse idem simul in potentia et in actu esse verum etiam de actu virtuali adhibita dupli limitatione*. Una est ut sit sermo de actu qui est principium motus physici et mere naturalis ut excludamus actiones immateriales et vitales. . . . Alia est, ut intelligatur de re existente in suo naturali statu (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 20.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 29-30.

<sup>376</sup> Responderi poterit . . . non distingui partem integrantem per se moventem et per se motam sed solum partem essentiali. Neque id esse inconveniens (*Ibid.*, n. 31).

it is enough that in the one part the rationes of acting and of receiving be diverse.<sup>377</sup>

(d) As to immanent actions, in which we are most of all interested, Suarez teaches that not only are the principles *quod* of acting and receiving not always distinguished, but it is not always necessary even that the principles *quo* be distinguished. The first part is clear: immanent action is received in the very thing operating so it is not necessary that the active supposit be distinct from that which receives, nor that it act and receive according to diverse parts, since (a) often it has no diverse parts, (b) the act is received into the potency which elicits it.

The second part, Suarez argues, is true, because the act remains in the eliciting potency: so nothing prohibits that there be no distinction even in the proximate principle *quo* of acting and of receiving.<sup>378</sup> These acts all pertain either to knowledge or appetite. In acts of sense knowledge or appetite it is true that the chief principle *quo* of acting is the soul; the principle of receiving is the body. In intellectual acts, however, the chief principle *quo* of acting is only rationally distinct from that of receiving.

Suarez indicates this difference however, that of cognitive acts the proximate active principle is distinguished from the principle of receiving as the including is distinguished from the included; for the former principle is faculty plus species; the latter is the faculty alone.<sup>379</sup> For appetitive acts no species is needed, so the one faculty is the principle *quo* of both acting and receiving. Some argue that the principle of act is faculty

<sup>377</sup> Non existimo inconveniens hunc modum attribuere ipsi animali et asserere secundum eamdem partem integralem movere et moveri; satisque esse quod rationes agendi et recipiendi sint diversae (*Ibid.*, n. 35).

<sup>378</sup> Necesse non est ut suppositum agens [actione immanente] distinctum sit a recipiente neque etiam ut secundum diversas partes agat et recipiat . . . nil vetat quominus etiam in proximo principio quo agente et recipiente illam non inveniatur in re distinctio (*Ibid.*, n. 45).

<sup>379</sup> In his ergo actionibus . . . in parte sensitiva facile distingui potest principium quo principale agendi et recipiendi; nam illud est anima . . . hoc vero est corpus . . . in actionibus cognoscendi . . . principium [proximum] agendi est potentia ut informata specie; principium autem recipiendi est sola potentia (*Ibid.*, nn. 46-47).

plus appetition of the end (which is attributed to the author of nature) and the act of willing means to the end is received in the will *alone*, and so they find even here a distinction between active and receptive principle. But Suarez rejects this and states that the will through itself is the proximate principle both of act and reception. The inconvenient conclusion is of course that, one thing is, under the same aspect, agent and patient; therefore under one aspect, one thing is in act and in potency. But this is no real difficulty for Suarez; he points out that there is no repugnance in this that one faculty be in first act, and in potency to second act for first act does not formally include second act but a power to elicit second act. Hence the faculty can at one time be in virtual act and in formal potency. As by one action a thing can be constituted actually acting and receiving so by one faculty a supposit can be constituted in the ratio of acting and receiving, in potency. There is no inconvenience in one thing's being, under one aspect, both agent and patient if it is taken with proportion, i. e., both in potency or both in act.<sup>380</sup>

From all this Suarez concludes: (1) It is not necessary to, or of the ratio of, an agent cause as such to be distinguished from the patient. (2) Neither is it of the ratio of an efficient cause as such that it be distinguished from the patient according to diverse substantial parts, either essential or integral. When either of these distinctions mentioned (in supposit or in substantial part) is necessary the necessity arises from the peculiar exigencies of this cause not by reason of efficient causality as such.<sup>381</sup> (3) Nor is it necessary to an efficient cause as such that the ratio of acting and of receiving be really distinct either

<sup>380</sup> *Fatendum est eamdem omnino potentiam per seipsam esse principium proximum agendi et recipiendi talem actum . . . eamdem facultatem esse in actu primo et in potentia ad actum secundum immanentem nulla est repugnantia quia actus primus non includit formaliter secundum, sed virtutem ad eliciendum illum . . . in hoc sensu non est inconveniens quod idem secundum idem constituantur agens et patiens si cum proportione sumatur* (*Ibid.*, n. 51).

<sup>381</sup> *Sequitur non esse de necessitate aut ratione causae efficientis ut sic quod distinguantur a paciente secundum diversas partes substantiales sive essentiales sive integrales* (*Ibid.*, n. 53).

as to subject or as to entity, integral or partial, for this distinction is sometimes lacking; therefore it is not *per se* and universally necessary by reason of efficiency. The distinction is always necessary in univocal action, and of that action the axiom "One thing cannot be at the same time in potency and act," is true. (4) When the proximate principles of acting and of receiving are not different in subject or integral entity the ratio of agent cause as of immanent action does not require even that they differ as including and included i. e., that the principle of acting include something which the passive principle does not have. In immanent actions which do not require an assimilative process the two principles are not distinguished even in partial entity. This way of acting is consonant with the will both on account of its liberty, and on account of its nature as an appetite. The faculty which receives immanent action, can, by its very self be sufficiently constituted in first act as a sufficient, proximate, effective principle of the same action which it receives.<sup>882</sup> (5) We might add here in large letters a proposition which while it is not enunciated by Suarez in speaking of efficient causality, is basic to his treatment of that causality. It is this ". . . that principle . . . everything which is moved is moved by another has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated in every kind of motion or action; for there are many things which through virtual act seem to move themselves and reduce themselves to formal act as can be seen in the appetite or will and in water reducing itself to its pristine frigidity; the same therefore can happen in local motion . . ." <sup>883</sup>

<sup>882</sup> Sequitur ex dictis non esse de ratione causae efficientis ut sic ut ratio agendi et patiendi sint in re distinctae vel subjecto vel entitate integra aut partiali . . . praetera quod principium proximum agendi et patiendi . . . saltem differant in re aliqua quam includit principium agendi et non patiendi ut sic. . . Non . . . provenit ex communi ratione agentis ut sic neque etiam ex communi ratione actionis immanentis ut sic . . . in actione immanente quae . . . assimilationem non requirit . . . non oporteat principium agendi esse in partiali etiam entitate distinctum a principio recipiendi (*Ibid.*, n. 54).

<sup>883</sup> Principium illud . . . *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* adhuc non esse satis demonstratum in omni genere motus vel actionis; nam multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et reducere ad actum formalem ut in

On the question, of the dissimilarity between agent and patient Suarez says at the outset,<sup>384</sup> that it is a question of the dissimilarity between efficient cause and its recipient at the beginning of the action, not at its end; and it is moreover a question of antecedence of nature, not of time.<sup>385</sup>

An agent cause, Suarez states, can have an effect on the patient only in so far as the latter is dissimilar to the agent, in form or in the term of the action. To substantiate this, Suarez appeals both to the authority of Aristotle<sup>386</sup> and to the following argument from reason. An agent acts in as much as it is in act, and in order to act it requires a patient which is in potency. But what is in potency as such is unlike that which is in *act* as such. Therefore. The major is shown by this that to act is to communicate being, therefore (1) The communicated being must be supposed in the agent, so the agent acts in as much as it is in act; (2) When the agent communicates being it reduces the patient from potency to act, hence the patient, as subjected to such action is supposed as in potency.<sup>387</sup>

The dissimilitude which is *per se* required for action is only such as is found between a habit and its privation, or between a thing constituted in act or existing in potency. The patient must lack the form it is to receive; but positive opposition and contrariety is not necessary by reason of efficient causality as such.

Univocal causes, introducing in the patient a form of the same ratio as that through which the agent acts supposes in the patient a lack of that form, i. e., formal unlikeness.<sup>388</sup> Equivocal causes suppose not formal unlikeness in the patient but unlikeness as the patient is subjected to and perfected by the action. It supposes therefore a lack of that similitude

appetitu seu voluntate videre licet et in aqua reducente se ad pristinam frigiditatem; idem ergo accidere potest in motu locali (*Ibid.*, disp. XXIX, sect. 1, n. 7).

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 9.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, nn. 5-6.

<sup>386</sup> *I de Generatione*, c. 7, text. 46.

<sup>387</sup> *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 9, nn. 7-8.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 9.

which can be between a form formally taken and another which eminently contains it. This is true in all immanent action, for such action produces something not of the same form as that of the agent, but a proportional thing, i. e., second act consonant with first act, which second act is the perfection of first and contained in it not formally but virtually and eminently.<sup>389</sup>

It is *per se* required for efficiency that the agent have power in the patient and with respect to its capacity. Suarez adds that his resolution does not go against the principle that a thing cannot be dissimilar to itself with respect to one and the same part; for one thing can be in first act and in potency to second act (or in virtual act and formal potency) and so have a certain dissimilitude to itself, a dissimilitude which is not formal but eminent, virtual.

2. *The proximate principles of operation.* Suarez begins this discussion by pointing out that while Aristotle never defined potency as a species he did define each of the kinds of potency; (1) active potency as the principle of changing another in as much as it is other; and (2) passive potency as the principle of being changed by another.<sup>390</sup> Suarez immediately goes into the question as to whether this division of potency into active and passive is adequate and sufficient. He shows that it is (1) from the authority of philosophers; (2) from the nature of potency which as first act bespeaks a regard to second act, and the proximate and immediate second act of any potency can be only either action or passion, because an act can only regard a

<sup>389</sup> *Causa equivoca . . . supponit dissimilitudinem inter passum ut actioni supponitur et ut per actionem perficitur . . . supponit in passo parentiam illius similitudinis quae inter formam aliquam formaliter sumptam et aliam quae eminenter continet illam, intercedere potest. . . . Et idem est . . . in actibus immanentibus in quibus semper actio potentiae aequivoca est de quo communiter dici solet, non tam tendere ad producendum simile quam ad producendum proportionale, i. e. actum secundum consentaneum primo, et qui sit perfectio ejus in quo non formaliter sed virtute et eminenter continetur (Ibid.).*

<sup>390</sup> *Definit, dicens potentiam activam esse principium transmutandi aliud in quantum aliud; passivam vero, principium transmutandi ab alio (Ibid., disp. XLIII, sect. 1, n. 1).*

potency as either principle from which the act is, or in which and out of which the act is.<sup>391</sup>

Granted the division of potency into active and passive do the two members of the division differ really, or sometimes only rationally? There are, Suarez answers, purely active powers really distinct from passive potencies, all powers, namely, which are *per se* and primarily ordered to acting through transient act, as the principles of such acts complete in their own order. Examples are the active intellect, the motive power of living things, the attractive and impulsive power in some bodies. These potencies are not receptive; they never suffer by receiving their own act (for they are not principles of immanent acts) nor by receiving anything as first act by which, as active powers, they are completed, for they are complete in their own order and require no further act by which they are intrinsically completed for acting. The fact that such faculties sometimes need application, or the motion of another power to exercise acts proves nothing against this, for this motion is not through physical action and passion but through a sympathy of powers of the one and the same soul.<sup>392</sup> As is clear from its task, such a faculty is really distinct from a passive potency for if the latter is active it is so through immanent, not transient, action.<sup>393</sup>

Are there, contrary to such purely active powers others which are purely passive? In the whole latitude of being there are purely passive capacities such as primary matter, but are there any such faculties which constitute a species of quality? Suarez answers that he has not found any quality which is instituted

<sup>391</sup> *Actus secundus proximus et immediatus alicujus potentiae non est nisi aut actio aut passio; ergo etiam potentia tantum potest esse aut activa aut passiva* (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

<sup>392</sup> *Suppono dari aliquas potentias pure activas . . . hae namque potentiae sunt principia agendi, ut constat, et non sunt principia patiendi quia . . . neque etiam patiuntur recipiendo aliquid per modum actus primi quo compleantur in ratione principii agendi; quia . . . sunt principia completa in suo ordine . . . et non requirunt ulteriorem actum quo intrinsece compleantur ad agendum. Nec refert quod hujusmodi facultates interdum indigent applicatione vel motione alterius potentiae . . . haec enim motio non fit per physicam actionem et passionem . . . sed fit per sympathiam potentiarum ejusdem animae* (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 1).

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 2.

solely for this purpose of only receiving qualities or accidents.<sup>394</sup> He adds that we must not confuse the ratio of material or passive disposition with a receptive potency. The former consists in information with a certain proportion to the effect of some other form but is not a potency receptive of it, as quantity, for example is in its way, a material disposition to substantial form; yet it is not a power receptive of form. Of natural qualities none, Suarez says, seems to be *per se* and primarily a passive power; of vital powers some are passive but not purely passive. There is therefore no potency which is purely passive.<sup>395</sup>

One faculty can be both active and passive, (1) with regard to diverse things, as the passive intellect is active with respect to the act of understanding, and passive with respect to the active intellect; (2) even with regard to itself, for one power can have the power of eliciting its act and yet be the principle of receiving the act it elicits, as immanent acts are received in the faculties which elicit them. The reason is that this quality in as much as it has the actual perfection of such a species can be a power (*virtus*) eminently or virtually containing another act, and formally actuablie through this act.<sup>396</sup>

Yet since in reality there is no distinction between the two-fold ratio of such a faculty it is not to be placed in a two-fold species of quality. Both rationes are essential, neither is accidental. The one potency includes in a united way the aspects of being active and passive; *per se* it is each. Suarez notes that such potencies are found only in the cognitive and appetitive orders for only in those orders are there immanent acts.

<sup>394</sup> Ergo vero hactenus non inveni qualitatem aliquam quae solum instituta sit ad hoc munus recipiendi tantum alias qualitates vel accidentia (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

<sup>395</sup> Non est autem confundenda ratio materialis seu passivae dispositionis cum potentia proprie receptiva . . . simpliciter loquendo nulla est qualitas essentialiter spectans ad secundam speciem, quae sit pura potentia passiva (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

<sup>396</sup> Verum . . . est eamdem facultatem secundum rem esse simul potentiam activam et passivam respectu ejusdem actus et respectu sui ipsius . . . quia illamet qualitas quatenus habet actualem perfectionem talis speciei potest esse virtus eminenter vel virtute continens alium actum et potest esse formaliter actuabilis per eundem actum (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

Through our inadequate concepts such a thing can be distinguished into active and passive aspects, yet it is, in reality only one thing; for by its ultimate difference as a vital and perfect power it comprehends the ratio of receiving and eliciting. The fact that our concepts can prescind two different respects is not enough to distinguish two species.<sup>397</sup>

Speaking more physically, then, active and passive powers in general are not so distinct in reality that all actuality is excluded from the latter. A passive faculty is receptive of its act even if it also elicits it.<sup>398</sup> This does not argue against Aristotle's definition of such a power as that which is changed by another in as much as it is other; this note of "other" does not exclude the very faculty from concurring. For the note of "other" a formal distinction is enough, a real one is not always necessary. So if a power which receives its act is also the principle of the act there is no difficulty; it can have both aspects in as much as it virtually or eminently contains the act.<sup>399</sup>

Suarez' own definition of potency is this: "a proximate principle of some operation for which [operation] it is, by its nature, instituted and ordained." Operation is understood to include both action and reception so as to include both kinds of potency; or if there is no purely passive potency then operation is to be taken in the sense of act which either (1) comes from a potency (a purely active potency) or (2) remains in the potency (the receptive and active potency). A potency is by its nature ordered to operation.<sup>400</sup>

<sup>397</sup> Existimo nullam esse distinctionem actualem et ex natura rei inter potentiam illam ut activam et passivam, quia illa qualitas essentialiter includit utramque rationem (*Ibid.*, n. 15; cf. also n. 16, 1).

<sup>398</sup> Dicendum est illa duo membra [potentiae activae sc. et passivae] esse in re distincta ita tamen ut a potentia quae passiva dicitur non excludatur in re ipsa omnis activitas . . . potentia vera passiva [dicitur] quae est receptiva sui actus etiamsi illius sit etiam elicativa (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

<sup>399</sup> Significatur non semper requiri distinctionem in re, sed formalem vel virtualem interdum satis esse, . . . Quod si aliquando illa eadem res est principium activum talis actus non est sub ea ratione sed quatenus illa res virtute aut eminenter continet talem actum (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

<sup>400</sup> Potentia est *principium proximum alicujus operationis ad quam natura sua institutum et ordinatum est* (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 2).

The next question to claim our attention is whether there responds to each potency its own act. Suarez in answering immediately points out that it is one thing to compare a thing in potency to a thing in act, and quite another to compare potency to act. The first compares one and the same thing as possible to itself as actually existing; there is here involved only logical or objective potency. We are treating here rather of real potency, active and passive, both as transcendental and predicamental.<sup>401</sup>

To every real potency, both active and passive, then, its own act corresponds but in different ways. To the passive there always corresponds some formal act actuating and perfecting it, and to the active potency there corresponds an action which does not formally actuate it but which flows from it. Suarez proves his dictum about the passive power from its very nature. Such a thing is certainly ordered to receiving. But proper and physical reception consists in the adhesion or union of some formal act; therefore the act of such a power is a formal actuating thing either aptitudinally or actually (for such a potency need not always be under its act). The act of such a power can be considered according to two aspects distinct in nature, viz., that of actual passion and that of a form in being. Under each aspect it is the formal act of the potency; the two rationes are ordered among themselves as becoming to being.<sup>402</sup>

Since an active potency is ordained not to receive but to act, the act corresponding to it is not as something which informs and is received but which comes from it. Clearly the effect of

<sup>401</sup> Suppono aliud esse comparare rem in potentia ad rem in actu aliud vero esse comparare potentiam ad actum. In priori . . . confertur . . . eadem res passibilis ut passibilis ad seipsam ut actu existentem (*Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 1).

<sup>402</sup> Cuilibet potentiae . . . respondet proprius actus sed diversimode: Nam potentiae passivae correspondet semper aliquis actus formalis actuans et perficiens ipsam; potentiae vero activae ut sic non respondet actus formalis actuans ipsam sed ab ea manans . . . receptio autem propria et physica consistit in adhaesione vel unione alicujus actus formalis . . . potentiae passivae corresponeat proprius actus actuans formaliter. . . . Quod vero sub utraque ratione [actualis passionis sc. et formae in facto esse] sit [actus potentiae passivae] formalis actus potentiae passivae, patet (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-4).

such action is not an act informing the active potency; neither then is the action. While this is most clearly true of transient action it is true also of immanent for while the latter is the formal act of its potency it is not such because it is action, but because it is at the same time the passion of the potency as the latter is passive. The effect, too, of immanent action is the formal act of its potency, not because it is the effect of the power, but rather because it is a form regarding the passive capacity of such a power. Action rather than the effect is the act corresponding to any active potency (one point of difference between it and the passive); for while the action is ordained to the effect the latter does not formally regard the agent with any intrinsic and transcendental respect as action does. In passion even the term does have a transcendental regard to the passive power and actuates it.<sup>403</sup> Not all power then is to act as subject is to form; the act of only a passive power informs and actuates it. Transient action is not in the active potency. In general action as action is not received in an active power as such.<sup>404</sup>

Though to each potency there corresponds an act proportionate to it, the act is always something in reality, essentially and specifically distinct from the potency. The real distinction is clear, for the respect of potency to its act is real. An active potency is an effective principle of its act, and true efficiency can only be between things really distinct. A passive potency on the other hand is the material cause of the act, and the act is its formal cause intrinsically effecting it; these two also must be really distinct. Again, separability is a real sign of real distinction and a potency is separable from its act. Aristotle is

<sup>403</sup> *Actus illi [i. e. potentiae activae] correspondens non debet esse per modum receptionis vel informationis sed per modum emanationis tantum . . . ostendemus formaliter id [actionem sc. non esse actum formalem agentis] esse verum de omni actione ut sic, quia licet actio immanens sit formalis actus suae potentiae activae non tamen id habet ex eo quod actio est, sed ex eo quod simul est passio talis potentiae ut passiva est (Ibid., n. 5).*

<sup>404</sup> *Solus actus potentiae passivae est actus informans et actuans ipsam . . . supponimus . . . actionem ut actionem non recipi in potentia agente ut sic (Ibid., n. 8).*

to be interpreted in this sense when he says<sup>405</sup> that potency and act make not many but one; he meant not that they are one and the same but they (i. e. a passive potency and its act) compose one thing. When he says that what was in potency is afterwards in act he does not mean that potency becomes act but that something which lacked act is later constituted under act. It can be understood not of potency and act but of a thing as it is in logical potency and then later in reality.<sup>406</sup> The real distinction is sometimes a real distinction sometimes modal but it is always essential for potency and act are distinguished in reality (*secundum rem*) and have respects which are altogether diverse and opposite.<sup>407</sup> The two are not necessarily of the same genus. Action, the proper immediate act, is of a diverse genus from its principle which is either a substance or a quality. If the effect of an active power is called its act it will be of the same or of a different genus according as the agent is univocal or equivocal. Passive potency transcendentally taken is of the same genus as its act only when it is *per se* ordered to act. Predicamental passive potency is of the same genus as its act, for it is active through immanent act.

There remains the question of the relative priority of potency and act, which question can be understood with regard to duration, perfection, and definition and knowledge. Suarez again distinguishes a two-fold comparison: (1) the comparison of a thing in logical potency to the thing in the act of existing; (2) the comparison of real potency to real act. In the first way it is clear that act is prior to potency in perfection; for anything it is better to be in act than in potency since without act

<sup>405</sup> Cf. *VIII Metaph.*, c. 6.

<sup>406</sup> Dicendum est quamvis unicuique potentiae respondeat actus illi proportionatus semper tamen esse aliquid in re et in essentia et specie distinctum ab ipsa. . . . Cum Aristoteles . . . ait potentiam et actum non facere multa sed unum non est sensus ipsa esse unum et idem, sed componere unum. . . . Et . . . ait quod prius erat in potentia postea esse in actu, non quia ipsamet potentia receptiva fiat actus sed quia eadem, quae prius carebat actu postea sub illo constituitur (*Disp. Meta.*, *disp. XLIII*, *sect. 5*, nn. 10-11).

<sup>407</sup> Distinctionem hanc . . . interdum est proprie et in rigore realis, interdum sufficit modalis (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

there is no real perfection.<sup>408</sup> It is prior also in knowledge for, comparing diverse things, the more actual of them is in itself prior in knowledge; and comparing one thing in potency to itself in act (of existing) is the principle of our knowing each thing. Properly understood it is true even of God for He has all His knowledge primarily and *per se* about a thing actually existing or from an actually existing thing for first and *per se* He knows Himself Who necessarily exists; even possible creatures He knows through Himself and His known power. Act then is also prior in definition since potential being cannot be defined except through actual being or relation to it.

As to duration it is not simply necessary that potential being precede actual being or vice versa, either in one individual or in different individuals of the same species, for an eternal world is not, on every part, impossible. In all things outside God, being in potency does precede; yet, necessarily, being in the virtual or eminent act of God Himself precedes in nature any potential being. Hence in the whole latitude of being act precedes potency, but not in duration; for immediately the act is, other things are possible from its power.<sup>409</sup>

Comparing real potency and act, the act of an active potency is not, *ex genere suo* prior in perfection for to the potency it adds no perfection since it is either (1) action, which is imperfect or (2) the term of the action, which does not exceed the active virtue of the potency (unless this latter be instrumental). From its very genus the potency is more perfect though in a particular case the term might be of equal or even greater perfection. It cannot be urged that the act perfects the potency by the term of action for this term is extrinsic to the active power and not properly its act. It is not more perfect for God's

<sup>408</sup> In priori ergo sensu . . . clarum est actum esse priorem quam potentiam perfectione, quia unicuique rei melius est esse in actu quam in potentia (*Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 2).

<sup>409</sup> In hac comparatione non esse simpliciter necessarium ut esse in potentia praecedat duratione esse in actu neque e converso . . . de facto tamen in omnibus rebus extra Deum esse in potentia praecedere duratione esse in actu . . . necessario esse in actu virtuali seu eminenti ipsius Dei antecedat non tempore sed natura quodlibet esse in potentia (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

power to act than not to act; for a created power transient action is not its formal act but only that which extrinsically names it actually acting. To neither therefore does act give real perfection. Immanent act is the perfection of its potency but in as much as the latter is receptive not active. It is not action as action which perfects it but reception. Hence potency rather perfects action than the other way around.<sup>410</sup>

The action of an active power is not, *per se* speaking prior in knowledge or definition to its potency (except in predicamental potency which, *per se*, is instituted for such action), for potency more eminently contains the action. If the former is perfectly known, the very action can be known. By nature the active potency is simply prior to its act; in duration, the potency is not always necessarily prior (for it can act in its very first instant if there be no resistance and the act does not intrinsically include succession) but it can be since it does not depend on act *per se*. Certainly it cannot be posterior to the act, since it is presupposed to it as a principle.<sup>411</sup>

Of passive power it is also true that it cannot be posterior to its act, that it need not be prior, but that there is no repugnance to its being prior even to any individual act or to its acts taken collectively. In the order of perfection the passive power as such is posterior to its act not because it is always simply a less perfect being but because it is better with the act than without it. Without act it is unformed and actuatable hence less perfect than act; yet this aspect does not consider the thing

<sup>410</sup> Dicendum est actum potentiae agentis ut sic, ex suo genere non esse priorem perfectione quam potentiam imo neque tali potentia ut sic addi perfectionem ex eo quod exerceat talem actum. . . . Necessa est ut ex suo genere [potentia] sit perfectior (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Si vero loquamus de actione immanente illa quidem est perfectio formalis ejus potentiae . . . non tam est perfectio ejus ut agens est, quam ut recipiens est. . . . Atque ita fit, ut potentia agens ex ratione sua non perficitur actu suo sed potius ipsa perficiat effective actionem suam et per illam perficiat vel passum vel effectum (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

<sup>411</sup> Dicendum est potentiae activae operationem per se loquendo non esse priorem cognitione aut definitione ipsa potentia sed potius e converso, nisi solum in potentia praedicamentali quae per se primo instituta est ad talem actionem, . . . quia virtus activa ex suo genere est eminentior actione sua (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

simply hence we cannot simply conclude that potency is less perfect, although that is always true in the order of substantial passive potency, for its act gives being simply.<sup>412</sup> As to passive potencies for accidental acts we must distinguish; if the power is not *per se* primarily ordered to such an act there is no universal rule for determining their relative perfection since the perfection of the potency is then measured by its own principles, not by its capacity for such an act. If the power is *per se* ordained to this act it is more perfect than the act for it is also, eminently and equivocally, the active principle. Yet it is better with act than without it because the act of a passive power is its formal perfection which adds to the power a perfection which, of itself, it does not have; not that the simple entity of the power increases in its essential perfection but there is added to it some intrinsic perfection as its complement, which constitutes it in a perfect state.<sup>413</sup> As to the order of knowledge and definition a passive power *per se* instituted for its act is posterior to its act since the act is the specifying principle of the power; the power is for it and therefore defined through it.<sup>414</sup>

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*(To be concluded)*

<sup>412</sup> Haec vero comparatio tantum est secundum quid; unde ex illa non licet colligere passivam potentiam in sua entitate simpliciter minus perfectam actu suo (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

<sup>413</sup> Posterior autem potentia propria et praedicamentalis . . . ut opinor, semper est perfectior illis (loquor de actibus naturalibus . . . ) tanquam principium eminent et aequivocum illorum (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 25.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*The College Seeks Religion.* By MERRIMON CUNINGGIM. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. Pp. 327, with index. \$4.00.

*Religion in the Twentieth Century.* Edited by VERGILIUS FERM. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. 489, with index. \$5.00.

One would be justified in saying that the books which are the subject of this review are akin to the horns of a dilemma, because one sets forth the need for religion in contemporary collegiate life and concludes that only a non-sectarian religion can fill that need, while the other volume is a practical demonstration of the fact that it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory and effective non-sectarian religion.

Dr. Cuninggim's book shows that he is a man of ideas as well as of ideals. The purpose of his book is ". . . to analyze the association of religion and higher education since 1900" (p. 1). His analysis leads him to express a thesis which may be stated briefly: The roots of American higher education are struck deep in the soil which is religion. Around the turn of the century, the religious complexion of higher education began to fade and changed to the pallor of secularization which reached its peak at the time of World War I. Since that time there has been a change in the attitude of administrators, which change has been reflected in a renewal of respect for religion and marked by a widespread and serious effort to restore religion to collegiate life. Whereas the religion from which the colleges apostatized at the turn of the century was a sectarianism, that to which they are returning is interdenominational and non-sectarian. Both this return and the non-sectarian goal thereof are very desirable, and should be fostered.

In the analysis that leads to the construction of this thesis as well as in the application of its principles to the contemporary collegiate *milieu*, Dr. Cuninggim gives evidence of painstaking scholarship combined with a sincere desire to improve the spiritual lot of a generation which another author described as "gutted of inspiration, rinsed of morality and robbed of belief." The development of the thesis leads the author into many areas of inquiry which range from a carefully documented historical investigation of the status of religion on the American campus and the varying attitudes which religion meets on the part of college administrators, to detailed studies of present religion programs on the campuses of a select group of schools. The volume concludes with the author's plan for a revival of religion in the colleges and three highly informative surveys of religious programs and provisions obtaining in a large group of colleges. These surveys are included as appendices.

It must be noted that Dr. Cuninggim makes no attempt to discuss religion in the Catholic colleges whose "religious attitudes and practices are fixed and certain" (viii). Nor does this volume express a majority opinion, as can be learned by reading *Religion in Public Education* by V. T. Thayer (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), which represents a contradictory attitude. Also, the author's views on the separation of church and state (Chapt. VIII) which are opposed to those of John Dewey and the naturalists, have been set at nought, at least in their application to state-supported colleges, by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Champaign School Case.

With these few limitations noted, it is possible to examine certain fundamental truths which are concerned in any discussion of religious education. There is a certain lack of precision in the term "religious education," and this is true whether the term be used by Catholics or others. For Dr. Cuninggim, religious education includes "a discipline of the mind which gives meaning to matter (and) can furnish a basis of unity for the curriculum . . . an appreciation of high values, including the supreme value, God . . . a motivation for ethical living, personal and social . . . an atmosphere (which) can suffuse the whole life of the college with love of truth, of beauty, and of good will" (p. 268). This concept is manifestly very extensive, and includes a variety of goals which are distinct, if not separate. This extension and inclusion demands that a certain order be put into the various values and objectives if the concept "religious education" is to be susceptible of complete understanding.

In the first place, "religious education" is a part of the totality which is "education" simply. Moreover, since this is a question of *religious education in the schools*, it must be noted that schooling is but a part of the educational process in the broad sense of that term. Consequently, schooling is not coextensive with education, nor is religious education in the schools the totality of man's effort to perfect the educable in respect of religious doctrine and practice.

The total process of education is a combination of artistic activities by which man is perfected according to the twofold capacities of nature and grace. This process of education is a potential totality—*totum potentiale*—in the language of the Schoolmen, which is divided into potential parts. The totality is present in each of the parts according to the totality of nature, but not according to the totality of power. St. Thomas points out that one and the same human soul is the subject of the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual functions in man, but that the total power of that same human soul is not realized and actuated in each of the single functions. Thus schooling is truly education because it partakes of the totality of education according to its nature, but schooling does not demand the complete activity of all educational agents, and is, consequently,

distinct from education in this respect. To put the matter simply: all schooling is education, but not all education is schooling.

It is reasonable to expect that distinct agents should have distinct activities that are specified by distinct objects. The school must make a distinctive contribution to the educational process if it is to enjoy existence as a dynamic part of that process. The distinctive activity of the school is to perfect man according to the intellectual virtues and the liberal arts. If the school fails to perfect man according to the pattern of art, science and wisdom, then it ceases to discharge its proper function in the educational process and thereby forfeits its right to a place in that process.

On the other hand, the school must be regarded as participating in the more general work of education which is the task of perfecting man not according to a limited formality (e. g., according to the pattern of art, science and wisdom), but rather of perfecting man simply as man, as reason and Divine Revelation manifest him to be. From this aspect, the school must blend perfectly into the totality of the educational environment which includes the home, the church, the state and the social *milieu*. All of these agencies of education are subject to the norms of morality, in the attainment of which they cooperate in creating and maintaining the proper atmosphere for the education of youth.

In view of these fundamental principles, it is possible to draw some valid conclusions regarding religious education in the colleges. First, the atmosphere of the college must be governed by the laws of morality, so that the educational environment is in complete accord with the rights of God, of the student, the home, the church and the state. Secondly, the school *as school* must make a contribution to the spiritual development of the student which is primarily intellectual. The student attends college for the sake of learning, the equipment of the college exists for the sake of learning, and this distinctive (although obviously intermediate) goal must be attained by and through the academic process or it will never be attained in the vast majority of cases.

A further development of this point is not out of place. It is accepted as axiomatic, at least in the practical order, that the undergraduate is capable of beginning truly scientific learning. A glance at any college catalogue shows that scientific courses are demanded even for Freshmen. Dr. Cuninggim remarks that courses in religion should be intellectually acceptable and presentable. The simple fact is that many religion courses are not intellectually presentable. This is manifest in the catalogues and text-books of many Catholic colleges which offer religion courses which appear to be, and are, the counterparts of impoverished and unwanted relations when viewed in comparison with the other courses of the curriculum. A specious defense is offered for this deplorable condition when it is main-

tained that provision must be made for "Christ's intellectually poor." However such nomenclature might appeal to sentimentality, one cannot refrain from thinking that these same poor will soon be removed from any campus that pretends to academic competency by inability to digest the excessively rich diet of science that is served up in the other courses of the curriculum. If the course in religion is designed to be naught but a plank in academic shipwreck, then that course will do more harm to the competent students than it will accomplish good in respect of those who should never have cumbered the academic processes with their incompetency in the first place.

The third point is that religious instruction at the undergraduate level should be scientific in its content, method and order. In other words, this instruction should be theological. For the Catholic college, such a conclusion presents certain difficulties that are both speculative and practical, but mainly practical. It is demonstrable according to the Catholic theology of education that theological courses are necessary in the colleges and due to the students at this level. The problem in regard to the state-supported institution is no longer real, because the Supreme Court has placed an effective barrier to the introduction of any such courses by making the public schools of this republic legally indifferent, if not positively opposed to religious education. There remains then, the problem of the church-related (Protestant) and independent colleges, to use the divisions of the author.

Any college that is serious about providing effective religious training for its students must certainly offer adequate instruction in religious truth. That is a primary obligation incumbent upon the college precisely as college, the proper and immediate object of which is to perfect the student according to the pattern of art, science and wisdom. Over and above this, the college—considered now as a part of the general educational environment must safeguard the right of its students to worship their Creator in a fitting manner. This obligation engenders another which is negative, in that it is fulfilled by barring from the collegiate environment whatever persons and circumstances constitute an obstacle to the proper appreciation and just fulfillment of the student's obligations to Almighty God. There is little point in instituting a course in religious truth on a campus where every shade of materialism, pragmatism and atheism is imbibed in other disciplines. This responsibility cannot be discharged by a sentimental and pietistic approach to God and revealed truth, for such an approach is a ready victim of scoffers and sophists. What is clearly needed is a strong department of theology, for theology is the only science capable of judging the subordinate disciplines and refuting whatever errors they might advance against the veracity of revealed truth.

On the positive side, the college must offer adequate opportunities for

the exercise of the virtue of religion through the medium of prayer, communal worship and the use of the sacraments. This is a function which is distinct from the scientific and academic presentation of religious truth and is the province of the chaplain rather than of the Department of Theology. In providing religious activities for the student, the college is not functioning under its proper formality as an institution of learning, but rather under its common formality as a part of the totality of the educational process. Nor is the college performing any charity in so acting, but it is rather acting in strict justice to discharge its debt to its students and their parents by making it reasonably convenient for the former to discharge their debt to Almighty God.

Both in providing adequate religious instruction and in offering proper religious activity, Dr. Cuninggim's principles encounter a serious obstacle. He maintains that sectarianism is practically non-existent, even in denominational (Protestant) colleges. He is convinced that a religion program can be Christian, denominational and non-sectarian all at once (p. 266). This is indeed a startling kind of religion. When one contemplates the fact that there are nearly three hundred Protestant sects in this country, it is difficult to see what would remain of their religion if all the conflicting tenets were removed. Those who favor Dr. Cuninggim's solution must end by making a new sect of non-sectarianism. A doctrine which offends no one will satisfy no one. Each concession begets another, while indifferentism grows apace. Dr. Cuninggim states that religion must be a vital force (p. 267) if it is to merit attention from the colleges, and throughout the entire volume he decries secularism as the great enemy of religion. But his thesis must rest on the divisive principles of Protestantism and his conclusion must of necessity hold for a compromise religion that begets indifferentism, fosters naturalism and, ultimately, nourishes secularism which is the very enemy he would oppose. The author's manifest sincerity cannot surmount that obstacle. There is, after all, an inherent unity in truth. God cannot be personal and not-personal; Christ cannot be God and not-God. The failure of the conclusion is contained in the contradiction of the principles, to the analysis of which the author's scholarly ability could well be turned with profit to his thesis.

The practical impossibility of arriving at a truly non-sectarian religion such as is demanded by the thesis of Dr. Cuninggim is manifested in the symposium, *Religion in the Twentieth Century*. This volume is "a chronological arrangement of essays on the larger divisions of religious ideologies and practices, not on denominations or cults" (pp. vi, vii). As a source of information about the twenty-seven such divisions represented, the volume has value as a work of ready reference. To offer adequate criticism of such a compilation as this would require a volume of greater length than the book itself, because it contains every shade of religious opinion

and error known to history. Consequently, no such criticism will be attempted.

On the credit side, there is brevity and a rather high level of readability together with the flavor of authority because all of the essays were written by men competent to discuss the respective religions. Each essay is preceded by a brief biographical sketch of the author. The net result is a book that will tell you something of the tenets, the practices and the history of modern religious groups, told for the most part by one who subscribes to the religion he describes. A select bibliography at the close of each essay furnishes a guide for further research. Polemics are conspicuously lacking.

On the debit side, the introductory essay by the editor could well have been restricted to a statement of purpose and the acknowledgment of debts of gratitude. His attempt at expressing an interpretative judgment is very confused. This is not surprising when one considers that he attempts to discover a harmonious note in the gamut of religion beginning with Hinduism and continuing through to Reconstructionism. Such an attempt is like that of a chameleon trying to maintain his reputation for changing colors on a swatch of Scotch plaid. The entire flavor of the introductory essay is relativistic and indifferent.

Catholics will take exception to many things in this book. To single out a sample, "Catholicism (is covered by its division) into its three-fold expression, Roman, Greek and Anglo-Catholic" (p. vi). Such reference to the "Branch Theory" is altogether unacceptable. On the other hand, Catholics will be glad to learn that the essay on their own faith was written in a forceful and unmistakable style by Father Charles A. Hart of the Department of Philosophy of The Catholic University of America. Father Hart's presentation is worthy of high praise as a strong and uncompromising statement of Catholic history, faith and practice.

It is not clear why there is no article on Orthodox Judaism in this compilation, whereas three essays are devoted to the various modern departures from the ancient faith of the Jews.

*Religion in the Twentieth Century* offers a demonstration that a truly non-sectarian religion is practically impossible because it is speculatively unattainable without a principle of unity, and there is no such principle admitted among various sects. On principle, the Protestants who collectively represent a majority, must admit the equality of all religions because of their affection for the doctrine of private interpretation of revealed truth. Now if all these dissident groups are equal, and equally true, how can one of them surrender what it holds to be true in favor of what it holds to be false without thereby admitting falsehood in itself and imputing it to others? What is needed is an intrinsic principle of unity, a "unity of the Spirit which is the bond of peace," and no such unity can

be discovered among incompatible elements as they are represented in this book. Such true unity derives only from the God Who is Truth, and Who, being Truth, is One and Indivisible. It is only when God is recognized and worshipped, not as men would make Him to be, but as He is Himself and as He has revealed Himself to men, that there will exist that true fraternity which is vivified by the Spirit and preserved in the bond of peace.

It would be interesting to learn Dr. Cuninggim's estimate of *Religion in the Twentieth Century*. It would be interesting to know what kind of non-sectarian religion he would offer to a campus having Hindus, Shintoists, Islamites, Catholics, Mormons, Swedenborgians, Jews, Christian Scientists and adherents of the Ramakrishna Movement.

How long will the spiritually hungry of this day seek their longed-for unity on the circumference of religious manifestation and change? When will the sincere seekers of truth cease to search for the answers in terms of change and look rather in the direction of the unchanging and dynamic eternal? Truly, a slight error in the principles leads to a great error in the conclusions. It is time to look back to the beginnings—to the *terminus a quo* of the endlessly divisive movements; it is time to look to the rock whence they were hewn.

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*Figures for an Apocalypse.* By Thomas Merton. Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions; 1948. Pp. 111. \$2.50.

About ten years ago Thomas Merton with a companion communist-minded student signed up for a course in medieval philosophy at Columbia University. From prospective hecklers, they became listeners, and from listeners, disciples. At the end of the semester they asked for a continuation of the course. Their teacher gave them Duns Scotus. Before the semester's end, Merton had asked his teacher to direct him to a priest for instructions. Presently, he was baptized. Sometime later he returned to his professor of philosophy to ask about monastic orders and the religious life. He was directed to the Father Superior of Saint Bonaventure College where shortly he found himself teaching literature and learning the science of the saints. The sequel was his entrance into the Trappist Monastery of Our Lady of Gethsemani, Kentucky.

As Brother Louis and under the constraint of holy obedience, Thomas Merton has published since 1944 three slender volumes: *Thirty Poems*, *Man in the Divided Sea*, and *Figures for an Apocalypse*. They stand in the

temporal center of our century and will perhaps mean for this period what the three small first books of Francis Thompson, published between 1893 and 1897, have come to mean for its beginning.

Immediately, other comparisons spring to mind: with Hopkins, with Eliot, with the disciples of these. Merton moves easily in the same intellectual orbit and in a rarer spiritual world. Other essentials being equal—as they are, and more—this in itself underwrites his future as a poet. It is not unlikely that another generation will appraise him in superlatives. This review will content itself with considering very simply his idiom, technic, themes, vision, beauty, these being the obvious factors out of which these twenty-seven least obvious of poems arise.

Nothing defies the diction of the poet so completely as the slang, the vernacular, the current idiom of the day. Yet, Merton whips these unruly outlaws into complete subservience to the disciplined line as:

And the cops come down the street in fours  
With clubs as loud as bells

or

All night long we waited at the desert's edge,  
.  
.  
Watching the white moon giggle in the stream:

The age itself submits to this summary:

Tomorrow is the millenium,  
The golden age!  
The human race will wake up  
And find dollars growing out of the palms of  
their hands,  
And the whole world will die of brotherly love  
Because the factories jig like drums  
And furnaces feed themselves,  
And all men lie in idleness upon the quilted  
pastures,  
tuning their friendly radios and dreaming in  
the sun!

The epitaph for New York City illustrates the language of the hour put to worthy work and lifted to singing strength by a poet:

This was a city  
That dressed herself in paper money.  
She lived four hundred years  
With nickles running in her veins.  
She loved the waters of the seven purple seas,  
And burned on her own green harbor  
Higher and whiter than ever any Tyre.

She was as callous as a taxi;  
Her high-heeled eyes were sometimes blue as gin,  
And she nailed them, all the days of her life,  
Through the hearts of her six million poor.

No slang is too racy, no provincialism too local to give itself up in unique service to his line. Place names, Kansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Lexington bring him the vigor of their rhythms and their musical staccatos. What he does with words he does more extensively with metaphors, with similes. Such figures as "The Trees have all torn up their programs," or "The cruel algebra of war" move clearly outside the pattern of conventional rhetoric. Merton sees his world in the light of common day and of the calendar day at that, but always by a comparison, as the poet must. So he says:

November analyzed our bankruptcies, but now  
His observations lie knee-deep beneath our  
    Christmas mercies,  
While folded in the buried seed  
The virtual summer lives and sleeps;  
And every acre keeps its treasure like a kingly secret.

Perhaps this series of sustained figures will serve to illustrate, one example for many, the quality and power of the Merton metaphor. It is the conclusion of his *Letter to America*:

Down where the movies grit  
Their white electric teeth,  
Maybe the glorious children have rebelled  
And rinsed their mental slums  
In the clean drench of an incalculable grief.

...  
But oh! the flowering cancers of that love  
That eats your earth with roots of steel!  
No few fast hours can drain your flesh  
Of all those seas of candied poison,

Until our long Gregorian cry  
Bows down the stars' Samaritan  
To rue the pity of so cruel a murder.

If Merton errs in his elected style, it may be in the overuse of simile. His lines bristle with astounding comparisons, all so good that the reader would protest the loss of any. Just what they do to a poem can be judged by this:

Your most learned, mad  
And immaculate indignation

...

Severs our midnight like a streak of flying pullmans  
 And challenges our black unhappiness  
 Loud as the lights of an express.

Not since Patmore has the ode known a better master. All these new poems employ this form. All enjoy the liberties, the rich variety, the complete discipline and tacit form of its formlessness. Contemporary poets can well be taught by their freedom and their orthodoxy. Every poem in the volume is autobiographical, looking outward from the Trappist Monastery to the world of New York City, America, the universe; inward, to the world of the monastery, the contemplative life, the ultimate city of God. Here is such surrender as one finds everywhere in the book:

Why are we all afraid of love?  
 Why should we, who are far greater than the grain  
 Fear to fall in the ground and die?  
 Have you not planned for minds and wills  
 Their own more subtle biochemistry?

This is the end of my old ways, dear Christ!  
 Now I will hear Your voice at last  
 And leave the frosts (that is: the fears) of my  
 December.  
 And though You kill me, (as You must) more, more  
 I'll trust in you.

The early allegiance to Duns Scotus is celebrated and the poet's love for the two Desert Fathers. These lines to Saint Paul indicate their power:

Because God, God  
 The One I hunt and never capture,  
 Opened His door, and lo, His loneliness invaded you.

Alone, alone.  
 Sitting in the sunny den-door  
 Under that date tree,  
 Wounded from head to foot by His most isolated  
 Trinity,

Asking no more questions,  
 Forgetting how to spell the thought of scrutiny  
 And wanting no secret  
 You died to the world of concept  
 Upon the cross of your humility.

After this, there is small need to speak of the vision, the essential insight of this Trappist monk. Here is a brave confession of it as contemplation:

For we are sunken in the summer of our adoration,  
 And plunge down, down into the fathoms of our  
 secret joy  
 That swims with indefinable fire.

Closer to the experience of the average reader is the world of *Natural History*. His comments on the irrational world are unforgettable:

O Savior! How we learn Your mercy and Your  
 Providence,  
 Seeing these creatures in their tiny tremendous  
 labor:  
 . . .  
 Measure the quality of the obedience  
 With which their natures hear Your thought and  
 come,  
 Each worm hastening as best he can  
 To die here in this patch of sun.  
 . . .  
 Walk we and ponder on this miracle  
 And on the way Your creatures love Your will,  
 . . .  
 Oh, we, who know from faith and Scripture  
 All the scope and end of the metamorphosis,  
 Run we like these creatures in their glad alacrity  
 To our far sweeter figurative death,  
 When we can learn such ways to God from creeping  
 things  
 And sanctity from a black and russet worm!

The title poem says and sings the tremendous apocalypse of New York City, its destruction and its ruins, with for a triumphant epilogue the vision of the heavenly city. With the invocations of Isaias and Solomon, the fierce invectives of the Baptist John, the theme of the Evangelist, Merton foretells the fall of our present Babylon, with its "rich women," "thin unprofitable queens," its "dendric bridges," its "black boils of Harlem and the Bronx."

Against the long survival of the wickedness of our metropolis the poet prophesies that:

Tomorrow and the day after  
 Grasses and flowers will grow  
 Upon the bosom of Manhattan.  
 . . .  
 There shall be doves' nests, and hives of bees  
 In the cliffs of the ancient apartments,  
 And birds shall sing in the sunny hawthorns

Where was once Park Avenue.  
And where Grand Central was, shall be a little hill  
Clustered with sweet, dark pine.

This vision which has come to pass of other cities and other cultures may some day be our history as well as poetry.

It is almost impossible to discuss or to describe Merton without quoting him. But here the word or epithet or line is so integral a part of the whole that to detach it is to do it harm. However, in the most fragmented readings one cannot miss the power, the spiritual intensities, the poetical promise of this young monk. His essay on *Poetry and the Contemplative Life*, with which his book concludes, presents his theory of the two arts under which his own form of perfect living will be conditioned.

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*Meaning and Necessity*. By Rudolf Carnap. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. 210, with index. \$5.00.

The chief concern of Professor Rudolf Carnap in his latest book in symbolic logic (the third volume of the series "Studies in Semantics") is the development of a "new method for analyzing and describing the meanings of linguistic expressions." This method is called "the method of extension and intension." In his preface, Professor Carnap says: "The method will be contrasted with various other semantical methods used in traditional philosophy or by contemporary authors. These other methods have one characteristic in common: They all regard an expression in a language as a name of a concrete or abstract entity. In contradistinction, the method here proposed takes an expression, not as naming anything, but as possessing an intension and an extension."

One other main point is covered in the book. It is concerned with modal logic, and presents a theory of modalities, such as necessity, contingency, possibility, and impossibility. The author's intention is to construct a system of modal logic or, more properly, systems of modal logic which will combine modalities with quantification. However, in the present book, there is only a preliminary discussion of meanings and problems of modalities.

Any detailed consideration of the problems with which Professor Carnap is concerned does not fall within the province of a review. Furthermore, they are problems which, in part, are peculiar to the technique of the symbolic logician and are therefore not of direct interest to us. But there is a fundamental point which needs consideration and which is related to

Professor Carnap's book as a whole. This point concerns the relation between Aristotelian logic and symbolic logic. We shall try to show, though briefly, the necessary priority of Aristotelian logic to symbolic logic. We shall try also to indicate that the symbolic logician cannot safely ignore this priority of Aristotelian logic and that, to a certain extent, symbolic logic itself must depend upon Aristotelian logic for the validity of its own procedure. This admittedly cannot be done too satisfactorily within the limits of a review, but perhaps enough can be indicated to manifest the point in a general way. At the same time, it will become evident, we believe, that the more specialized problems with which Professor Carnap is concerned within the procedure of symbolic logic have a real connection with this fundamental relation.

We are aware also that there is, to a certain extent, an excessive opposition between Aristotelian logicians and symbolic logicians. The Aristotelian logician and the symbolic logician have pursued separated and even somewhat hostile paths far too much. The Aristotelian logician has contributed to this by neglecting to grasp the purpose and role of symbolic logic and consequently has criticized it on irrelevant grounds. On the other hand, the symbolic logician has let himself be blinded by wrong presuppositions about Aristotelian logic and philosophy. This blind spot has prevented the symbolic logician from examining more critically the presuppositions within symbolic logic, where the relation to Aristotelian logic is made evident. By way of illustrating this latter point, we shall quote a passage from Professor Carnap's book. We shall also use this passage to introduce the positive point of manifesting the relation of symbolic logic to Aristotelian logic. This passage occurs on page twenty-two in the context of explaining the meaning of some basic terms to be used in the book:

The preceding remarks are meant merely as an informal terminological clarification. They should by no means be regarded as an attempt toward a solution of the old controversial problem of the universals. The traditional discussions concerning this problem are, in my view, a rather heterogeneous mixture of different components, among them logical statements, psychological statements, and pseudo-statements, that is, expressions which are erroneously regarded as statements but do not have cognitive content, although they may have noncognitive—for instance, emotive—meaning components. My remarks on the interpretation intended for the term 'property' are admittedly rather vague, chiefly because of a lack of a clear and generally accepted terminology about matters of this kind. Nevertheless, I hope they will give sufficiently clear indications for all practical purposes and, above all, may help to avoid certain typical misunderstandings.

I wish to emphasize the fact that the discussions in this book about properties, and similarly about relations, concepts in general, propositions, etc., do not involve a hypostatization. As I understand it, a hypostatization or substantialization or reification consists in mistaking as things entities which are not things. Examples of hypostatizations of properties (or ideas, universals, or the like) in this sense

are such formulations as 'the ideas have an independent subsistence,' 'they reside in a super-heavenly place,' 'they were in the mind of God before they became manifested in things,' and the like, provided that these formulations are meant literally and not merely as poetical metaphors. (We leave aside here the historical question of whether these hypostatizations are to be attributed to Plato himself or rather to his interpreters.) These formulations, if taken literally, are pseudo-statements, devoid of cognitive content, and therefore neither true nor false. Whatever is said in this book about properties may be wrong, but it has at least cognitive content. This follows from the fact that our statements belong to, or can be translated into, the general language of science. We use the term 'property' in that sense in which it is used by scientists in statements of the following form: 'These two bodies have the same chemical properties, but there are certain physical properties in which they differ'; 'Let us express the property . . . , which is exemplified by the one but not by the other of these two bodies, by 'P'.'

The term '*entity*' is frequently used in this book. I am aware of the metaphysical connotations associated with it, but I hope that the reader will be able to leave them aside and to take the word in the simple sense in which it is meant here, as a common designation for properties, propositions, and other intensions, on the one hand, and for classes, individuals, and other extensions, on the other.

We could manifest here, at some length, the very faulty notion Professor Carnap has of what constitutes metaphysics, the false a priori idealistic presuppositions about the subject matter of metaphysics, and the naive characterization of philosophical distinctions as pseudo-statements, a position logical positivists habitually and uncritically assume. But such matters are beside the immediate point.

Let us recognize, first, the sense in which Professor Carnap is justified in maintaining that his "terminological clarification" is not to be regarded as a solution to the problem of universals. His clarification of terminology, insofar as it falls within the technique of symbolic logic, has no more to do with universals than the remarks of the experimental scientist concerning electrons and protons have to do with substances and accidents. The reason for this is basically simple. Substances as substances do not fall within the method of experimental science, which can deal only with operations on things. Likewise, symbolic logic as such is not concerned with universals in any rigorous sense of the term because no universal is ever attained directly through experimental verification, with which symbolic logic is concerned. The universal in the traditional sense (the aptitude for being in many and being said of many) can be obtained only by abstraction. If we tried to get a universal through the experimental method we would see, by the very fact that more than one observable case is necessary, that the true universal could never be obtained. This is the situation for the symbolic logician who, since he is not dealing with universals (in the traditional sense), does not have a predicational logic which

rests, ultimately, upon observed connections between experimentally observed phenomena.

All this emphasizes the distinction between the Aristotelian logic and symbolic logic. Some Aristotelian logicians have failed to appreciate this sufficiently when considering symbolic logic; as a consequence, they do not discern a justified difference between the two. Nevertheless, despite this difference in aim, a fundamental relation of dependence still exists between symbolic logic and Aristotelian logic. This is a relation of priority of Aristotelian logic to symbolic logic, which the symbolic logician usually ignores.

By way of illustrating briefly how symbolic logic must rest upon Aristotelian logic for its own intelligibility, we can examine the way in which Professor Carnap explains his basic terms. As a necessary preliminary point to this, we should recall the underlying reason for predication in Aristotelian logic, which rests upon the universal. That is, what justifies our making a predication or a proposition is the universal and, more specifically, that the more universal term can be predicated of the less universal term all the way down to where a universal term can be said of the singular. Accordingly, it is universality, or the aptitude of one being in many, which permits the formation of a proposition at all by the human intellect, and any specialized type of proposition must presuppose this common proposition as a basis.

We shall thus presume in this review this dependence of the proposition upon the universal such that to deny the universal is to deny the validity of all propositions and of all consequent reasoning based on propositions. Now, it is customary to speak of symbolic logic as "relational" logic by way of distinguishing it from predicational logic. This distinction has validity, as we have noted above. But we wish to emphasize now that, from the standpoint of logical analysis, a relational proposition cannot be justified unless a prior predicational proposition as a basis is admitted, explicitly or implicitly. In other words, any relation of terms in a proposition must presuppose an original identity or sameness between the terms obtained only by the act of predication, just as accidents must presuppose substance in order to exist. One term cannot "imply" another term unless both are somehow one.

By way of illustrating the necessity of this, let us note how Professor Carnap treats such terms as "property" or "class." He recognizes, first, several ways of stating the following expression in ordinary language: "Scott is human"; "Scott has the property human"; "Scott belongs to the class human." These differ, he points out, only in that the latter two add the "more explicit sense" of "property" or "class." He also adds another example in the mode of symbolic logic to show the same thing: "(x) [Hx ⊃ Bx]"; "The property Human implies materially the property Biped"; "The Class Human is a subclass of the class Biped."

Professor Carnap's question becomes, in this formulation, one of determining the difference between "property" and "class." He finds that the fundamental difference is in the *condition of identity*. Thus he writes (p. 18): "Classes are usually taken as identical if they have the same elements. Thus, for example, the class Human has the same elements as the class Featherless Biped. . . . Under what condition properties are usually regarded as identical is less clear. It seems natural, and sufficiently in agreement with the vague customary usage, to regard properties as identical if it can be shown by logical means alone without reference to the facts that whatever has the one property has the other and vice versa. . . ."

The immediate point here is that what Professor Carnap takes as an "assumption" or as "vague customary usage" or as a "condition of identity" rests upon nothing else than the act of predication made by the human mind, which is made explicit in Aristotelian logic. If the symbolic logician examined such presuppositions as this more critically, along with an analysis of Aristotelian logic, he would find this confirmed for himself. For actually, the symbolic logician is constantly assuming (with no reason at all for granting the assumption) principles which in fact are in Aristotelian logic and which would give him an intelligible justification for what he seeks to do in symbolic logic.

Otherwise, why should we accept, on the basis of what we learn from the symbolic logician, the legitimacy of asserting that "Scott is human"? There is not the slightest logical ground in symbolic logic, as it is in fact constituted by logical positivists at least, for the legitimacy of such an assertion. How and why can we make such an assertion? How and why can we say "human" of "Scott"? The symbolic logicians do not manifest this for us and, insofar as they claim to give a complete system of logic, they are obligated to explain the most common and most necessary type of proposition. We could accept their assumptions if we knew they meant them as an indirect reference to the basic process of the human mind, which is only another way of referring to Aristotelian logic. But they tell us, instead, either that Aristotelian logic is outmoded or that it is somehow included within symbolic logic. In such circumstances, we then have the right to demand an adequate explanation for such assertions as "Scott is human." And when they cannot give such an explanation, they should be disposed to see the justification for any proposition in the act of predication.

To indicate this in another way, we can raise the same questions about the "condition of identity." Why should we accept the "condition of identity" in symbolic logic? As far as the procedure of symbolic logic is concerned, there is every reason not to accept it since, in the light of what we learn from them, there is no such identity possible. For their

presupposition is the radical difference of all individuals (otherwise they would admit the proper universal). But under such a presupposition, there cannot be a real identity or sameness. And without such an identity, the theoretical justification for symbolic logic falls. If, however, the symbolic logicians accepted the identity made by the mind in predication, which is only the natural development of the human mind making a judgment, they could go on to treat of the more specialized, relational proposition consistently and intelligibly. Without accepting this, they cannot sufficiently establish the very foundation of symbolic logic.

We have been led in this review to consider briefly only one or two very basic points and to attack, in one sense, the presuppositions of symbolic logic. We have proceeded in this way for two reasons. The first is a negative one, to offset the constant attack Professor Carnap—and logical positivists in general—make upon philosophical principles. As one example of this, in the quotation given above, Professor Carnap asserts: “The traditional discussions concerning this problem (of the universals) are, in my view, a rather heterogeneous mixture of different components, among them logical statements, psychological statements, and pseudo-statements, that is, expressions which are erroneously regarded as statements but do not have cognitive content, although they may have noncognitive—for instance, emotive-meaning components . . .” etc. Since Professor Carnap thus chooses to introduce philosophical matter, we have to point out that this purely *rhetorical* approach to the problem not only does not dismiss the problem, but undermines, as we have suggested, the position of the symbolic logician as well.

This leads into the second and positive reason, for it is in this “old, controversial problem of the universals” that the present vulnerability of the logical positivist can be removed. As we have remarked, the theoretical justification of symbolic logic collapses unless the universal is acknowledged. There is no primary concept, nor property, nor class unless there is the original universal with the relations of genus, species, property, etc., from which the “property” and “class” of the symbolic logician ultimately derives.

The logical positivists suffer from an “anti-metaphysical” blindness of their own creation. In this they are to be distinguished from symbolic logicians in general. The logical positivists, in fact, have harmed the development of symbolic logic because of the unsound philosophical presuppositions they have assumed under the name of logical positivism. For the good of symbolic logic itself, they should discard the imaginary battle they wage against a false notion of metaphysics and discover that in Aristotelian logic and a sound metaphysics they will find exactly what they need to support and make intelligible the method of symbolic logic. Without this basis of sound philosophical penetration, they will continue on in

an unending circle of "new" problems and temporary resolutions, so far as their theoretical foundation is concerned. There are, of course, genuine and important problems within symbolic logic; Professor Carnap treats some of them quite thoroughly. But in this book, and in the texts of logical positivists generally, a good deal of unnecessary work and untenable analysis would be saved if they made use of a logical analysis already achieved and available for them. To mention one instance: an application of the doctrine of supposition would aid Professor Carnap immeasurably in treating "extension" and "intension" as he wishes to use this in symbolic logic.

Finally, we insist again that the Aristotelian logician has an obligation to penetrate the method of symbolic logic, to recognize its worth and application, and to assist in its theoretical justification.

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*Selbstkritik der Philosophie und vergleichende Philosophiegeschichte im Umriss* (A Self-criticism of Philosophy and Outlines for a Comparative History of Philosophy). By Alois Dempf. Vienna: Herder, 1947. Pp. 357, with indexes. s. fr. 18.00; S 46.80.

Shortly before the Germans occupied Austria, Professor Dempf had been appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna, coming there from Bonn. He was immediately dismissed, as a Catholic and *persona non grata*. He devoted the years of involuntary leisure to a comprehensive study of basic problems, especially to a detailed survey of the whole history of philosophy. He had written previously on many subjects, particularly on the political philosophy of the Middle Ages (*Sacrum Imperium*, 1929), and contributed to the *Handbuch der Philosophie* the parts dealing with the medieval philosophers; he also published studies on Donoso Cortes, on Kierkegaard, and several others.

The fruits of all this work and the years of research are presented in this volume. The presentation is unusually compact; it presupposes on the part of the reader a good acquaintance with many things. There is no bibliography and, unfortunately, some of the philosophers who are credited with important influence are not well known, at least to the average student of philosophy. Dempf envisions as outstanding figures some who are usually given but scant notice in textbooks and even larger treatises. The brevity of the references sometimes leaves a doubt in the mind of the reader regarding the justice of the characterization of one or another writer. A

further difficulty is created by the author's inclusion of Eastern philosophies, of Arabia, India, and China, of which at least this reviewer has but a very poor knowledge.

The main difficulty, however, results from the width of the plan and the brevity of the text. Moreover, diagrams, tables, and indexes consume pages 313 to the end of the work. Further, pages 209 to 312 contain, as an appendix, the comparative history of philosophy. It is evident that either of the two subjects mentioned in the title would have been sufficient to fill a much larger volume.

This density of presentation renders a criticism particularly difficult. It is impossible, in view of the limitations of space, to present the ideas of the book with any adequacy. The reviewer has to content himself with indicating some few fundamental conceptions and strive to point out that a careful study of the work itself is necessary to arrive at an evaluation of the author's endeavors. It seems, therefore, best to refrain from any extensive criticism and to limit this report to an objective, if very incomplete, listing of the author's tenets. His position is new and unusual; it will indubitably arouse controversy, as it has already in Europe.

The main part comprises an introduction and three sections: I. Philosophy as a realm of spirit (*Geistesreich*) and critique of historical reason; II. Philosophy as science and critique of constructive reason; III. Philosophy as anthropology and critique of human reason. This division corresponds to the notion that the "style of philosophy depends on the developmental height of the civilization out of the crisis of which the philosophy emerges." Philosophy achieves its independence in cultural crises. In the Western world may be observed two periods of theological, two of civic (*bürgerlich*), and two of juridical nature. The theological style arose out of the conflict between the knightly and the sacerdotal estates; the civic, out of that between the knights and the commoners; the juridical, out of that between the imperialistic and the nationalistic estates of the community (*Staatsstände*). Each of these periods manifests a tendency to make its peculiar approach absolute, but the typical currents remain nonetheless effective. They are indeed perennial in virtue "of the dialectic of philosophical characters according to the division of psychic powers." Each single period begins as a philosophy of culture, becomes cosmological, and ends as anthropology. This view, conceived first on the basis of an analysis of Occidental philosophy, the author finds confirmed by a study of the Oriental schools, so that he disposes of six theological, two civic, and five juridical styles. The steps mentioned above are paralleled by and, if this reviewer understands the author correctly, dependent upon a shifting from a mode of thought based on social organization in estates, to a mode of thought mirroring the differences in work or calling, with a culmination in personal thought.

Dempf distinguishes, furthermore, seven types of philosophy, elaborating on Dilthey's typology. He enumerates: moral realism (Socrates); mystical realism (Plato); critical realism (Aristotle); subjective idealism (Parmenides); objective idealism (Heraclitus); naturalism (Anaximenes); materialism (Democritus). He further enumerates as corresponding exemplifications among medieval authors: Petrus Hispanus, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Amalric (why Amalric should be viewed as a "subjective idealist" is not clear), Alfredus Anglicus, Roger Bacon (a materialist?—one might perhaps have accepted William of Conches, though with reservation; but Bacon, Oresme, or even Nicholas d'Autrecourt seem doubtful).

The notion of philosophy as a "realm of the spirit" is connected, in the mind of the author, with the political conception of an universal empire. He coins the term "imperiology" and outlines its propositions: victorious invaders found the "old empire" against which arise the hitherto leading strata of civilization and the old religion; in this war of authorities lies the opportunity for the emergence of a theological philosophy. Feudalism is overthrown by the recuperating city-states, and thus is born the first democracy; in this time the civic spirit gives birth to a laic philosophy. A new centralization, the "middle empire," expands so that nationalities begin to play a decisive role, at least in regard to civilization; nationalistic ideologies develop, and the jurist becomes the representative of philosophy. The ideology of the empire finds another antagonist in universal religion (as in Christianity, the higher form of Buddhism, or Islam) which may extend over several "circles of culture" and bring forth a new theological philosophy. The second democracy or the "new empire" have been associated with new philosophies until now only insofar as the restoration of the empire-ideology was accompanied by a renewal of traditional philosophy in India and China.

It has seemed advisable to summarize this particular set of ideas because they are strongly reminiscent of some proposed by other writers. Dempf himself refers, though critically, to the theories of Spengler. He seems not to be acquainted with the work of A. J. Toynbee. The convergence of the latter's ideas (although one cannot speak of any coincidence) and those of the author is not devoid of interest. The observer of recent developments might find therein an indication of certain trends which, perhaps, are common to and characteristic of our days. Dempf believes that his analysis of "historical reason" allows a "higher consideration of history." Previous attempts were based on a more or less onesided emphasis on one or the other cultural aspect. One has, however, to take account of the fact that religious, political, and spiritual cultures always coexist and that there are still further differentiations; as, within religion, into liturgic and mystic, theology and gnosis; or, in politics, into conservative, progressive, and liberal trends; or, in philosophy, into mystical, critical, or moral realism.

"General historiology" appears as a continuation and expansion of "sophiology"; to carry out a thorough critique of human reason "imperiology" and "ecclesiology" would have to be added.

There is no possibility to summarize, in however imperfect manner, the second part on philosophy of science. The critique of "constructive science" rests on the idea that cosmology results from the attempt to found a principle of the development of mankind on a cosmic law; notwithstanding the emphasis on scientific analysis of the universe, cosmology remains primarily a philosophy of life, destined to enable man to retain his place in nature (*Selbstbehauptung*). Cosmology appears in four main forms: spiritual, political, medical, and technical. The tendency for a monistic preference for one definite kind of cosmology is reinforced by the vocational differences (the physician, the ruler, etc.) and, within these frames, by human types, so that predominance of will creates a disposition or predestination for subjective idealism, predominance of intellect one for objective idealism, predominance of imagination one for naturalism, and the type of "calculating rationalists" a disposition to materialism.

What has been said may give a faint idea of Dempf's approach. His goal is no other than a reconstruction of all philosophy and a new vision of the place philosophy holds within the framework of human existence and man's endeavors for an understanding of himself and his history. This intention of the author becomes particularly clear in the third part of the book and in its conclusion. Here, as in many of the preceding sections, it must be realized that the author's enterprise is directed against two antagonists, contemporary positivism and historicism. Dempf opposes to the latter and its conception of a mere relativity of human knowledge, in dependence upon historical circumstances, his idea of a regularity in the sequence of stages. He emphatically denies, however, that his conception is comparable to that of the "materialistic interpretation" of history (Marx) and differs therefrom in replacing economic conditions by those of socio-political development as determinants of all "superstructures." Yet, even though political situations, like the domination by a conquering people, or social factors, as the battle for internal supremacy between the two prior estates and the third, determine the stage of philosophical insight, they leave sufficient freedom for the choice of this or that particular view of reality, man, and God. The same applies to the determination of certain types of philosophy by the individual, psychological make-up or predominant mental powers notwithstanding.

Positivism appears to the author not as a final achievement. Contrary to the well known view of modern positivists, he considers this approach as belonging to the "empirical interval between the beginning of the modern late phase in the evolution of philosophical thought and the latter's final consolidation." Positivism stresses the hopelessness of all philosophical

enterprise which, Dempf admits, has started twelve times in the history of mankind without arriving at definite answers. To the positivist, this failure is one reason more for relying exclusively on the data and methods of "science." Hitherto, however, the way of philosophy has been chosen involuntarily, without a clear vision of the issues at stake. When philosophy understands itself, as Dempf feels it will by viewing its nature and history in the light of his interpretation, things may develop differently. History is determined in its march by three factors: God, Spirit, and Power. Yet, history is intelligible notwithstanding the supra-rationality of Divine Providence and the irrationality of so many human decisions. "The way leads from the order of the family and the history of tribes in pre-cultural stages through the history of states during periods of high culture (*Hochkultur*) to the history of states and of philosophy in the age of fulfilled civilization (*Volkkultur*), and also to the nationalistic-reactionary secondary civilizations. But, the final goal remains firmly the same: one world-religion, perennial philosophy, and the federation of all peoples."

The belief in the power of science as sole remedy, characteristic of the nineteenth century, has suffered shipwreck. The recent progress in biology has pointed out anew the existence of inescapable metaphysical problems. The "human studies" (*Geisteswissenschaften*) have demonstrated the fallacies back of rashly constructed monisms. The comparative history of philosophy results in a systematic exposition of the main ways to ensure truth: by starting from intellect and the natures of things, from spirit and values, from reason and principles. (The distinction of intellect and reason is, apparently, that of Kant between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.)

All monistic interpretations prove insufficient because they make one of the strata into an absolute. The differentiation of being into several strata must be considered in each of the branches of philosophy. In epistemology, one cannot separate the theory of the objects from that of the powers, nor treat logic without considering the phenomenology and metaphysics of natures, structures, and principles.

Dempf sees in language and its primordial coinings a proof for the capacity of the human mind to attain a true view of the world. The cosmological realism of all periods has brought forth a true idea. It has, however, been falsified subsequently under special social conditions (predominance of certain "callings").

Dempf's work culminates in a program and a prophecy or a call for a new orientation of all philosophical and cultural endeavors. There is no doubt that this work is the expression of serious and penetrating reasoning, based on an amazing wealth of information. It should be given full attention. It is obviously written with the honest will to stay within the boundaries of Catholic faith. Whether all its basic notions are truly compatible with these tenets will have to be shown by careful analysis. It

should not be overlooked that for Dempf the *philosophia perennis* is not a static thing but a living and dynamically unfolding process. A criticism, therefore, which would be satisfied to point out the differences between Dempf's views and the teachings of Aquinas would not be, in the first instance, appropriate.

This work is obviously the precursor of further studies. It would be prudent to reserve a final judgment until these other texts are available. Yet, the present work deserves careful study. Even were it nothing more, it is highly provocative and stimulating. The approach is original, the ideas worthy of serious consideration. Unfortunately, the book will hardly lend itself to translation; it must be read as it is. Anyone so doing will not fail to derive great profit.

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*The Fall of the Spanish American Empire.* By Salvador de Madariaga.  
New York: Macmillan, 1948. Pp. 450, with index. \$5.00.

Mr. Madariaga has done the English-speaking world a service by devoting his talents to the interpretation of Spanish civilization—a great task, to say the least—in terms that are meaningful to people of Anglo-Saxon mentality. Spain has been treated very shabbily in the past, as Mr. Madariaga is well aware, and the Anglo-Saxon bias against Spain, which probably stems from religious and political considerations, is taking a long time to die out. Needless to say, Mr. Madariaga has not alone been responsible for the healthier climate of opinion that now exists toward Spain in England and the United States, but his books, because of their widespread appeal, and because they are withal the work of a man of uncommon intellectual stature, have contributed greatly to that end. His contribution, it should be observed, has not been made within the accepted academic tradition of historical writing, nor has it added anything significant to the reservoir of material in the field of Spanish and Spanish-American history; Mr. Madariaga is not a research scholar as the term is understood today. Yet he has the rare facility of interpreting and explaining history very well, and his books, however unacademic they may be, richly deserve a place on the shelf of even the old-fashioned, ponderous scholar (for whom, incidentally, they were not written).

Like the one which immediately preceded it, Mr. Madariaga's present book is designed to serve as an introduction to a proposed study on Simón Bolívar, the commanding figure of the independence movement in Spanish South America. The first two parts are devoted to "The Soul of the Indies" and "Internal Origins of the Secession." In these sections

the author analyzes better than I have seen it done elsewhere the socio-logical elements of colonial life, particularly from the point of view of race, and he includes a chapter on the spirit of criticism which developed in the eighteenth century among Spaniards and Creoles alike. Part III is entitled "External Origins of the Secession." There is an excellent chapter on the influence of the four philosophers of the movement for independence: Rousseau, Voltaire, Raynal, and Montesquieu. In other chapters the Jews, Freemasons, and Jesuits (as the result of their expulsion in 1767) are treated as factors in the disintegration of the Spanish Empire, the Jews least convincingly. There are still other chapters on the influence of the American and French Revolutions and of the revolt of the Negroes of Haiti against their white masters. Part IV, "Beggars for Independence," is largely a spirited account of the career of Francisco de Miranda, the greatest precursor of independence in Spanish America. In an epilogue the author blames the Bourbons and their exaggerated centralization for contributing to the break-up of the empire, as did the late Cecil Jane, and blames also the Spanish character, which, in the case of the Liberators, will explain, as he says, why their actions were more passionate than realistic.

Although the author has exposed the interplay of forces that made possible the overthrow of the Spanish empire, one hardly feels that the Spanish character as a factor in the *débâcle* deserves as much attention as he has given to it. We are willing to agree that the Creoles who won independence were, in a sense, victims of their own Spanish character, but what of the men of the same character, conquerors and colonizers of Spanish America, who achieved a difficult job with exceeding competence? If it is true that the play of Spanish character led to disaster at a critical moment in the history of the empire, the phenomenon is in itself significant. And it poses questions whose answers might better be found in Spain herself, rather than in the colonies and France. Mr. Madariaga shows clearly that the Pyrenees were ineffectual as a barrier to hold back the subversive doctrines of France, but one wonders whether the barrier was pierced by the *philosophes* or by the unsatisfied spirit of the Spaniards themselves. Why was Spain a willing prey to French thought? Had Spanish genius dried up to the extent that it no longer had anything to say? Had Scholasticism gone to seed? Liberalism, it is true, played havoc with the Spanish mind, in Europe as in America, but it must be admitted that the new ideas fell like rain on a soil that thirsted for water. Mr. Madariaga does not tell us what went wrong with traditional and Catholic Spain. He is content to give us a glimpse of a so-called Catholic country ruled or influenced in the eighteenth century by Freemasons, Regalists, Jansenists, Physiocrats, and the "New Philosophy." Was the Church partly to blame? The Bourbons? The Inquisition? The economic policies? If Mr. Madariaga had speculated more on these things he might have been able to tell us more

clearly just how the shattering of the unity of Spanish "soul" in Spain paved the way for the acceptance of the idea of independence on the part of the colonies.

Although Mr. Madariaga (and we think unfortunately) does not dwell at length upon these problems, he does make public, in his dramatic and fascinating way, what the esoteric circle has known right along, that the Spanish empire did not break up as the result of the ignorance of the Spanish Americans, or the blighting effect of the Inquisition, or the repression of the authorities, or the cruelty of the Spaniards to the Indians, or any of the romantic reasons advanced by the Creole leaders of the independence movement, who were trying to gain sympathy in England and France even at the risk of having to tell patriotic lies. In *The Fall of the Spanish American Empire*, Mr. Madariaga has in this regard done for England and the United States what M. Marius André did for France in his *La Fin de l'Empire Espagnol d'Amérique*, but Mr. Madariaga has done it in a more exciting manner.

Even so, the results are at times uneven. Mr. Madariaga has blind spots in his love for Spain, and these color at times his objectivity. His Castilian imperialism, of the kind so well described by Fidelino de Figueiredo, leads him at times into the absurdity of wishful thinking. He would like to see the map of the Iberian Peninsula of one color, a thing which Castilian imperialists have at various times tried to achieve; he is peeved at what he calls Portuguese "separatism," and begrudges the independence of Portugal as though the Portuguese were recalcitrant relatives cheating Castilian heirs out of what rightly belongs to them. Toward Spanish America his feelings are mixed. He admires the fecundity of Spain in the New World, but regrets the circumstances that kept Spain's American children from forming part of a great Spanish commonwealth. He laments the fragmentation of the Hispanic world and, by extension, its ineffectualness; he believes that the shattering of the "Spanish pomegranate" was a mistake. The book suffers here and there from these personal attitudes, yet the author's disciplined mind does not allow them to get out of bounds.

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*Society as the Patient. Essays on Culture and Personality.* By LAWRENCE E. FRANK. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1948. Pp. 395. \$5.00.

This is a collection of essays which appeared in various journals from 1916 to 1946. The essays range over the field of economics, law, sociology, mental hygiene, and education, emphasizing what their author calls "the

psycho-cultural approach" to the problems of man in society. The dominant ideas are those of Darwin, Freud, and Dewey.

Man is seen as nothing more than a product of organic evolution who rose above the level of other animals through the development of a large brain which made it impossible for him to be content with the mere satisfaction of his organic drives. This condition coupled with the experience of boredom impelled humanity to develop cultures and socialized patterns of living that distinguish man from the other animals and gave him an area of freedom and control over the compulsions of his biological nature. Culture and institutions, according to Frank, are human creations, products of history, whose only justification is their ability to satisfy human needs and desires in a completely this-worldly perspective. Science has made all the older views of man's nature and destiny (including the Christian) obsolete, by showing that the earth is not the center of the universe and man not a rational animal but a descendant of mammalian ancestry, chiefly impelled by feelings and emotions. Frank believes there is no longer any room for the traditional concept of man as an individually responsible agent, since man has no "fixed" nature and his "personality" is itself a creation of socially inculcated ways of thinking and behaving. He expresses the Freudian view that very many of the problems of society are to be traced to the warped personalities produced by harsh childhood training in eating and elimination habits. Such childhood training produces resentment, a desire to "get even" with others and to exploit them, and accounts for the competitive behavior of the business and political leaders of our society. The author will surprise some readers by his contention that Freud's theory of human nature is not pessimistic and that "his portrayal of the process of personality development in infancy and childhood has provided the most effective support for the ethics of Jesus: the injunction to love little children" (p. 165).

Frank subscribes to the naively optimistic faith in human progress which for many of our contemporaries continues (despite repeated and cruel deceptions, one would think) to replace the Christian view of human life. He admits that "a short time perspective means only eat, drink, be merry, for tomorrow we die" (p. 355), yet two pages later he states the view that man's highest objective is to live in a timeless present such as can be achieved through the experience of sex and through esthetic enjoyment (p. 357 f.). He sees that a free society needs self-discipline and a high standard of ethics but considers the Christian "epic" outmoded by science. He is aware that men who discard the Christian creed need something to take its place. For him as for many other "post-Christian" intellectuals there is the problem of how to maintain most of the Christian code of behavior despite the rejection of Christian belief which he mistakenly identifies with Ptolemaic astronomy and a Fundamentalist under-

standing of the Bible. A truer understanding of what Christian belief really is would dissipate that problem. Frank believes a substitute for the Christian creed can be found in "a statement of the *meaning* (his italics) of scientific knowledge in terms of its emotional significance for living, so that modern astronomy, geology and biology will provide the equivalent of 'now I lay me down to sleep,' in which the traditional cosmology, biology, and psychology were expressed" (p. 284).

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*Between Man and Man.* By Martin Buber (translated by R. G. Smith).

New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948. Pp. 218, with index. \$3.50.

Martin Buber, formerly of Frankfurt University, is presently Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The English version of his *I and Thou* appeared in 1937. Its theme is amplified in *Between Man and Man*, which is a collection of five works, brought together for English readers and felicitously translated by Ronald G. Smith.

The works cover the years from 1925 to 1939 and include *Dialogue* (1929), *The Question to the Single One* (1936), two addresses on problems of education, one given in 1925 and the other in 1939, and finally Dr. Buber's inaugural course of lectures at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1938). *Between Man and Man* is not likely to dim the reputation of this foremost Jewish philosopher and mystic; whether it fulfills the expectation of clarifying his thought is another question.

The unifying thread of the collection is what Dr. Buber calls the "dialogical principle." Its gist seems to be that in trying to fathom the significance of man, one must begin with neither the individual nor with the collectivity of human beings, but "only with the reality of the mutual relation between man and man." Dr. Buber insists that this relation cannot be expressed in words. Yet it is not of the mystical order, nor explicable in terms of tenderness or eroticism. In fact, the author says it cannot be conveyed in ideas to a reader, but only illustrated by examples drawn from personal life. The success of his examples may be judged from his concluding words: "No more knowing is needed. For where unreserve has ruled, even wordlessly, between men, the word of dialogue has happened sacramentally." (p. 4)

The author's thought is perhaps clearer when, more concretely, he speaks of the Word of God. "We expect," he writes, "a theophany of which we know nothing but the place, and the place is called community. In the public catacombs of this expectation there is no single God's Word which

can be clearly known and advocated, but the words delivered are clarified for us in our human situation of being turned to one another. There is no obedience to the coming one without loyalty to his creature. To have experienced this is our way." (p. 7)

In such a process differences of faith are inherent. They are lodged, according to Dr. Buber, in the ever-changing human scene. Dogma, even when its claims of origin are certain, proves itself highly effective armor against revelation. For revelation tolerates no perfect tense. So the author declares that as nothing can so hide the face of our fellow-man as morality, so religion can hide from us as nothing else can the face of God.

Yet even in the face of such relativism and subjectivism Dr. Buber clings firmly to truth—understood, of course, in his own unique way. He traces the ills of the time to persons being collectivized and to truth being politicized. "There is need of man's faith in the truth as that which is independent of him, which he cannot acquire for himself, but with which he can enter into a real relation of his very life; the faith of human persons in the truth as that which sustains them all altogether, in itself inaccessible but disclosing itself, in the fact of responsibility which awaits test, to him who really woos the truth." (p. 82)

*Between Man and Man* rejects collectivism which swallows the individual just as trenchantly as it criticizes the individualism of Kierkegaard's "Single One." Creatures, as Dr. Buber eloquently explains, are not hurdles on the road to God. They are the road itself, ". . . placed in my way so that I, their fellow-creature, by means of them and with them (may) find the way to God. A God reached by their exclusion would not be the God of all lives in whom all life is fulfilled." (p. 52)

Dr. Buber carries the "dialogical principle" into his philosophy of education. Here the aim cannot be merely the training of the instinct of origination but rather the building of true human life through the indispensable forms of learning to share in an undertaking and to enter into mutuality. Otherwise man stands "wholly without bonds in the echoing hall of his deeds." And only "if someone grasps his hand not as a 'creator' but as a fellow-creature lost in the world, to be his comrade or friend or lover beyond the arts, does he have an awareness and a share of mutuality." (p. 87) Genuine education of character is education for community. In this is man's unity, and "the educator who helps to bring man back to his own unity will help to put him again face to face with God." (p. 116-117)

Significantly *Between Man and Man* opens with a dream; unfortunately it seems never to escape entirely from that atmosphere. Dr. Buber postulates a real world. But his "real" appears a far cry from the rationally vindicable of his classic progenitors. In Dr. Buber's work there is no appeal to formal demonstration. The author rests his case in capable criticism of opponents

and in multiplying assertions of the "dialogical principle," or the real relation between men.

Since relation is indeed a category of real being and the union of human beings one which deserves most loving study, there is much in *Between Man and Man* to win respect and admiration. But the author's preoccupation with this one category produces a distorted view not only of man but of the universe and his relations to it.

A partial explanation of Dr. Buber's position is his dissatisfaction with Kant and Kierkegaard and contemporary fallacies which sacrifice man's social nature to his individuality or lose his individuality in some collectivism. Likewise, although Dr. Buber may be a mystic, he has been energetic for years in the cause of Zionism. The essence of such a movement is cohesion, and Dr. Buber's efforts to foster close human relations undoubtedly colored his metaphysics.

On this score Dr. Buber has waged a brilliant and persevering crusade. Yet it is regrettable that he evidences so little of the perepatetic rationalism of such Jews as Gabirol and Maimonides. Possibly, however, the author has an intimation of a vision undreamed of by Aristotle and the "philosophers." *Between Man and Man* may leave some readers with the impression that Dr. Buber is groping for a truth found nowhere else than in the Christian doctrine of the Mystical Body.

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## BRIEF NOTICES

*Natuurwetenschap en Wijsbegeerte* (Science and Philosophy). By A. G. M. VAN MELSEN. Bibliothek v. Thomistische Wijsbegeerte. Spectrum, Utrecht-Brussels: Spectrum, 1946. Pp. 204, with index.

The subtitle of this volume reads: "General consideration of the relation of philosophy and science, the philosophical consequences of modern physics." The author states at the very beginning of his discussion, that he takes his stand with Thomistic philosophy; but he wants to present his ideas without presupposing any particular views. He intends his work mainly for the scientist who might be curious to know about the philosophical relevance of his own doings and theories. Many scientists and philosophers today believe that philosophy ought to revise all its tenets in the light of recent developments in science and that the former has no more urgent task than that of taking account of the new discoveries and ideas. It has been pointed out, however, by some thinkers that no discovery in the field of science can disprove any fundamental tenet of metaphysics nor force the philosopher to alter any of his general propositions. Those who claim that philosophy must change because of discoveries made by the physicist are still under the impression aroused by the attitude philosophy assumed at the time when the "new science" appeared on the stage. At that time, the philosophers were indeed, almost without exception, unable to distinguish between the truly philosophical problems and propositions and those which depend on the state of scientific knowledge. Those philosophers believed that by abandoning the view of physics as proposed by Aristotle one would abandon also the whole of Aristotelian philosophy. When science apparently proved victorious, both sides—the scientists and the philosophers—came to believe that speculation depends on physics. Today too, we are told by many that the new physics, like the theory of relativity, or the mechanics of quanta, or the latest developments in nuclear investigations will force the philosopher to rebuild his systems.

The author of the book under discussion, however, arrives at a very different conclusion. In his summary he declares in so many words that "the importance of modern physics does not lie in the field of philosophy but in that of science." He realizes that he thus opposes two parties: the positivistic school by denying the relevance of scientific data for the basic questions of philosophy, and other philosophers, among whom a certain group also of Thomistic thinkers who refuse to recognize the scientific relevance of the new developments and hence the necessity to modify,

not of course the tenets of metaphysics, but some doctrines in the philosophy of nature or in cosmology.

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with the general relations of science and philosophy, emphasizing the peculiar nature and the inevitability of metaphysical speculation (man is "born a metaphysician"). The second part reviews the recent developments in physics, first the theory of quanta and its eventual bearing on philosophy. The alleged relevance of this chapter in modern physics is seen by many in its contradicting or even abolishing the principle of causality and in the introduction of statistics, whereby the infallible laws of classic physics appear as replaced by statistical laws. The author points out that the changes in the system of concepts and categories, used by science and imposed thereupon by recent developments, concerns only science and does not attain the level of metaphysical problems. To this reviewer it has seemed always a rather curious fact that a remark made by one of the fathers of both modern physics and positivistic philosophy, namely E. Mach, has been given so little emphasis in all these discussions. Mach, speaking of causality, remarks that this is in no way a question to concern the scientist, who does not deal with causes at all, but only with mathematical functions, stating the concomitant variations of several sets of phenomena. Retaining the causalistic terminology in science is, in fact, something of an "anthropomorphic" attitude, similar to that which Heisenberg justly criticizes when referring to the problem of the so-called primary and secondary qualities. No change of principle or of categories, eventuating in physics, can have any bearing on the philosophy of causation, because science is incapable, in virtue of its methodology, to make any statement on causation.

The author then proceeds to discuss the problems related to the theory of relativity. The mode of evaluation corresponds to that employed in the analysis of the theory of quanta. The relativization of time is, so to say, an affair of physics; it has nothing to do with metaphysics. The author might have added that the time which is truly relevant in human existence is not even that of pre-relativistic physics, not that which is measured by chronometric devices, but the "lived time," the *temps vécu*, as the French aptly call it. This time lacks some of the fundamental characteristics of chronometric time; the time in which each of us lives is not of constant velocity, because it may slow down in expectancy or boredom, and become accelerated when we are amused or interested, or by other factors, as e. g. by some drugs; nor does this time, secondly, flow in an uninterrupted, continuous manner, since in experience there is an extended "now"—something analogical to the *nunc stans*—whereas chronometric time knows of no extended present; the present in chronometry is a dimensionless point where the future is continuously swallowed up by the past.

All statements on relativity, however important they be within physics, are without importance when we try to apply them to our personal experience and existence.

This little book deserves study. One regrets that the author is sometimes all too brief in his demonstrations, and particularly the absence of an index. But, as it stands, this work is a very good introduction into the problems discussed and might, perhaps, deserve translation. To this reviewer, at least, no comparable work is known in English.

*The Canticle of Canticles.* By WILLIAM POUGET, C.M. and JEAN GUITTON.  
(Translated by Joseph L. Lilly, C. M.) New York: The Declan X. McMullen Company Inc., 1948. Pp. 201. \$3.00.

Up to the present there has been no entirely satisfactory solution to the problems connected with the interpretation of the Canticle of Canticles. Perhaps there never will. Among the more serious recent attempts to consider all the problems involved and to blend into a consistent whole all the available data must be numbered the work of Pouget and Guitton, of which Father Lilly now gives us a good translation. The original French of this volume appeared in 1934 and proved itself provocative and useful. However it cannot be said to be a definitive solution. Other solutions retain their plausibility.

The first part of this volume (pp. 19-166) considers in turn the literary, historical, moral, and mystical problems of the Canticle. With commendable restraint the authors present or suggest arguments of different degrees of clarity and probability for their points of view. The following are some of their conclusions. The Canticle was probably composed by an unknown author between 285 and 220 B. C. (p. 89.) But "philological and historical research may lead to a revision of the date we have proposed, since this is the most debatable point in our argument." (p. 165.) The Canticle is not a collection of songs, but a unit. Specifically it is a drama, though probably never produced. There are *three* main characters: the Shulamite, a country maiden; the King (not the Solomon of history), who seeks to win the Shulamite's love; the Shepherd, who is the Shulamite's spouse, and to whom she remains faithful, despite the blandishments of Solomon (pp. 17-69.)

The proper literal sense, intended by the human author, was a moral lesson on matrimony. "The precept which the Canticle illustrates is the indissolubility of marriage and the duty of conjugal fidelity. The counsels which it suggests are of two kinds: that the social rank of the contracting parties agree, and that the consent be entirely free." (p. 97.) However, although the literal sense is unique (p. 136), other senses, which seem to be

literal, are possible. "We are inclined to believe that its interpretation passed through three stages, which were virtually present from the beginning as a germ planted by inspiration. In its first phase it was a work of the imagination, an historical and lyrical drama, designed to give a lesson on conjugal fidelity. It soon became a parable whose chief aspect was to illustrate the love of Yahweh for his people. And finally it was an allegory, when the literal sense was neglected, and when the parabolic sense was forgotten, and a treatise on spiritual mysticism was drawn from the sacred verses." (p. 124.) The authors consider the traditional interpretation of the Canticle, the union of God and His People: Israel and the Church (the Blessed Virgin, Virgins), to be the spiritual sense of the Canticle (p. 141 ff.)

The second part of the book (pp. 167-196) contains the text of the Canticle, arranged in the form of a drama in twelve scenes, with suitable annotations. This arrangement will probably prove itself the most definitive part of the book for those who consider the Canticle a unit.

This is the first publication of The Catholic Scripture Library, a new enterprise of The Catholic Biblical Association of America. The purpose of the series is to make available in English translations Scriptural works written in other languages. This is an auspicious beginning. We look forward to the forthcoming volumes.

*The Poetry of History.* By EMERY NEFF. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. 266, with index. \$3.50.

The person who follows the tantalizingly elusive figure of Clio through academic halls is apt to be cautioned, here and there in his pursuits, that he must avoid two pitfalls: he must refrain from presenting the account of his labors in a dull, dry, factual volume, and he must guard rigorously against introducing too much interpretation and imagination into any written accounts. As a natural result, the average historical writer falls into one or other of the errors against which he has been cautioned, usually into the former one. Some writers resent the assumption, induced by a plethora of the factual-history type of volume, that this approach to historical scholarship is inevitable. In an attempt to express the possibilities which may be found in other approaches, Emery Neff has written a series of essays about great authors whose preoccupation was with *The Poetry of History*, as he has titled this volume.

The essays include considerations of Voltaire, Herder, Goethe, Gibbon, Vico, Carlyle, Burckhardt, and Green, to mention the most familiar names. With these, as well as with the half-dozen or more others who are treated, Professor Neff has given very useful outlines of the careers and writings of each. In many cases his treatment presupposes some slight familiarity with the author considered, but for the most part this familiarity could be acquired by referring to an encyclopedia article or two. Readers who

have even this much knowledge of the writers treated would not need any further introduction than Neff's concise, beautifully phrased biographies and brief appraisals of works. These appraisals are too well done and evince too much familiarity and affection for the authors and their works to be dismissed cavalierly as capsule criticism.

In form the book is all that might be desired. The type-face is attractive; the margins are just comfortably wide; the index is excellent, and there is a brief, helpful foreword. The volume is dedicated to those who believe that knowledge is one and indivisible, and because the book seems, from its title through its last sentence, to belie this dedication, some few remarks must be made after these words of praise have been indited.

There is, in the first place, a certain lack of fitness in Professor Neff's title. History surely is poetic; it can be so in the hands of great historians, but what Neff means by history is not what the bewildered seeker of Clio means at all. To explain his viewpoint, then, the essayist adds an overlong subtitle which declares that the book is concerned with the contribution of literature and literary scholarship to the writing of history since Voltaire. Such contributions certainly ought to be investigated, and, if found, ought to be evaluated, but not under the title chosen for this work. Nothing in the title would indicate that the work is not concerned with history proper; almost nothing in the table of contents would indicate that history was being considered. Clearly the title, though a happy choice on grounds of euphony and meter, does not live up to the first requirement of good titles.

No one could doubt Mr. Neff's qualifications for evaluating most of the persons he has chosen to consider. In the case of Carlyle he had already written two volumes, and his investigations of English and European literature have been extensive. Whether he knows equally as much about historical scholarship and its problems is, however, extremely problematical. To assess the value of Voltaire to French or world literature is one thing; to determine his contributions to historical writing demands critical apparatus of a much more specialized kind. In this group of essays, then, one has frequently the feeling that mere impressions are substituted for considered judgments, that a genuine feeling for the color and richness of words is expected to supply for a deficient knowledge of facts.

Nineteenth-century English history was hampered considerably in its development by an amateur interest in antiquarian research. Intuition was thought to compensate for lack of careful training, and enthusiasm for the failure to make reasonable hypotheses. Mr. Neff's insistence upon regarding contributions of literature to history as constituting the latter's poetry are much like this earlier attitude.

A far more serious defect to one who has devoted an appreciable time to the study of history is that the really poetic approaches of Guizot and Thiers, of Adams and Mommsen, even of Toynbee at the present day, or

the stylistically hampered but poetically minded Acton, are totally ignored, and such a major figure as Ranke is relegated to a few brief mentions, almost all of them merely names. The regrettable feature of this series of omissions lies not in the failure of the names to appear, but in the complete and insular ignorance that these people belong to literary history as well as to history proper, just as the ones considered belong to literary history and to literature proper. In a book which has such a promising title and such a soundly expressed dedication, not to mention the famous dictum of Trevelyan to act as a colophon, there is displayed much erudition, but in the wrong cause. The votary of Clio will never be helped by Mr. Neff's work unless he ignores its pretensions, and concentrates upon its pleasantly presented facts.

*Die Krisis des Fortschrittsglaubens* (The Crisis of the Belief in Progress). By ALOIS DEMPF. Vienna: Herder, 1947. Pp. 40. S 3; s fr. 1.80.

The subtitle of this pamphlet is: "Aphorism on the spiritual situation." Progress, in the analysis of Dr. Dempf, as it has been achieved and exclusively appreciated during the nineteenth century became possible because the inner tension or dialectic of Christian faith had been forgotten, and man either trusted himself and believed in self-redemption, or relied on grace alone. The effect was the predominance of materialistic atheism, born out of science and the belief of its universal applicability. Scientific and technological advance was in no way paralleled by moral progress. In recent times there have been fundamental changes in physics, biology, medicine, and sociology. There is a rebirth of philosophy which twenty years ago seemed doomed to disappear.

Yet, progress, especially in science, carries with itself the danger of increasing license for evil. Insecurity and greater responsibility are the price mankind has to pay for progress. The complacency of bourgeois intellectualism has given way to a sentiment of dread. Progress in the old sense became questionable and was replaced by the belief in an inevitable law of historical development. Those who did not accept this doctrine began to doubt the reality of any progress, to discredit everything related to the older conception, to preach violence and appeal to such irrational powers as those of the race.

Today, some real progress becomes noticeable. Liberals, socialists, and Christian democrats have learned to criticize their own views, to abandon narrow party programs. Dempf considers Lippman as the outstanding representative of a neo-liberalism, together with Hayek and Röpke; whereas the neo-socialist movement is best studied in Schumpeter's work, and the new Christian democratic doctrine, best to be characterized as neo-solidarism, finds its spokesman in Christopher Dawson. Dempf visualizes a restoration of Christian unity, wherein the modern sociology of religion

will prove helpful. A thorough understanding of Professor Dempf's ideas is possible only in the background of his peculiar theory of the dependence of philosophical and cultural developments on social developments. (He has devoted to the exposition of his view a larger volume, reviewed on page 112 ff.)

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